From 64841a9004a68be27ce9a161c6e9565d0eff33b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damjan Marion Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 17:41:16 +0100 Subject: crypto-native: avoid mem overflow when loading IV Type: improvement Change-Id: I946d91e67c332ecac0b09d50980529b9d4e74f9c Signed-off-by: Damjan Marion --- src/plugins/crypto_native/aes_gcm.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/plugins/crypto_native/aes_gcm.c b/src/plugins/crypto_native/aes_gcm.c index 09bb06f1994..dde8ab34ee6 100644 --- a/src/plugins/crypto_native/aes_gcm.c +++ b/src/plugins/crypto_native/aes_gcm.c @@ -1018,17 +1018,17 @@ aes_gcm_dec (u8x16 T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, aes_gcm_counter_t * ctr, } static_always_inline int -aes_gcm (u8x16u * in, u8x16u * out, u8x16u * addt, u8x16u * iv, u8x16u * tag, - u32 data_bytes, u32 aad_bytes, u8 tag_len, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, +aes_gcm (u8x16u *in, u8x16u *out, u8x16u *addt, u8 *ivp, u8x16u *tag, + u32 data_bytes, u32 aad_bytes, u8 tag_len, aes_gcm_key_data_t *kd, int aes_rounds, int is_encrypt) { int i; u8x16 r, T = { }; - u32x4 Y0; + vec128_t Y0 = {}; ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd; aes_gcm_counter_t _ctr, *ctr = &_ctr; - clib_prefetch_load (iv); + clib_prefetch_load (ivp); clib_prefetch_load (in); clib_prefetch_load (in + 4); @@ -1042,11 +1042,13 @@ aes_gcm (u8x16u * in, u8x16u * out, u8x16u * addt, u8x16u * iv, u8x16u * tag, /* initalize counter */ ctr->counter = 1; - Y0 = (u32x4) aes_load_partial (iv, 12) + ctr_inv_1; + Y0.as_u64x2[0] = *(u64u *) ivp; + Y0.as_u32x4[2] = *(u32u *) (ivp + 8); + Y0.as_u32x4 += ctr_inv_1; #ifdef __VAES__ - ctr->Y4 = u32x16_splat_u32x4 (Y0) + ctr_inv_1234; + ctr->Y4 = u32x16_splat_u32x4 (Y0.as_u32x4) + ctr_inv_1234; #else - ctr->Y = Y0 + ctr_inv_1; + ctr->Y = Y0.as_u32x4 + ctr_inv_1; #endif /* ghash and encrypt/edcrypt */ @@ -1064,7 +1066,7 @@ aes_gcm (u8x16u * in, u8x16u * out, u8x16u * addt, u8x16u * iv, u8x16u * tag, /* interleaved computation of final ghash and E(Y0, k) */ ghash_mul_first (gd, r ^ T, kd->Hi[NUM_HI - 1]); - r = kd->Ke[0] ^ (u8x16) Y0; + r = kd->Ke[0] ^ Y0.as_u8x16; for (i = 1; i < 5; i += 1) r = aes_enc_round (r, kd->Ke[i]); ghash_reduce (gd); @@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ aes_ops_enc_aes_gcm (vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[], next: kd = (aes_gcm_key_data_t *) cm->key_data[op->key_index]; aes_gcm ((u8x16u *) op->src, (u8x16u *) op->dst, (u8x16u *) op->aad, - (u8x16u *) op->iv, (u8x16u *) op->tag, op->len, op->aad_len, + (u8 *) op->iv, (u8x16u *) op->tag, op->len, op->aad_len, op->tag_len, kd, AES_KEY_ROUNDS (ks), /* is_encrypt */ 1); op->status = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_COMPLETED; @@ -1137,8 +1139,8 @@ aes_ops_dec_aes_gcm (vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[], u32 n_ops, next: kd = (aes_gcm_key_data_t *) cm->key_data[op->key_index]; rv = aes_gcm ((u8x16u *) op->src, (u8x16u *) op->dst, (u8x16u *) op->aad, - (u8x16u *) op->iv, (u8x16u *) op->tag, op->len, - op->aad_len, op->tag_len, kd, AES_KEY_ROUNDS (ks), + (u8 *) op->iv, (u8x16u *) op->tag, op->len, op->aad_len, + op->tag_len, kd, AES_KEY_ROUNDS (ks), /* is_encrypt */ 0); if (rv) -- cgit 1.2.3-korg