From 44ec846f4ad1c11cc596c9fa6b73284511131ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Chernavin Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 10:48:56 +0000 Subject: wireguard: add processing of received cookie messages Type: feature Currently, if a handshake message is sent and a cookie message is received in reply, the cookie message will be ignored. Thus, further handshake messages will not have valid mac2 and handshake will not be able to be completed. With this change, process received cookie messages to be able to calculate mac2 for further handshake messages sent. Cover this with tests. Signed-off-by: Alexander Chernavin Change-Id: I6d51459778b7145be7077badec479b2aa85960b9 --- src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c (limited to 'src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c') diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..961b43f100d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Rubicon Communications, LLC. + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at: + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +bool +wg_chacha20poly1305_calc (vlib_main_t *vm, u8 *src, u32 src_len, u8 *dst, + u8 *aad, u32 aad_len, u64 nonce, + vnet_crypto_op_id_t op_id, + vnet_crypto_key_index_t key_index) +{ + vnet_crypto_op_t _op, *op = &_op; + u8 iv[12]; + u8 tag_[NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN] = {}; + u8 src_[] = {}; + + clib_memset (iv, 0, 12); + clib_memcpy (iv + 4, &nonce, sizeof (nonce)); + + vnet_crypto_op_init (op, op_id); + + op->tag_len = NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; + if (op_id == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC) + { + op->tag = src + src_len - NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; + src_len -= NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; + op->flags |= VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_HMAC_CHECK; + } + else + op->tag = tag_; + + op->src = !src ? src_ : src; + op->len = src_len; + + op->dst = dst; + op->key_index = key_index; + op->aad = aad; + op->aad_len = aad_len; + op->iv = iv; + + vnet_crypto_process_ops (vm, op, 1); + if (op_id == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC) + { + clib_memcpy (dst + src_len, op->tag, NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN); + } + + return (op->status == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_COMPLETED); +} + +bool +wg_xchacha20poly1305_decrypt (vlib_main_t *vm, u8 *src, u32 src_len, u8 *dst, + u8 *aad, u32 aad_len, + u8 nonce[XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE], + u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int ret, i; + u32 derived_key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE / sizeof (u32)]; + u64 h_nonce; + + clib_memcpy (&h_nonce, nonce + 16, sizeof (h_nonce)); + h_nonce = le64toh (h_nonce); + hchacha20 (derived_key, nonce, key); + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof (derived_key) / sizeof (derived_key[0])); i++) + (derived_key[i]) = htole32 ((derived_key[i])); + + uint32_t key_idx; + + key_idx = + vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + (uint8_t *) derived_key, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE); + + ret = + wg_chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, src_len, dst, aad, aad_len, h_nonce, + VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC, key_idx); + + vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx); + wg_secure_zero_memory (derived_key, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * fd.io coding-style-patch-verification: ON + * + * Local Variables: + * eval: (c-set-style "gnu") + * End: + */ -- cgit 1.2.3-korg