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authorPeter Mikus <pmikus@cisco.com>2019-08-09 07:48:43 +0000
committerTibor Frank <tifrank@cisco.com>2019-08-09 08:30:53 +0000
commitc5e04c68e8361be8c7deac912a4d676492099629 (patch)
tree4be7ff1b964b8c0d4f7f132afa1b6c5b007a003b /docs
parent16a6033e5405020d8ae2f52906596476784d25dd (diff)
DOC: rls1908 static content
Signed-off-by: Peter Mikus <pmikus@cisco.com> Change-Id: Ia0778acc543a51fe85b8a75162f12905badaa382 (cherry picked from commit ce1c52b1fd27d3e2b6c4909219fa98418565ba61)
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
-rw-r--r--docs/fdio_csit_dev_plan.txt84
-rw-r--r--docs/report/csit_framework_documentation/csit_design.rst1
-rw-r--r--docs/report/dmm_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst4
-rw-r--r--docs/report/dpdk_performance_tests/test_environment.rst8
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/methodology_kvm_vms_vhost_user.rst28
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/methodology_trex_traffic_generator.rst4
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/methodology_vpp_device_functional.rst10
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_2.rst38
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst9
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_dnv.rst255
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_hsw.rst244
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_skx.rst244
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_environment_tg.rst2
-rw-r--r--docs/report/introduction/test_scenarios_overview.rst22
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_device_tests/csit_release_notes.rst8
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_device_tests/overview.rst21
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_device_tests/test_environment.rst573
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst42
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/overview.rst47
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/csit_release_notes.rst67
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/overview.rst6
-rw-r--r--docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/test_environment.rst7
-rw-r--r--docs/vpp-device.rst534
23 files changed, 1054 insertions, 1204 deletions
diff --git a/docs/fdio_csit_dev_plan.txt b/docs/fdio_csit_dev_plan.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index acf01657fb..0000000000
--- a/docs/fdio_csit_dev_plan.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-fdio_csit_dev_plan.txt - DRAFT
-
-FD.io CSIT High-Level Development Plan
-======================================
-
-Proposed Work Organisation
---------------------------
-
-* Each work area is covered by owners.
- - Technical Lead (TL) - overall responsibility incl. design, detailed
- work plan, DT coordination, managing dependencies.
- - Development Team (DT) - doing work following the TL.
- - Project Lead (PL) - involved in all work areas at higher level,
- focusing on requirements definitions, design and work reviews,
- acceptance.
- - For work areas with large number of deliverables there could be
- multiple TLs e.g. for operations, framework or test refactor.
- - FD.io CSIT owners' initials listed with suffix strings:
- "[TL;DT1..DTn;PL]", contact details at the end of this note.
-
-* Actual work breakdown tracked in FD.io CSIT jira:
- - Tasks tracked in Jira under CSIT Epics.
-
-Plan Timeline
--------------
-
-* Current release cycle:
- - FD.io CSIT rls18.07, associated with VPP-18.07.
-* Sub-sequent releases:
- - FD.io CSIT rls18.10, rls1812, ..
- - Work not completed fully in current release cycle marked as backlog
- for follow-on release(s).
-
-Plan Summary
-------------
-
-* Infrastructure, Framework, Tools
- * New Skylake testbed infra to increase FD.io CSIT lab capacity.
- [PM;EK,PM;MK]
- * Introduce 2-node performance tests for new Skylake testbed infra.
- [TF;JG,PM,TF;MK]
- * Productize duration aware multi-rate MLR search. [VP;PM,VP;MK]
- * Improve continuous performance trending: anomaly detection tunings,
- add dpdk. [TF;TF,VP;MK]
- * Complete and phase into production continuous per VPP patch
- performance tests. [PM;PM,TF,VP;MK]
- * Implement proper per-packet latency measurements, reporting and
- analytics with TRex HdrHistogram. [TF;PM,TF,VP;MK]
- * Evolve presentation and analytics layer (PAL) addressing growing
- volumes of test measurement and telemetry data. [TF;EK,PM,TF,VP;MK]
- * Start migration from CSIT_VIRL to VPP_Path (make_test) and
- VPP_Device integration tests. [JG;EK,JG,TF;MK]
- * Enhance CSIT reports, trending pages, PAL backend and trending test
- code addressing wider set of data plane workloads and automate
- CI/CD trending communication to FD.io community. [TF;PM,TF,VP;MK]
- * Automate VPP performance regression search. [TF;TF,VP;MK]
- * Other refactor: VAT to PAPI, data driven tests, suite duration,
- infra overhead. [VP;JG,PM,TF,VP;MK]
-
-* Testing, Performance
- * New tests: more TCP stack, SRv6, memif; AVF driver (no DPDK).
- [MK;JG,PM,TF,VP;MK]
- * VPP_Path: migration of P0 VIRL tests to VPP_make_test, followed by
- qualification of VIRL P1, P2 tests; adding use case driven
- functional tests.
- * VPP_Device: new use cases per VPP_Device design note <add link>.
- * VPP_Path_Device: continue to add relevant tests.
-
-* Other
- * FD.io Operations. [All]
- * ARM, Atom servers. [?]
- * API changes across VPP major versions. [?]
- * Plugin dependencies. [?]
- * DPDK driver dependencies. [?]
-
-FD.io CSIT Contributors
------------------------
-
-* JG - Jan Gelety <jgelety@cisco.com>, irc: jgelety.
-* EK - Ed Kern <ejk@cisco.com>, irc: snergster.
-* MK - Maciek Konstantynowicz <mkonstan@cisco.com>, irc: mackonstan.
-* PM - Peter Mikus <pmikus@cisco.com>, irc: pmikus.
-* TF - Tibor Frank <tifrank@cisco.com>, irc: tifrank.
-* VP - Vratko Polak <vrpolak@cisco.com>, irc: vrpolak.
diff --git a/docs/report/csit_framework_documentation/csit_design.rst b/docs/report/csit_framework_documentation/csit_design.rst
index 43dfc343de..4cd29fad6d 100644
--- a/docs/report/csit_framework_documentation/csit_design.rst
+++ b/docs/report/csit_framework_documentation/csit_design.rst
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ A brief bottom-up description is provided here:
- VPP;
- DPDK-Testpmd;
- DPDK-L3Fwd;
- - Honeycomb;
- Tools:
diff --git a/docs/report/dmm_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst b/docs/report/dmm_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
index f525d1e904..32ee01ace6 100644
--- a/docs/report/dmm_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
+++ b/docs/report/dmm_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ Release Notes
Changes in |csit-release|
-------------------------
-#. DMM FUNCTIONAL TESTS
-
- - Added DMM lwip integration test case.
+No changes
Known Issues
------------
diff --git a/docs/report/dpdk_performance_tests/test_environment.rst b/docs/report/dpdk_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
index e1eb8fa874..ccedca0795 100644
--- a/docs/report/dpdk_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
+++ b/docs/report/dpdk_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_1.rst
-.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst
-
DUT Settings - DPDK
-------------------
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ DPDK Compile Parameters
.. code-block:: bash
- make install T=x86_64-native-linuxapp-gcc -j
+ make install T=<arch>-native-linuxapp-gcc -j
Testpmd Startup Configuration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ sending jumbo frames. Startup command template:
.. code-block:: bash
- testpmd -c $$CORE_MASK -n 4 -- --numa --nb-ports=2 --portmask=0x3 --nb-cores=$$CORES --max-pkt-len=9000 --txqflags=0 --forward-mode=io --rxq=$$RXQ --txq=$$TXQ --burst=64 --rxd=1024 --txd=1024 --disable-link-check --auto-start
+ testpmd -c $$CORE_MASK -n 4 -- --numa --nb-ports=2 --portmask=0x3 --nb-cores=$$CORES [--max-pkt-len=9000] --txqflags=0 --forward-mode=io --rxq=$$RXQ --txq=$$TXQ --burst=64 --rxd=1024 --txd=1024 --disable-link-check --auto-start
L3FWD Startup Configuration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -49,7 +47,7 @@ jumbo frames. Startup command template:
.. code-block:: bash
- l3fwd -l $$CORE_LIST -n 4 -- -P -L -p 0x3 --config='${port_config}' --enable-jumbo --max-pkt-len=9000 --eth-dest=0,${adj_mac0} --eth-dest=1,${adj_mac1} --parse-ptype
+ l3fwd -l $$CORE_LIST -n 4 -- -P -L -p 0x3 --config='${port_config}' [--enable-jumbo --max-pkt-len=9000] --eth-dest=0,${adj_mac0} --eth-dest=1,${adj_mac1} --parse-ptype
.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_tg.rst
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_kvm_vms_vhost_user.rst b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_kvm_vms_vhost_user.rst
index 79f1134881..e6a98596da 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_kvm_vms_vhost_user.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_kvm_vms_vhost_user.rst
@@ -9,25 +9,7 @@ to the QEMU binary can be adjusted in `Constants.py`.
FD.io CSIT performance lab is testing VPP vhost-user with KVM VMs using
following environment settings:
-- Tests with varying QEMU virtio queue (a.k.a. vring) sizes: [vr1024]
- 1024 descriptors to optimize for packet throughput.
-- Tests with varying Linux :abbr:`CFS (Completely Fair Scheduler)`
- settings: i) [cfs] default settings, ii) [cfsrr1] CFS RoundRobin(1)
- policy applied to all data plane threads handling test packet path
- including all VPP worker threads and all QEMU testpmd poll-mode
- threads.
-- Resulting test cases are all combinations with [vr1024] and
- [cfs,cfsrr1] settings.
-- Adjusted Linux kernel :abbr:`CFS (Completely Fair Scheduler)`
- scheduler policy for data plane threads used in CSIT is documented in
- `CSIT Performance Environment Tuning wiki
- <https://wiki.fd.io/view/CSIT/csit-perf-env-tuning-ubuntu1604>`_.
-
-Testing with different CFS settings enables verifying the impact of
-making VPP and VM data plane threads less susceptible to other Linux OS
-system tasks hijacking CPU cores running those data plane threads.
-
-CSIT supports two types of VMs:
+CSIT supports two types of VMs:
- **Image-VM**: used for all functional, VPP_device, and regular
performance tests except NFV density tests.
@@ -83,10 +65,10 @@ Example of custom init script for the kernel-VM:
mount -t hugetlbfs -o "rw,relatime,pagesize=2M" hugetlbfs /dev/hugepages
echo 0000:00:06.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:06.0/driver/unbind
echo 0000:00:07.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:07.0/driver/unbind
- echo uio_pci_generic > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:06.0/driver_override
- echo uio_pci_generic > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:07.0/driver_override
- echo 0000:00:06.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/uio_pci_generic/bind
- echo 0000:00:07.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/uio_pci_generic/bind
+ echo vfio-pci > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:06.0/driver_override
+ echo vfio-pci > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:07.0/driver_override
+ echo 0000:00:06.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/bind
+ echo 0000:00:07.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/bind
$vnf_bin
poweroff -f
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_trex_traffic_generator.rst b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_trex_traffic_generator.rst
index 2a25931faa..918a34f73d 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_trex_traffic_generator.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_trex_traffic_generator.rst
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ is:
- TRex is started in the background mode
::
- $ sh -c 'cd <t-rex-install-dir>/scripts/ && sudo nohup ./t-rex-64 -i -c 7 --iom 0 > /tmp/trex.log 2>&1 &' > /dev/null
+ $ sh -c 'cd <t-rex-install-dir>/scripts/ && sudo nohup ./t-rex-64 -i -c 7 > /tmp/trex.log 2>&1 &' > /dev/null
- There are traffic streams dynamically prepared for each test, based on traffic
profiles. The traffic is sent and the statistics obtained using
- :command:`trex_stl_lib.api.STLClient`.
+ :command:`trex.stl.api.STLClient`.
Measuring Packet Loss
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_vpp_device_functional.rst b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_vpp_device_functional.rst
index 41a8040ef6..0c29624419 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/methodology_vpp_device_functional.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/methodology_vpp_device_functional.rst
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
VPP_Device Functional
---------------------
-|csit-release| added new VPP_Device test environment for functional VPP
+|csit-release| includes VPP_Device test environment for functional VPP
device tests integrated into LFN CI/CD infrastructure. VPP_Device tests
run on 1-Node testbeds (1n-skx, 1n-arm) and rely on Linux SRIOV Virtual
Function (VF), dot1q VLAN tagging and external loopback cables to
facilitate packet passing over exernal physical links. Initial focus is
-on few baseline tests. Existing CSIT VIRL tests can be moved to
-VPP_Device framework by changing L1 and L2 KW(s). RF test definition
-code stays unchanged with the exception of requiring adjustments from
-3-Node to 2-Node logical topologies. CSIT VIRL to VPP_Device migration
-is expected in the next CSIT release.
+on few baseline tests. Existing CSIT Performance tests can be moved to
+VPP_Device framework. RF test definition code stays unchanged with the
+exception of traffic generator related L2 KWs.
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_2.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_2.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 24fcd741e9..0000000000
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_2.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-Linux CFS Tunings
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Linux CFS scheduler tunings are applied to all QEMU vCPU worker threads
-(the ones handling testpmd PMD threads) and VPP data plane worker
-threads. List of VPP data plane threads can be obtained by running:
-
-::
-
- $ for psid in $(pgrep vpp)
- $ do
- $ for tid in $(ps -Lo tid --pid $psid | grep -v TID)
- $ do
- $ echo $tid
- $ done
- $ done
-
-Or:
-
-::
-
- $ cat /proc/`pidof vpp`/task/*/stat | awk '{print $1" "$2" "$39}'
-
-CFS round-robin scheduling with highest priority is applied using:
-
-::
-
- $ for psid in $(pgrep vpp)
- $ do
- $ for tid in $(ps -Lo tid --pid $psid | grep -v TID)
- $ do
- $ chrt -r -p 1 $tid
- $ done
- $ done
-
-More information about Linux CFS can be found in `Sched manual pages
-<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/sched.7.html>`_.
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 20dc155058..0000000000
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-
-Host Writeback Affinity
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Writebacks are pinned to core 0. The same configuration is applied in host Linux and guest VM.
-
-::
-
- $ echo 1 | sudo tee /sys/bus/workqueue/devices/writeback/cpumask
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_dnv.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_dnv.rst
index 71d1b6808f..a83869ba03 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_dnv.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_dnv.rst
@@ -6,121 +6,144 @@ system is vulnerable against the several "speculative execution" CVEs that were
made public in 2018. Script is available on `Spectre & Meltdown Checker Github
<https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker>`_.
-- CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
-- CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
-- CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
-- CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
-- CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
-- CVE-2018-3615 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow (SGX)'
-- CVE-2018-3620 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
-- CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM)'
-
::
- $ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --no-color
-
- Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.40
-
- Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
- Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-36-generic #39~16.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Tue Sep 25 08:59:23 UTC 2018 x86_64
- CPU is Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU C3858 @ 2.00GHz
-
- Hardware check
- * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
- * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
- * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
- * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
- * CPU indicates SSBD capability: YES (Intel SSBD)
- * L1 data cache invalidation
- * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: NO
- * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: NO
- * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
- * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: YES
- * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): YES
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
- * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: YES
- * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
- * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
- * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x5f family 0x6 stepping 0x1 ucode 0x24 cpuid 0x506f1)
- * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: YES (latest version is 0x24 dated 2018/05/11 according to builtin MCExtractor DB v84 - 2018/09/27)
- * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): NO
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): YES
-
- CVE-2017-5753 aka 'Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
- * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
- * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
- * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
-
- CVE-2017-5715 aka 'Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
- * Mitigation 1
- * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
- * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for kernel and firmware code)
- * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
- * IBPB enabled and active: YES
- * Mitigation 2
- * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
- * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
- * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2017-5754 aka 'Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
- * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
- * PTI enabled and active: NO
- * Reduced performance impact of PTI: NO (PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant)
- * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
-
- CVE-2018-3640 aka 'Variant 3a, rogue system register read'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: YES
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2018-3639 aka 'Variant 4, speculative store bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
- * Kernel supports speculation store bypass: YES (found in /proc/self/status)
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
-
- CVE-2018-3615 aka 'Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
-
- CVE-2018-3620 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
- * Kernel supports PTE inversion: YES (found in kernel image)
- * PTE inversion enabled and active: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Not affected)
-
- CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'
- * Information from the /sys interface:
- * This system is a host running an hypervisor: NO
- * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
- * EPT is disabled: NO
- * Mitigation 2
- * L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in kernel image)
- * L1D flush enabled: UNKNOWN (unrecognized mode)
- * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: NO (flush will be done in software, this is slower)
- * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running an hypervisor)
-
- > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK
-
- Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain
- A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer
+ Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.42
+ Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
+ Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-51-generic #55-Ubuntu SMP Wed May 15 14:27:21 UTC 2019 x86_64
+ CPU is Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU C3858 @ 2.00GHz
+
+ Hardware check
+ * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
+ * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
+ * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
+ * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
+ * CPU indicates SSBD capability: YES (Intel SSBD)
+ * L1 data cache invalidation
+ * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: NO
+ * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: NO
+ * Microarchitecture Data Sampling
+ * VERW instruction is available: YES (MD_CLEAR feature bit)
+ * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
+ * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: YES
+ * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown/L1TF (RDCL_NO): YES
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
+ * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: YES
+ * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS_NO): YES
+ * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
+ * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x5f family 0x6 stepping 0x1 ucode 0x2e cpuid 0x506f1)
+ * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: awk: fatal: cannot open file `bash for reading (No such file or directory)
+ UNKNOWN (latest microcode version for your CPU model is unknown)
+ * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12126 (Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12130 (ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12127 (RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2019-11091 (RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)): NO
+
+ CVE-2017-5753 aka Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+ * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
+ * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
+ * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+
+ CVE-2017-5715 aka Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, STIBP: disabled, RSB filling)
+ * Mitigation 1
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
+ * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for firmware code only)
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
+ * IBPB enabled and active: YES
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
+ * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
+ * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2017-5754 aka Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
+ * PTI enabled and active: UNKNOWN (dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script)
+ * Reduced performance impact of PTI: NO (PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant)
+ * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3640 aka Variant 3a, rogue system register read
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-3639 aka Variant 4, speculative store bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+ * Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB): YES (found in /proc/self/status)
+ * SSB mitigation is enabled and active: YES (per-thread through prctl)
+ * SSB mitigation currently active for selected processes: YES (systemd-journald systemd-logind systemd-networkd systemd-resolved systemd-timesyncd systemd-udevd)
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+
+ CVE-2018-3615 aka Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3620 aka Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports PTE inversion: YES (found in kernel image)
+ * PTE inversion enabled and active: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3646 aka Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault
+ * Information from the /sys interface: Not affected
+ * This system is a host running a hypervisor: NO
+ * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
+ * EPT is disabled: NO
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in kernel image)
+ * L1D flush enabled: NO
+ * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: NO (flush will be done in software, this is slower)
+ * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-12126 aka Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: YES (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: NO
+ * SMT is either mitigated or disabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-12130 aka ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: YES (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: NO
+ * SMT is either mitigated or disabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-12127 aka RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: YES (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: NO
+ * SMT is either mitigated or disabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2019-11091 aka RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Not affected)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: YES (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: NO
+ * SMT is either mitigated or disabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK CVE-2018-12126:OK CVE-2018-12130:OK CVE-2018-12127:OK CVE-2019-11091:OK
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_hsw.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_hsw.rst
index 71787f0691..8634aa4cfa 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_hsw.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_hsw.rst
@@ -6,121 +6,133 @@ system is vulnerable against the several "speculative execution" CVEs that were
made public in 2018. Script is available on `Spectre & Meltdown Checker Github
<https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker>`_.
-- CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
-- CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
-- CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
-- CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
-- CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
-- CVE-2018-3615 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow (SGX)'
-- CVE-2018-3620 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
-- CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM)'
-
::
- $ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --no-color
-
- Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.40
-
- Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
- Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-36-generic #39-Ubuntu SMP Mon Sep 24 16:19:09 UTC 2018 x86_64
- CPU is Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2699 v3 @ 2.30GHz
-
- Hardware check
- * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
- * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
- * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
- * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
- * CPU indicates SSBD capability: YES (Intel SSBD)
- * L1 data cache invalidation
- * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: YES (L1D flush feature bit)
- * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
- * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
- * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): NO
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
- * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: NO
- * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
- * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
- * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x3f family 0x6 stepping 0x2 ucode 0x3d cpuid 0x306f2)
- * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: YES (latest version is 0x3d dated 2018/04/20 according to builtin MCExtractor DB v84 - 2018/09/27)
- * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): YES
-
- CVE-2017-5753 aka 'Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
- * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
- * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
- * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
-
- CVE-2017-5715 aka 'Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
- * Mitigation 1
- * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
- * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for kernel and firmware code)
- * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
- * IBPB enabled and active: YES
- * Mitigation 2
- * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
- * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
- * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2017-5754 aka 'Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTI)
- * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
- * PTI enabled and active: YES
- * Reduced performance impact of PTI: YES (CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
- * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)
-
- CVE-2018-3640 aka 'Variant 3a, rogue system register read'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: YES
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2018-3639 aka 'Variant 4, speculative store bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
- * Kernel supports speculation store bypass: YES (found in /proc/self/status)
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
-
- CVE-2018-3615 aka 'Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
-
- CVE-2018-3620 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTE Inversion)
- * Kernel supports PTE inversion: YES (found in kernel image)
- * PTE inversion enabled and active: YES
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTE Inversion)
-
- CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'
- * Information from the /sys interface: VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled
- * This system is a host running an hypervisor: NO
- * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
- * EPT is disabled: NO
- * Mitigation 2
- * L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in /proc/cpuinfo)
- * L1D flush enabled: YES (conditional flushes)
- * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: YES (performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced)
- * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running an hypervisor)
-
- > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK
-
- Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain
- A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer
+ Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.42
+
+ Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
+ Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-36-generic #39-Ubuntu SMP Mon Sep 24 16:19:09 UTC 2018 x86_64
+ CPU is Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2699 v3 @ 2.30GHz
+
+ Hardware check
+ * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
+ * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
+ * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
+ * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
+ * CPU indicates SSBD capability: YES (Intel SSBD)
+ * L1 data cache invalidation
+ * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: YES (L1D flush feature bit)
+ * Microarchitecture Data Sampling
+ * VERW instruction is available: NO
+ * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
+ * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
+ * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown/L1TF (RDCL_NO): NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
+ * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: NO
+ * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS_NO): NO
+ * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
+ * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x3f family 0x6 stepping 0x2 ucode 0x3d cpuid 0x306f2)
+ * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: awk: cannot open bash (No such file or directory)
+ UNKNOWN (latest microcode version for your CPU model is unknown)
+ * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12126 (Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12130 (ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12127 (RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2019-11091 (RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)): YES
+
+ CVE-2017-5753 aka Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+ * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
+ * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
+ * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+
+ CVE-2017-5715 aka Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
+ * Mitigation 1
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
+ * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for firmware code only)
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
+ * IBPB enabled and active: YES
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
+ * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
+ * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2017-5754 aka Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTI)
+ * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
+ * PTI enabled and active: YES
+ * Reduced performance impact of PTI: YES (CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
+ * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)
+
+ CVE-2018-3640 aka Variant 3a, rogue system register read
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-3639 aka Variant 4, speculative store bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+ * Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB): YES (found in /proc/self/status)
+ * SSB mitigation is enabled and active: YES (per-thread through prctl)
+ * SSB mitigation currently active for selected processes: YES (systemd-journald systemd-logind systemd-networkd systemd-resolved systemd-timesyncd systemd-udevd)
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+
+ CVE-2018-3615 aka Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3620 aka Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled)
+ * Kernel supports PTE inversion: YES (found in kernel image)
+ * PTE inversion enabled and active: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled)
+
+ CVE-2018-3646 aka Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault
+ * Information from the /sys interface: Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled
+ * This system is a host running a hypervisor: NO
+ * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
+ * EPT is disabled: NO
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * L1D flush enabled: YES (conditional flushes)
+ * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: YES (performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced)
+ * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running a hypervisor)
+
+ CVE-2018-12126 aka Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-12130 aka ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-12127 aka RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2019-11091 aka RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK CVE-2018-12126:KO CVE-2018-12130:KO CVE-2018-12127:KO CVE-2019-11091:KO
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_skx.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_skx.rst
index 443a7fd484..15b098a9ce 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_skx.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_sut_meltspec_skx.rst
@@ -6,120 +6,134 @@ system is vulnerable against the several "speculative execution" CVEs that were
made public in 2018. Script is available on `Spectre & Meltdown Checker Github
<https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker>`_.
-- CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
-- CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
-- CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
-- CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
-- CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
-- CVE-2018-3615 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow (SGX)'
-- CVE-2018-3620 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
-- CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM)'
-
::
- $ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --no-color
-
- Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.40
-
- Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
- Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-23-generic #25-Ubuntu SMP Wed May 23 18:02:16 UTC 2018 x86_64
- CPU is Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8180 CPU @ 2.50GHz
-
- Hardware check
- * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
- * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
- * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
- * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
- * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
- * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
- * CPU indicates SSBD capability: NO
- * L1 data cache invalidation
- * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: NO
- * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: NO
- * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
- * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
- * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): NO
- * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
- * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: NO
- * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
- * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
- * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x55 family 0x6 stepping 0x4 ucode 0x2000043 cpuid 0x50654)
- * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: NO (latest version is 0x200004d dated 2018/05/15 according to builtin MCExtractor DB v84 - 2018/09/27)
- * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): YES
- * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): YES
-
- CVE-2017-5753 aka 'Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
- * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
- * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
- * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
-
- CVE-2017-5715 aka 'Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
- * Mitigation 1
- * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
- * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for kernel and firmware code)
- * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
- * IBPB enabled and active: YES
- * Mitigation 2
- * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
- * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
- * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
- * Kernel supports RSB filling: YES
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2017-5754 aka 'Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTI)
- * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
- * PTI enabled and active: YES
- * Reduced performance impact of PTI: YES (CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
- * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)
-
- CVE-2018-3640 aka 'Variant 3a, rogue system register read'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: NO
- > STATUS: VULNERABLE (an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability)
-
- CVE-2018-3639 aka 'Variant 4, speculative store bypass'
- * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: NO (Vulnerable)
- * Kernel supports speculation store bypass: YES (found in /proc/self/status)
- > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Your CPU doesn't support SSBD)
-
- CVE-2018-3615 aka 'Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault'
- * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
-
- CVE-2018-3620 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault'
- * Kernel supports PTE inversion: NO
- * PTE inversion enabled and active: UNKNOWN (sysfs interface not available)
- > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Your kernel doesn't support PTE inversion, update it)
-
- CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'
- * This system is a host running an hypervisor: NO
- * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
- * EPT is disabled: NO
- * Mitigation 2
- * L1D flush is supported by kernel: NO
- * L1D flush enabled: UNKNOWN (can't find or read /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf)
- * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: NO (flush will be done in software, this is slower)
- * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: YES
- > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running an hypervisor)
-
- > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:KO CVE-2018-3639:KO CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:KO CVE-2018-3646:OK
-
- Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain
- A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer
+ Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.42
+
+ Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
+ Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-46-generic #49-Ubuntu SMP Wed Feb 6 09:33:07 UTC 2019 x86_64
+ CPU is Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8180 CPU @ 2.50GHz
+
+ Hardware check
+ * Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
+ * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
+ * PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
+ * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
+ * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
+ * CPU indicates SSBD capability: YES (Intel SSBD)
+ * L1 data cache invalidation
+ * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: YES
+ * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: YES (L1D flush feature bit)
+ * Microarchitecture Data Sampling
+ * VERW instruction is available: NO
+ * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
+ * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
+ * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown/L1TF (RDCL_NO): NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): NO
+ * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: NO
+ * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): NO
+ * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS_NO): NO
+ * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): NO
+ * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 0x55 family 0x6 stepping 0x4 ucode 0x200004d cpuid 0x50654)
+ * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: awk: cannot open bash (No such file or directory)
+ UNKNOWN (latest microcode version for your CPU model is unknown)
+ * CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault): NO
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12126 (Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12130 (ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-12127 (RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)): YES
+ * Vulnerable to CVE-2019-11091 (RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)): YES
+
+ CVE-2017-5753 aka Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+ * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
+ * Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
+ * Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
+
+ CVE-2017-5715 aka Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
+ * Mitigation 1
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
+ * IBRS enabled and active: YES (for firmware code only)
+ * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
+ * IBPB enabled and active: YES
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
+ * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
+ * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
+ * Kernel supports RSB filling: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2017-5754 aka Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTI)
+ * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
+ * PTI enabled and active: YES
+ * Reduced performance impact of PTI: YES (CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
+ * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)
+
+ CVE-2018-3640 aka Variant 3a, rogue system register read
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-3639 aka Variant 4, speculative store bypass
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+ * Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB): YES (found in /proc/self/status)
+ * SSB mitigation is enabled and active: YES (per-thread through prctl)
+ * SSB mitigation currently active for selected processes: YES (systemd-journald systemd-logind systemd-networkd systemd-resolved systemd-timesyncd systemd-udevd)
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
+
+ CVE-2018-3615 aka Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault
+ * CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: N/A
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3620 aka Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault
+ * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)
+ * Kernel supports PTE inversion: YES (found in kernel image)
+ * PTE inversion enabled and active: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)
+
+ CVE-2018-3646 aka Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault
+ * Information from the /sys interface: Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable
+ * This system is a host running a hypervisor: NO
+ * Mitigation 1 (KVM)
+ * EPT is disabled: NO
+ * Mitigation 2
+ * L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in /proc/cpuinfo)
+ * L1D flush enabled: YES (conditional flushes)
+ * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: YES (performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced)
+ * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: YES
+ > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running a hypervisor)
+
+ CVE-2018-12126 aka Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-12130 aka ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2018-12127 aka RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ CVE-2019-11091 aka RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)
+ * Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: NO
+ > STATUS: VULNERABLE (Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability)
+
+ > SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK CVE-2018-12126:KO CVE-2018-12130:KO CVE-2018-12127:KO CVE-2019-11091:KO
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_tg.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_tg.rst
index 135c9d478d..60dc81270b 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_tg.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/test_environment_tg.rst
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ TG Version
DPDK Version
~~~~~~~~~~~~
-DPDK v18.08
+DPDK v19.02
TG Build Script Used
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
diff --git a/docs/report/introduction/test_scenarios_overview.rst b/docs/report/introduction/test_scenarios_overview.rst
index ee334a6407..8d66836e9d 100644
--- a/docs/report/introduction/test_scenarios_overview.rst
+++ b/docs/report/introduction/test_scenarios_overview.rst
@@ -12,18 +12,17 @@ Brief overview of test scenarios covered in this report:
#. **VPP Performance**: VPP performance tests are executed in physical
FD.io testbeds, focusing on VPP network data plane performance in
NIC-to-NIC switching topologies. Tested across Intel Xeon Haswell
- and Skylake servers, range of NICs (10GE, 25GE, 40GE) and multi-
- thread/multi-core configurations. VPP application runs in bare-metal
+ and Skylake servers, ARM, Denverton, range of NICs (10GE, 25GE, 40GE) and
+ multi-thread/multi-core configurations. VPP application runs in bare-metal
host user-mode handling NICs. TRex is used as a traffic generator.
#. **VPP Vhostuser Performance with KVM VMs**: VPP VM service switching
performance tests using vhostuser virtual interface for
- interconnecting multiple Testpmd-in-VM instances. VPP vswitch
+ interconnecting multiple NF-in-VM instances. VPP vswitch
instance runs in bare-metal user-mode handling NICs and connecting
- over vhost-user interfaces to VM instances each running DPDK
- Testpmd with virtio virtual interfaces. Similarly to VPP
- Performance, tests are run across a range of configurations. TRex
- is used as a traffic generator.
+ over vhost-user interfaces to VM instances each running VPP with virtio
+ virtual interfaces. Similarly to VPP Performance, tests are run across a
+ range of configurations. TRex is used as a traffic generator.
#. **VPP Memif Performance with LXC and Docker Containers**: VPP
Container service switching performance tests using memif virtual
@@ -49,12 +48,11 @@ Brief overview of test scenarios covered in this report:
cover vNIC-to-vNIC vNIC-to-nestedVM-to-vNIC forwarding topologies.
Scapy is used as a traffic generator.
-#. **Honeycomb Functional**: Honeycomb functional tests are executed in
- virtual FD.io testbeds, focusing on Honeycomb management and
- programming functionality of VPP. Tests cover a range of CRUD
- operations executed against VPP.
-
..
+ #. **Honeycomb Functional**: Honeycomb functional tests are executed in
+ virtual FD.io testbeds, focusing on Honeycomb management and
+ programming functionality of VPP. Tests cover a range of CRUD
+ operations executed against VPP.
#. **DMM Functional**: DMM functional tests are executed in virtual
FD.io testbeds demonstrating a single server (DUT1) and single
client (DUT2) scenario using DMM framework and Linux kernel TCP/IP
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/csit_release_notes.rst b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
index 6f07713413..58ac234f6f 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ Changes in |csit-release|
#. TEST FRAMEWORK
- **Bug fixes**.
+ - **ARM platform compatibility**.
+
+#. TEST COVERAGE
+
+ - Increased test coverage: **Dot1q**, **IPsec**, **802.1ad VXLAN**,
+ **COP whitelist**, **COP blacklist**, **QoS Policer Metering**,
+ **iACL whitelist**, **AVF driver**, **TAP Interface**.
+ - Align vpp_device L2 Robot Keywords with performance L2 Robot Keywords.
Known Issues
------------
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/overview.rst b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/overview.rst
index a53e3f4971..4a53d619a2 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/overview.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/overview.rst
@@ -111,6 +111,15 @@ environment:
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Functionality | Description |
+=======================+==============================================+
+| ACL | Ingress Access Control List security for L2 |
+| | Bridge-Domain MAC switching, IPv4 routing, |
+| | IPv6 routing. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| COP | COP address white-list and black-list |
+| | filtering for IPv4 and IPv6 routing. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| IPSec | IPSec tunnel and transport modes. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| IPv4 | IPv4 routing, ICMPv4. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| IPv6 | IPv4 routing, ICMPv6. |
@@ -121,9 +130,19 @@ environment:
| L2XC | L2 Cross-Connect switching for untagged |
| | Ethernet. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| Memif Interface | Baseline VPP memif interface tests. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| QoS Policer Metering | Ingress packet rate metering and marking for |
+| | IPv4, IPv6. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| Tap Interface | Baseline Linux tap interface tests. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
+| VLAN Tag | L2 VLAN subinterfaces. |
++-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Vhost-user Interface | Baseline VPP vhost-user interface tests. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| Memif Interface | Baseline VPP memif interface tests. |
+| VXLAN | VXLAN overlay tunneling for L2-over-IPv4 and |
+| | -over-IPv6. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
Tests Naming
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/test_environment.rst b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/test_environment.rst
index 97c296086b..f56f1b913f 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/test_environment.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_device_tests/test_environment.rst
@@ -1,2 +1,573 @@
+Integration Tests
+=================
-.. include:: ../../../../../../docs/vpp-device.rst
+Abstract
+--------
+
+FD.io VPP software data plane technology has become very popular across
+a wide range of VPP eco-system use cases, putting higher pressure on
+continuous verification of VPP software quality.
+
+This document describes a proposal for design and implementation of extended
+continuous VPP testing by extending existing test environments.
+Furthermore it describes and summarizes implementation details of Integration
+and System tests platform *1-Node VPP_Device*. It aims to provide a complete
+end-to-end view of *1-Node VPP_Device* environment in order to improve
+extendability and maintenance, under the guideline of VPP core team.
+
+The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
+"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
+interpreted as described in :rfc:`8174`.
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+.. only:: latex
+
+ .. raw:: latex
+
+ \begin{figure}[H]
+ \centering
+ \graphicspath{{../_tmp/src/vpp_device_tests/}}
+ \includegraphics[width=0.90\textwidth]{vpp_device}
+ \label{fig:vpp_device}
+ \end{figure}
+
+.. only:: html
+
+ .. figure:: vpp_device.svg
+ :alt: vpp_device
+ :align: center
+
+Physical Testbeds
+-----------------
+
+All :abbr:`FD.io (Fast Data Input/Ouput)` :abbr:`CSIT (Continuous System
+Integration and Testing)` vpp-device tests are executed on physical testbeds
+built with bare-metal servers hosted by :abbr:`LF (Linux Foundation)` FD.io
+project. Two 1-node testbed topologies are used:
+
+- **2-Container Topology**: Consisting of one Docker container acting as SUT
+ (System Under Test) and one Docker container as TG (Traffic Generator), both
+ connected in ring topology via physical NIC cross-connecting.
+
+Current FD.io production testbeds are built with servers based on one
+processor generation of Intel Xeons: Skylake (Platinum 8180). Testbeds built
+with servers based on Arm processors are in the process of being added to FD.io
+production.
+
+Following section describe existing production 1n-skx testbed.
+
+1-Node Xeon Skylake (1n-skx)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+1n-skx testbed is based on single SuperMicro SYS-7049GP-TRT server equipped with
+two Intel Xeon Skylake Platinum 8180 2.5 GHz 28 core processors. Physical
+testbed topology is depicted in a figure below.
+
+.. only:: latex
+
+ .. raw:: latex
+
+ \begin{figure}[H]
+ \centering
+ \graphicspath{{../_tmp/src/vpp_device_tests/}}
+ \includegraphics[width=0.90\textwidth]{vf-2n-nic2nic}
+ \label{fig:vf-2n-nic2nic}
+ \end{figure}
+
+.. only:: html
+
+ .. figure:: vf-2n-nic2nic.svg
+ :alt: vf-2n-nic2nic
+ :align: center
+
+Server is populated with the following NIC models:
+
+#. NIC-1: x710-da4 4p10GE Intel.
+#. NIC-2: x710-da4 4p10GE Intel.
+
+All Intel Xeon Skylake servers run with Intel Hyper-Threading enabled,
+doubling the number of logical cores exposed to Linux, with 56 logical
+cores and 28 physical cores per processor socket.
+
+NIC interfaces are shared using Linux vfio_pci and VPP VF drivers:
+
+- DPDK VF driver,
+- Fortville AVF driver.
+
+Provided Intel x710-da4 4p10GE NICs support 32 VFs per interface, 128 per NIC.
+
+Complete 1n-skx testbeds specification is available on `CSIT LF Testbeds
+<https://wiki.fd.io/view/CSIT/Testbeds:_Xeon_Skx,_Arm,_Atom.>`_ wiki page.
+
+Total of two 1n-skx testbeds are in operation in FD.io labs.
+
+1-Node Virtualbox (1n-vbox)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+1n-skx testbed can run in single VirtualBox VM machine. This solution replaces
+the previously used Vagrant environment based on 3 VMs.
+
+VirtualBox VM MAY be created by Vagrant and MUST have additional 4 virtio NICs
+each pair attached to separate private networks to simulate back-to-back
+connections. It SHOULD be 82545EM device model (otherwise can be changed in
+boostrap scripts). Example of Vagrant configuration:
+
+::
+
+ Vagrant.configure(2) do |c|
+ c.vm.network "private_network", type: "dhcp", auto_config: false,
+ virtualbox__intnet: "port1", nic_type: "82545EM"
+ c.vm.network "private_network", type: "dhcp", auto_config: false,
+ virtualbox__intnet: "port2", nic_type: "82545EM"
+
+ c.vm.provider :virtualbox do |v|
+ v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc2", "allow-all"]
+ v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc3", "allow-all"]
+ v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc4", "allow-all"]
+ v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc5", "allow-all"]
+
+Vagrant VM is populated with the following NIC models:
+
+#. NIC-1: 82545EM Intel.
+#. NIC-2: 82545EM Intel.
+#. NIC-3: 82545EM Intel.
+#. NIC-4: 82545EM Intel.
+
+Containers
+----------
+
+It was agreed on :abbr:`TWS (Technical Work Stream)` call to continue with
+Ubuntu 18.04 LTS as a baseline system with OPTIONAL extend to Centos 7 and
+SuSE per demand [TWSLink]_.
+
+All :abbr:`DCR (Docker container)` images are REQUIRED to be hosted on Docker
+registry available from LF network, publicly available and trackable. For
+backup, tracking and contributing purposes all Dockerfiles (including files
+needed for building container) MUST be available and stored in [fdiocsitgerrit]_
+repository under appropriate folders. This allows the peer review process to be
+done for every change of infrastructure related to scope of this document.
+Currently only **csit-shim-dcr** and **csit-sut-dcr** containers will be stored
+and maintained under CSIT repository by CSIT contributors.
+
+At the time of designing solution described in this document the interconnection
+between [dockerhub]_ and [fdiocsitgerrit]_ for automated build purposes and
+image hosting cannot be established with the trust and respectful to
+security of FD.io project. Unless adressed, :abbr:`DCR` images will be placed in
+custom registry service [fdioregistry]_. Automated Jenkins jobs will be created
+in align of long term solution for container lifecycle and ability to build
+new version of docker images.
+
+In parallel, the effort is started to find the outsourced Docker registry
+service.
+
+Versioning
+~~~~~~~~~~
+
+As of initial version of vpp-device, we do have only single latest version of
+Docker image hosted on [dockerhub]_. This will be addressed as further
+improvement with proper semantic versioning.
+
+jenkins-slave-dcr
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+This :abbr:`DCR` acts as the Jenkins slave (known also as jenkins minion). It
+can connect over SSH protocol to TCP port 6022 of **csit-shim-dcr** and executes
+non-interactive reservation script. Nomad is responsible for scheduling this
+container execution onto specific **1-Node VPP_Device** testbed. It executes
+:abbr:`CSIT` environment including :abbr:`CSIT` framework.
+
+All software dependencies including VPP/DPDK that are not present in
+**csit-sut-dcr** container image and/or needs to be compiled prior running on
+**csit-sut-dcr** SHOULD be compiled in this container.
+
+- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/vpp-ubuntu18.
+
+- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [JenkinsSlaveDcrFile]_.
+
+- *Initializing*: Container is initialized from within *Consul by HashiCorp*
+ and *Nomad by HashiCorp*.
+
+csit-shim-dcr
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+This :abbr:`DCR` acts as an intermediate layer running script responsible for
+orchestrating topologies under test and reservation. Responsible for managing VF
+resources and allocation to :abbr:`DUT (Device Under Test)`, :abbr:`TG
+(Traffic Generator)` containers. This MUST to be done on **csit-shim-dcr**.
+This image also acts as the generic reservation mechanics arbiter to make sure
+that only Y number of simulations are spawned on any given HW node.
+
+- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/csit-shim.
+
+- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [CsitShimDcrFile]_.
+
+- *Initializing*: Container is initialized from within *Consul by HashiCorp*
+ and *Nomad by HashiCorp*. Required docker parameters, to be able to run
+ nested containers with VF reservation system are: privileged, net=host,
+ pid=host.
+
+- *Connectivity*: Over SSH only, using <host>:6022 format. Currently using
+ *root* user account as primary. From the jenkins slave it will be able to
+ connect via env variable, since the jenkins slave doesn't actually know what
+ host its running on.
+
+ ::
+
+ ssh -p 6022 root@10.30.51.node
+
+csit-sut-dcr
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+This :abbr:`DCR` acts as an :abbr:`SUT (System Under Test)`. Any :abbr:`DUT` or
+:abbr:`TG` application is installed there. It is RECOMMENDED to install DUT and
+all DUT dependencies via commands ``rpm -ihv`` on RedHat based OS or ``dpkg -i``
+on Debian based OS.
+
+Container is designed to be a very lightweight Docker image that only installs
+packages and execute binaries (previously built or downloaded on
+**jenkins-slave-dcr**) and contains libraries necessary to run CSIT framework
+including those required by DUT/TG.
+
+- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/csit-sut.
+
+- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [CsitSutDcrFile]_.
+
+- *Initializing*:
+ ::
+
+ docker run
+ # Run the container in the background and print the new container ID.
+ --detach=true
+ # Give extended privileges to this container. A "privileged" container is
+ # given access to all devices and able to run nested containers.
+ --privileged
+ # Publish all exposed ports to random ports on the host interfaces.
+ --publish-all
+ # Automatically remove the container when it exits.
+ --rm
+ # Size of /dev/shm.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--shm-size 512M "
+ # Override access to PCI bus by attaching a filesystem mount to the
+ # container.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--mount type=tmpfs,destination=/sys/bus/pci/devices "
+ # Mount vfio to be able to bind to see binded interfaces. We cannot use
+ # --device=/dev/vfio as this does not see newly binded interfaces.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--volume /dev/vfio:/dev/vfio "
+ # Mount docker.sock to be able to use docker deamon of the host.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--volume /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock "
+ # Mount /opt/boot/ where VM kernel and initrd are located.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--volume /opt/boot/:/opt/boot/ "
+ # Mount host hugepages for VMs.
+ dcr_stc_params+="--volume /dev/hugepages/:/dev/hugepages/ "
+
+ Container name is catenated from **csit-** prefix and uuid generated uniquely
+ for each container instance.
+
+- *Connectivity*: Over SSH only, using <host>[:<port>] format. Currently using
+ *root* user account as primary.
+ ::
+
+ ssh -p <port> root@10.30.51.<node>
+
+Container required to run as ``--privileged`` due to ability to create nested
+containers and have full read/write access to sysfs (for bind/unbind). Docker
+automatically pick free network port (``--publish-all``) for ability to connect
+over ssh. To be able to limit access to PCI bus, container is creating tmpfs
+mount type in PCI bus tree. CSIT reservation script is dynamically linking only
+PCI devices (NIC cards) that are reserved for particular container. This
+way it is not colliding with other containers. To make vfio work, access to
+``/dev/vfio`` must be granted.
+
+.. todo: Change default user to testuser with non-privileged and install sudo.
+
+Environment initialization
+--------------------------
+
+All 1-node servers are to be managed and provisioned via the [ansiblelink]_ set
+of playbooks with *vpp-device* role. Full playbooks can be found under
+[fdiocsitansible]_ directory. This way we are able to track all configuration
+changes of physical servers in gerrit (in structured yaml format) as well as we
+are able to extend *vpp-device* to additional servers with less effort or
+re-stage servers in case of failure.
+
+SR-IOV VF initialization is done via ``systemd`` service during host system boot
+up. Service with name *csit-initialize-vfs.service* is created under systemd
+system context (``/etc/systemd/system/``). By default service is calling
+``/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh`` with single parameter:
+
+- **start**: Creates maximum number of :abbr:`virtual functions (VFs)` (detected
+ from ``sriov_totalvfs``) for each whitelisted PCI device.
+- **stop**: Removes all :abbr:`VFs` for all whitelisted PCI device.
+
+Service is considered active even when all of its processes exited successfully.
+Stopping service will automatically remove :abbr:`VFs`.
+
+::
+
+ [Unit]
+ Description=CSIT Initialize SR-IOV VFs
+ After=network.target
+
+ [Service]
+ Type=one-shot
+ RemainAfterExit=True
+ ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh start
+ ExecStop=/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh stop
+
+ [Install]
+ WantedBy=default.target
+
+Script is driven by two array variables ``pci_blacklist``/``pci_whitelist``.
+They MUST store all PCI addresses in **<domain>:<bus>:<device>.<func>** format,
+where:
+
+- **pci_blacklist**: PCI addresses to be skipped from :abbr:`VFs`
+ initialization (usefull for e.g. excluding management network interfaces).
+- **pci_whitelist**: PCI addresses to be included for :abbr:`VFs`
+ initialization.
+
+VF reservation
+--------------
+
+During topology initialization phase of script, mutex is used to avoid multiple
+instances of script to interact with each other during resources allocation.
+Mutal exclusion ensure that no two distinct instances of script will get same
+resource list.
+
+Reservation function reads the list of all available virtual function network
+devices in system:
+
+::
+
+ # Find the first ${device_count} number of available TG Linux network
+ # VF device names. Only allowed VF PCI IDs are filtered.
+ for netdev in ${tg_netdev[@]}
+ do
+ for netdev_path in $(grep -l "${pci_id}" \
+ /sys/class/net/${netdev}*/device/device \
+ 2> /dev/null)
+ do
+ if [[ ${#TG_NETDEVS[@]} -lt ${device_count} ]]; then
+ tg_netdev_name=$(dirname ${netdev_path})
+ tg_netdev_name=$(dirname ${tg_netdev_name})
+ TG_NETDEVS+=($(basename ${tg_netdev_name}))
+ else
+ break
+ fi
+ done
+ if [[ ${#TG_NETDEVS[@]} -eq ${device_count} ]]; then
+ break
+ fi
+ done
+
+Where ``${pci_id}`` is ID of white-listed VF PCI ID. For more information please
+see [pciids]_. This act as security constraint to prevent taking other unwanted
+interfaces.
+The output list of all VF network devices is split into two lists for TG and
+SUT side of connection. First two items from each TG or SUT network devices
+list are taken to expose directly to namespace of container. This can be done
+via commands:
+
+::
+
+ $ ip link set ${netdev} netns ${DCR_CPIDS[tg]}
+ $ ip link set ${netdev} netns ${DCR_CPIDS[dut1]}
+
+In this stage also symbolic links to PCI devices under sysfs bus directory tree
+are created in running containers. Once VF devices are assigned to container
+namespace and PCI deivces are linked to running containers and mutex is exited.
+Selected VF network device automatically dissapear from parent container
+namespace, so another instance of script will not find device under that
+namespace.
+
+Once Docker container exits, network device is returned back into parent
+namespace and can be reused.
+
+Network traffic isolation - Intel i40evf
+----------------------------------------
+
+In a virtualized environment, on Intel(R) Server Adapters that support SR-IOV,
+the virtual function (VF) may be subject to malicious behavior. Software-
+generated layer two frames, like IEEE 802.3x (link flow control), IEEE 802.1Qbb
+(priority based flow-control), and others of this type, are not expected and
+can throttle traffic between the host and the virtual switch, reducing
+performance. To resolve this issue, configure all SR-IOV enabled ports for
+VLAN tagging. This configuration allows unexpected, and potentially malicious,
+frames to be dropped. [inteli40e]_
+
+To configure VLAN tagging for the ports on an SR-IOV enabled adapter,
+use the following command. The VLAN configuration SHOULD be done
+before the VF driver is loaded or the VM is booted. [inteli40e]_
+
+::
+
+ $ ip link set dev <PF netdev id> vf <id> vlan <vlan id>
+
+For example, the following instructions will configure PF eth0 and
+the first VF on VLAN 10.
+
+::
+
+ $ ip link set dev eth0 vf 0 vlan 10
+
+VLAN Tag Packet Steering allows to send all packets with a specific VLAN tag to
+a particular SR-IOV virtual function (VF). Further, this feature allows to
+designate a particular VF as trusted, and allows that trusted VF to request
+selective promiscuous mode on the Physical Function (PF). [inteli40e]_
+
+To set a VF as trusted or untrusted, enter the following command in the
+Hypervisor:
+
+::
+
+ $ ip link set dev eth0 vf 1 trust [on|off]
+
+Once the VF is designated as trusted, use the following commands in the VM
+to set the VF to promiscuous mode. [inteli40e]_
+
+- For promiscuous all:
+ ::
+
+ $ ip link set eth2 promisc on
+
+- For promiscuous Multicast:
+ ::
+
+ $ ip link set eth2 allmulti on
+
+.. note::
+
+ By default, the ethtool priv-flag vf-true-promisc-support is set to
+ *off*, meaning that promiscuous mode for the VF will be limited. To set the
+ promiscuous mode for the VF to true promiscuous and allow the VF to see
+ all ingress traffic, use the following command.
+ $ ethtool set-priv-flags p261p1 vf-true-promisc-support on
+ The vf-true-promisc-support priv-flag does not enable promiscuous mode;
+ rather, it designates which type of promiscuous mode (limited or true)
+ you will get when you enable promiscuous mode using the ip link commands
+ above. Note that this is a global setting that affects the entire device.
+ However,the vf-true-promisc-support priv-flag is only exposed to the first
+ PF of the device. The PF remains in limited promiscuous mode (unless it
+ is in MFP mode) regardless of the vf-true-promisc-support setting.
+ [inteli40e]_
+
+Service described earlier *csit-initialize-vfs.service* is responsible for
+assigning 802.1Q vlan tagging to each vitual function via physical function
+from list of white-listed PCI addresses by following (simplified) code.
+
+::
+
+ SCRIPT_DIR="$(dirname $(readlink -e "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"))"
+ source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/csit-initialize-vfs-data.sh"
+
+ # Initilize whitelisted NICs with maximum number of VFs.
+ pci_idx=0
+ for pci_addr in ${PCI_WHITELIST[@]}; do
+ if ! [[ ${PCI_BLACKLIST[*]} =~ "${pci_addr}" ]]; then
+ pci_path="/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pci_addr}"
+ # SR-IOV initialization
+ case "${1:-start}" in
+ "start" )
+ sriov_totalvfs=$(< "${pci_path}"/sriov_totalvfs)
+ ;;
+ "stop" )
+ sriov_totalvfs=0
+ ;;
+ esac
+ echo ${sriov_totalvfs} > "${pci_path}"/sriov_numvfs
+ # SR-IOV 802.1Q isolation
+ case "${1:-start}" in
+ "start" )
+ pf=$(basename "${pci_path}"/net/*)
+ for vf in $(seq "${sriov_totalvfs}"); do
+ # PCI address index in array (pairing siblings).
+ if [[ -n ${PF_INDICES[@]} ]]
+ then
+ vlan_pf_idx=${PF_INDICES[$pci_addr]}
+ else
+ vlan_pf_idx=$((pci_idx % (${#PCI_WHITELIST[@]}/2)))
+ fi
+ # 802.1Q base offset.
+ vlan_bs_off=1100
+ # 802.1Q PF PCI address offset.
+ vlan_pf_off=$(( vlan_pf_idx * 100 + vlan_bs_off ))
+ # 802.1Q VF PCI address offset.
+ vlan_vf_off=$(( vlan_pf_off + vf - 1 ))
+ # VLAN string.
+ vlan_str="vlan ${vlan_vf_off}"
+ # MAC string.
+ mac5="$(printf '%x' ${pci_idx})"
+ mac6="$(printf '%x' $(( vf - 1 )))"
+ mac_str="mac ba:dc:0f:fe:${mac5}:${mac6}"
+ # Set 802.1Q VLAN id and MAC address
+ ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1)) ${mac_str} ${vlan_str}
+ ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1)) trust on
+ ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1)) spoof off
+ done
+ pci_idx=$(( pci_idx + 1 ))
+ ;;
+ esac
+ rmmod i40evf
+ modprobe i40evf
+ fi
+ done
+
+Assignment starts at VLAN 1100 and incrementing by 1 for each VF and by 100 for
+each white-listed PCI address up to the middle of the PCI list. Second half of
+the lists is assumed to be directly (cable) paired siblings and assigned with
+same 802.1Q VLANs as its siblings.
+
+Open tasks
+----------
+
+Security
+~~~~~~~~
+
+.. note::
+
+ Switch to non-privileged containers: As of now all three container
+ flavors are using privileged containers to make it working. Explore options
+ to switch containers to non-privileged with explicit rather implicit
+ privileges.
+
+.. note::
+
+ Switch to testuser account intead of root.
+
+Maintainability
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. note::
+
+ Docker image distribution: Create jenkins jobs with full pipiline of
+ CI/CD for CSIT Docker images.
+
+Stability
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. note::
+
+ Implement queueing mechanism: Currently there is no mechanics that
+ would place starving jobs in queue in case of no resources available.
+
+.. note::
+
+ Replace reservation script with Docker network plugin written in
+ GOLANG/SH/Python - platform independent.
+
+Links
+-----
+
+.. [TWSLink] `TWS <https://wiki.fd.io/view/CSIT/TWS>`_
+.. [dockerhub] `Docker hub <https://hub.docker.com/>`_
+.. [fdiocsitgerrit] `FD.io/CSIT gerrit <https://gerrit.fd.io/r/CSIT>`_
+.. [fdioregistry] `FD.io registy <registry.fdiopoc.net>`_
+.. [JenkinsSlaveDcrFile] `jenkins-slave-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/ubuntu18/Dockerfile>`_
+.. [CsitShimDcrFile] `csit-shim-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/csit-shim/Dockerfile>`_
+.. [CsitSutDcrFile] `csit-sut-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/csit-sut/Dockerfile>`_
+.. [ansiblelink] `ansible <https://www.ansible.com/>`_
+.. [fdiocsitansible] `Fd.io/CSIT ansible <https://git.fd.io/csit/tree/resources/tools/testbed-setup/ansible>`_
+.. [inteli40e] `Intel i40e <https://downloadmirror.intel.com/26370/eng/readme.txt>`_
+.. [pciids] `pci ids <http://pci-ids.ucw.cz/v2.2/pci.ids>`_
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst b/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
index 57114cc858..ecb0a63ebc 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
@@ -10,43 +10,17 @@ Changes in |csit-release|
#. CSIT TEST MIMGRATION
- - **VPP_Path**: Continuing migration of the original FD.io CSIT VIRL
- tests to VPP-make_test VPP integration tests for functional
- acceptance of VPP feature path(s) driven by use case(s). See P1
- and P2 markup in `CSIT_VIRL migration progress
- <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1PciV8XN9v1qHbIRUpFJoqyES29_vik7lcFDl73G1usc/edit?usp=sharing>`_
+ - **VPP_Device**: Continuing migration of the original FD.io CSIT VIRL
+ tests to VPP-device tests for functional acceptance of VPP feature path(s)
+ driven by performance tests.
Known Issues
------------
List of known issues in |csit-release| for VPP functional tests in VIRL:
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| # | JiraID | Issue Description |
-+===+=========================================+=========================================================================================================================+
-| 1 | `CSIT-129 | DHCPv4 client: Client responses to DHCPv4 OFFER sent with different XID. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-129>`_ | Client replies with DHCPv4 REQUEST message when received DHCPv4 OFFER message with different (wrong) XID. |
-| | `VPP-99 | |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-99>`_ | |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 2 | `CSIT-398 | Softwire - MAP-E: Incorrect calculation of IPv6 destination address when IPv4 prefix is 0. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-398>`_ | IPv6 destination address is wrongly calculated in case that IPv4 prefix is equal to 0 and IPv6 prefix is less than 40. |
-| | `VPP-380 | |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-380>`_ | |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 3 | `CSIT-399 | Softwire - MAP-E: Map domain is created when incorrect parameters provided. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-399>`_ | Map domain is created in case that the sum of suffix length of IPv4 prefix and PSID length is greater than EA bits |
-| | `VPP-435 | length. IPv6 destination address contains bits writen with PSID over the EA-bit length when IPv4 packet is sent. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-435>`_ | |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 4 | `CSIT-409 | IPv6 RA: Incorrect IPv6 destination address in response to ICMPv6 Router Solicitation. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-409>`_ | Wrong IPv6 destination address (ff02::1) is used in ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packet sent as a response to received |
-| | `VPP-406 | ICMPv6 Router Solicitation packet. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-406>`_ | |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 5 | `CSIT-565 | Vhost-user: QEMU reconnect does not work. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-565>`_ | QEMU 2.5.0 used in CSIT does not support vhost-user reconnect. Requires upgrading CSIT VIRL environment to QEMU 2.7.0. |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 6 | `CSIT-1371 | Softwire: Exclude all softwire functional tests until KWs re-worked to PAPI |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1371>`_ | Map commands were remove from VAT by VPP patch https://gerrit.fd.io/r/#/c/16115/. |
-+---+-----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
++---+--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
+| # | JiraID | Issue Description |
++===+====================+=====================================================+
+| | | |
++---+--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/overview.rst b/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/overview.rst
index a4635e7f85..510f204bdf 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/overview.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_functional_tests/overview.rst
@@ -106,56 +106,9 @@ environment:
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Functionality | Description |
+=======================+==============================================+
-| ACL | Ingress Access Control List security for L2 |
-| | Bridge-Domain MAC switching, IPv4 routing, |
-| | IPv6 routing. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| COP | COP address white-list and black-list |
-| | filtering for IPv4 and IPv6 routing. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| DHCP | Dynamic Host Control Protocol Client and |
-| | Proxy for IPv4 and IPv6 routing. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| GRE | Generic Routing Encapsulation Overlay |
-| | Tunnels for IPv4. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPSec | IPSec tunnel and transport modes. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPv4 | IPv4 routing, RPF, ARP, Proxy ARP, ICMPv4. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPv6 | IPv6 routing, NS/ND, RA, ICMPv6. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| L2BD | L2 Bridge-Domain switching for untagged |
-| | Ethernet, dot1q and dot1ad tagged. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| L2XC | L2 Cross-Connect switching for untagged |
-| | Ethernet, dot1q and dot1ad tagged. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| LISP | Locator/ID Separation Protocol overlay |
| | tunnels and locator/id mapping control. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| QoS Policer Metering | Ingress packet rate metering and marking for |
-| | IPv4, IPv6. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| Softwire Tunnels | IPv4-in-IPv6 softwire tunnels. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| Tap Interface | Baseline Linux tap interface tests. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPFIX and SPAN | Telemetry IPFIX netflow statistics and SPAN |
-| | port mirroring. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| uRPF Source Security | Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding security for |
-| | IPv4 and IPv6 routing. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| VLAN Tag Translation | L2 VLAN tag translation 2to2, 2to1, 1to2, |
-| | 1to1. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| VRF Routing | Multi-context VRF IPVPN routing for IPv4 and |
-| | IPv6. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| VXLAN | VXLAN overlay tunneling for L2-over-IPv4 and |
-| | -over-IPv6. |
-+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
Functional Tests Naming
-----------------------
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/csit_release_notes.rst b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
index 74ab68062b..3156ece355 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/csit_release_notes.rst
@@ -6,35 +6,33 @@ Changes in |csit-release|
#. VPP PERFORMANCE TESTS
- - **Service density 2n-skx tests**: Added higher NF density tests with two
- NFs' data-plane threads sharing a physical core. VPP IPv4 routing is now
- used as a VNF payload similar to CNF tests.
+ - **Service density 2n-skx tests**: Added higher NF density tests with
+ 802.1q (vlan) and 802.1ad (vxlan) encapsulation from Traffic Generator.
- - **Soak Tests**: Optimized performamce soak tests framework
- code for extended time duration tests and throughput discovery
- at given PLR and at give total test time e.g. minutes, hours,
- days, weeks. See updated
- :ref:`test_methodology` section for more details.
+ - **GBP tests**: Added GBP routing test cases with 802.1q (vlan) external
+ traffic.
-#. TEST FRAMEWORK
+ - **AVF IPv4 scale tests**: Increased coverage of AVF IPv4 base and scale
+ test cases.
+
+ - **2n-skx tests**: Increased coverage of selected (COP, iACL, Policer)
+ test cases.
+
+ - **IPsec scale tests**: Added IPsec interface mode scale tests with
+ 1, 40, 400, 1000, 5000, 10000, 20000, 40000, 60000 tunnels. Removed DPDK
+ backend dependency.
- - **Qemu code refactor**: Complete code refactor of the key components of
- QemuUtil.py and QemuManager.py (L1 and L2 KW counterparts). Added
- implementation of kernel-image-kvm based VM replacing the previously used
- NestedVM images. Added ability to run VPP as a payload in VNF.
+#. TEST FRAMEWORK
- - **CSIT PAPI Support**: Continued conversion of CSIT VAT L1 keywords to
+ - **CSIT PAPI Support**: Finished conversion of CSIT VAT L1 keywords to
PAPI L1 KWs in CSIT using VPP Python bindings. Redesign of key components
- of PAPI Executor and PAPI history.
+ of PAPI Executor and PAPI history. Currently the only exception is
+ usage of VAT command for scale configuration.
- **General Code Housekeeping**: Ongoing RF keywords optimizations,
- removal of redundant RF keywords.
-
- - **Test suite generator**: Added capability to generate suites for
- different NIC models as well as throughput search algorithm types. Uses
- base tests suites as source.
+ removal of redundant RF keywords and aligning of suite/test
+ setup/teardowns.
- - **TOX verification**: Added verifications for test suite generator.
#. PRESENTATION AND ANALYTICS LAYER
@@ -42,16 +40,6 @@ Changes in |csit-release|
for better readibility and maintenance: test grouping, axis
labels, descriptions, other informative decoration.
-..
- #. MISCELLANEOUS
-
- - **2n-dnv Tests (3rd Party)**: Published performance tests for 2n-
- dnv (2-Node Atom Denverton) from 3rd party testbeds running FD.io
- |csit-release| automated testing code.
- Only graphs for Packet Throughput and Speedup Multi-core and not
- for Packet Latency were published as there are no results for Packet
- Latency available.
-
.. raw:: latex
\clearpage
@@ -72,21 +60,6 @@ List of known issues in |csit-release| for VPP performance tests:
| 2 | `CSIT-1503 | [`TRex-519 <https://trex-tgn.cisco.com/youtrack/issue/trex-519>`_] XL710/XXV710 with FW 6.0.1 will have |
| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1503>`_ | Rx drop rate of 27MPPS. |
+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 3 | `CSIT-1501 | Sporadic crypto backend fails loading `VPP-1670 <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-1670>`_ |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1501>`_ | |
-+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 4 | `CSIT-1427 | Sporadic HW aes-128-cbc-sha1 tunnel-interface tests are failing. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1427>`_ | `VPP-1671 <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-1671>`_ |
-+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 5 | `CSIT-1498 | Memif tests are sporadically failing on initialization of memif connection. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1498>`_ | |
-+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 6 | `CSIT-1499 | AVF tests are sporadically failing on initialization of AVF interface. |
+| 3 | `CSIT-1499 | AVF tests are sporadically failing on initialization of AVF interface. |
| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/CSIT-1499>`_ | |
+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 7 | `VPP-1676 | 9000B ip4 memif errors - ip4-input: ip4 length > l2 length. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-1676>`_ | IP4 jumbo frames (9000B) are dropped in case of tests with memif. |
-+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-| 8 | `VPP-1677 | 9000B ip4 nat44: VPP crash + coredump. |
-| | <https://jira.fd.io/browse/VPP-1677>`_ | VPP crashes very often in case that NAT44 is configured and it has to process IP4 jumbo frames (9000B). |
-+----+-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/overview.rst b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/overview.rst
index 3c95919c55..a2ead6a0b6 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/overview.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/overview.rst
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ performance tested across a range of NIC drivers and NIC models:
| IPv6 Scale | IPv6 routing with 20k, 200k and 2M FIB |
| | entries. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPSecHW | IPSec encryption with AES-GCM, CBC-SHA1 |
+| IPSecHW | IPSec encryption with AES-GCM, CBC-SHA-256 |
| | ciphers, in combination with IPv4 routing. |
| | Intel QAT HW acceleration. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ performance tested across a range of NIC drivers and NIC models:
| | combination with LISP-GPE overlay tunneling |
| | for IPv4-over-IPv4. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
-| IPSecSW | IPSec encryption with AES-GCM, CBC-SHA1 |
+| IPSecSW | IPSec encryption with AES-GCM, CBC-SHA-256 |
| | ciphers, in combination with IPv4 routing. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| K8s Containers Memif | K8s orchestrated container VPP service chain |
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ performance tested across a range of NIC drivers and NIC models:
| | interface. |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| KVM VMs vhost-user | Virtual topologies with service |
-| | chains of 1 and 2 VMs using vhost-user |
+| | chains of 1 VM using vhost-user |
| | interfaces, with different VPP forwarding |
| | modes incl. L2XC, L2BD, VXLAN with L2BD, |
| | IPv4 routing. |
diff --git a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/test_environment.rst b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
index 3c179e1f7a..48045e943e 100644
--- a/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
+++ b/docs/report/vpp_performance_tests/test_environment.rst
@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@
.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_1.rst
-.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_2.rst
-
-.. include:: ../introduction/test_environment_sut_conf_3.rst
-
DUT Settings - VPP
------------------
@@ -38,7 +34,7 @@ VPP Install Parameters
::
- $ dpkg -i --force-all vpp*
+ $ dpkg -i --force-all *vpp*
VPP Startup Configuration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -99,7 +95,6 @@ below:
{
num-rx-queues $$NUM_RX_QUEUES
}
- socket-mem 1024,1024
no-tx-checksum-offload
dev $$DEV_1
dev $$DEV_2
diff --git a/docs/vpp-device.rst b/docs/vpp-device.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 4289887c6b..0000000000
--- a/docs/vpp-device.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
-Integration Tests
-=================
-
-Abstract
---------
-
-FD.io VPP software data plane technology has become very popular across
-a wide range of VPP eco-system use cases, putting higher pressure on
-continuous verification of VPP software quality.
-
-This document describes a proposal for design and implementation of extended
-continuous VPP testing by extending existing test environments.
-Furthermore it describes and summarizes implementation details of Integration
-and System tests platform *1-Node VPP_Device*. It aims to provide a complete
-end-to-end view of *1-Node VPP_Device* environment in order to improve
-extendability and maintenance, under the guideline of VPP core team.
-
-The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
-"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
-interpreted as described in :rfc:`8174`.
-
-Overview
---------
-
-.. only:: latex
-
- .. raw:: latex
-
- \begin{figure}[H]
- \centering
- \graphicspath{{../_tmp/src/vpp_device_tests/}}
- \includegraphics[width=0.90\textwidth]{vpp_device}
- \label{fig:vpp_device}
- \end{figure}
-
-.. only:: html
-
- .. figure:: vpp_device.svg
- :alt: vpp_device
- :align: center
-
-Physical Testbeds
------------------
-
-All :abbr:`FD.io (Fast Data Input/Ouput)` :abbr:`CSIT (Continuous System
-Integration and Testing)` vpp-device tests are executed on physical testbeds
-built with bare-metal servers hosted by :abbr:`LF (Linux Foundation)` FD.io
-project. Two 1-node testbed topologies are used:
-
-- **2-Container Topology**: Consisting of one Docker container acting as SUT
- (System Under Test) and one Docker container as TG (Traffic Generator), both
- connected in ring topology via physical NIC cross-connecting.
-
-Current FD.io production testbeds are built with servers based on one
-processor generation of Intel Xeons: Skylake (Platinum 8180). Testbeds built
-with servers based on Arm processors are in the process of being added to FD.io
-production.
-
-Following section describe existing production 1n-skx testbed.
-
-1-Node Xeon Skylake (1n-skx)
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-1n-skx testbed is based on single SuperMicro SYS-7049GP-TRT server equipped with
-two Intel Xeon Skylake Platinum 8180 2.5 GHz 28 core processors. Physical
-testbed topology is depicted in a figure below.
-
-.. only:: latex
-
- .. raw:: latex
-
- \begin{figure}[H]
- \centering
- \graphicspath{{../_tmp/src/vpp_device_tests/}}
- \includegraphics[width=0.90\textwidth]{vf-2n-nic2nic}
- \label{fig:vf-2n-nic2nic}
- \end{figure}
-
-.. only:: html
-
- .. figure:: vf-2n-nic2nic.svg
- :alt: vf-2n-nic2nic
- :align: center
-
-Server is populated with the following NIC models:
-
-#. NIC-1: x710-da4 4p10GE Intel.
-#. NIC-2: x710-da4 4p10GE Intel.
-
-All Intel Xeon Skylake servers run with Intel Hyper-Threading enabled,
-doubling the number of logical cores exposed to Linux, with 56 logical
-cores and 28 physical cores per processor socket.
-
-NIC interfaces are shared using Linux vfio_pci and VPP VF drivers:
-
-- DPDK VF driver,
-- Fortville AVF driver.
-
-Provided Intel x710-da4 4p10GE NICs support 32 VFs per interface, 128 per NIC.
-
-Complete 1n-skx testbeds specification is available on `CSIT LF Testbeds
-<https://wiki.fd.io/view/CSIT/Testbeds:_Xeon_Skx,_Arm,_Atom.>`_ wiki page.
-
-Total of two 1n-skx testbeds are in operation in FD.io labs.
-
-1-Node Virtualbox (1n-vbox)
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-1n-skx testbed can run in single VirtualBox VM machine. This solution replaces
-the previously used Vagrant environment based on 3 VMs.
-
-VirtualBox VM MAY be created by Vagrant and MUST have additional 4 virtio NICs
-each pair attached to separate private networks to simulate back-to-back
-connections. It SHOULD be 82545EM device model (otherwise can be changed in
-boostrap scripts). Example of Vagrant configuration:
-
-::
-
- Vagrant.configure(2) do |c|
- c.vm.network "private_network", type: "dhcp", auto_config: false,
- virtualbox__intnet: "port1", nic_type: "82545EM"
- c.vm.network "private_network", type: "dhcp", auto_config: false,
- virtualbox__intnet: "port2", nic_type: "82545EM"
-
- c.vm.provider :virtualbox do |v|
- v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc2", "allow-all"]
- v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc3", "allow-all"]
- v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc4", "allow-all"]
- v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nicpromisc5", "allow-all"]
-
-Vagrant VM is populated with the following NIC models:
-
-#. NIC-1: 82545EM Intel.
-#. NIC-2: 82545EM Intel.
-#. NIC-3: 82545EM Intel.
-#. NIC-4: 82545EM Intel.
-
-Containers
-----------
-
-It was agreed on :abbr:`TWS (Technical Work Stream)` call to continue with
-Ubuntu 18.04 LTS as a baseline system with OPTIONAL extend to Centos 7 and
-SuSE per demand [TWSLink]_.
-
-All :abbr:`DCR (Docker container)` images are REQUIRED to be hosted on Docker
-registry available from LF network, publicly available and trackable. For
-backup, tracking and contributing purposes all Dockerfiles (including files
-needed for building container) MUST be available and stored in [fdiocsitgerrit]_
-repository under appropriate folders. This allows the peer review process to be
-done for every change of infrastructure related to scope of this document.
-Currently only **csit-shim-dcr** and **csit-sut-dcr** containers will be stored
-and maintained under CSIT repository by CSIT contributors.
-
-At the time of designing solution described in this document the interconnection
-between [dockerhub]_ and [fdiocsitgerrit]_ for automated build purposes and
-image hosting cannot be established with the trust and respectful to
-security of FD.io project. Unless adressed, :abbr:`DCR` images will be placed in
-custom registry service [fdioregistry]_. Automated Jenkins jobs will be created
-in align of long term solution for container lifecycle and ability to build
-new version of docker images.
-
-In parallel, the effort is started to find the outsourced Docker registry
-service.
-
-Versioning
-~~~~~~~~~~
-
-As of initial version of vpp-device, we do have only single latest version of
-Docker image hosted on [dockerhub]_. This will be addressed as further
-improvement with proper semantic versioning.
-
-jenkins-slave-dcr
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-This :abbr:`DCR` acts as the Jenkins slave (known also as jenkins minion). It
-can connect over SSH protocol to TCP port 6022 of **csit-shim-dcr** and executes
-non-interactive reservation script. Nomad is responsible for scheduling this
-container execution onto specific **1-Node VPP_Device** testbed. It executes
-:abbr:`CSIT` environment including :abbr:`CSIT` framework.
-
-All software dependencies including VPP/DPDK that are not present in
-**csit-sut-dcr** container image and/or needs to be compiled prior running on
-**csit-sut-dcr** SHOULD be compiled in this container.
-
-- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/vpp-ubuntu18.
-
-- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [JenkinsSlaveDcrFile]_.
-
-- *Initializing*: Container is initialized from within *Consul by HashiCorp*
- and *Nomad by HashiCorp*.
-
-csit-shim-dcr
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-This :abbr:`DCR` acts as an intermediate layer running script responsible for
-orchestrating topologies under test and reservation. Responsible for managing VF
-resources and allocation to :abbr:`DUT (Device Under Test)`, :abbr:`TG
-(Traffic Generator)` containers. This MUST to be done on **csit-shim-dcr**.
-This image also acts as the generic reservation mechanics arbiter to make sure
-that only Y number of simulations are spawned on any given HW node.
-
-- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/csit-shim.
-
-- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [CsitShimDcrFile]_.
-
-- *Initializing*: Container is initialized from within *Consul by HashiCorp*
- and *Nomad by HashiCorp*. Required docker parameters, to be able to run
- nested containers with VF reservation system are: privileged, net=host,
- pid=host.
-
-- *Connectivity*: Over SSH only, using <host>:6022 format. Currently using
- *root* user account as primary. From the jenkins slave it will be able to
- connect via env variable, since the jenkins slave doesn't actually know what
- host its running on.
-
- ::
-
- ssh -p 6022 root@10.30.51.node
-
-csit-sut-dcr
-~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-This :abbr:`DCR` acts as an :abbr:`SUT (System Under Test)`. Any :abbr:`DUT` or
-:abbr:`TG` application is installed there. It is RECOMMENDED to install DUT and
-all DUT dependencies via commands ``rpm -ihv`` on RedHat based OS or ``dpkg -i``
-on Debian based OS.
-
-Container is designed to be a very lightweight Docker image that only installs
-packages and execute binaries (previously built or downloaded on
-**jenkins-slave-dcr**) and contains libraries necessary to run CSIT framework
-including those required by DUT/TG.
-
-- *Container Image Location*: Docker image at snergster/csit-sut.
-
-- *Container Definition*: Docker file specified at [CsitSutDcrFile]_.
-
-- *Initializing*:
- ::
-
- docker run
- # Run the container in the background and print the new container ID.
- --detach=true
- # Give extended privileges to this container. A "privileged" container is
- # given access to all devices and able to run nested containers.
- --privileged
- # Publish all exposed ports to random ports on the host interfaces.
- --publish-all
- # Automatically remove the container when it exits.
- --rm
- # Size of /dev/shm.
- --shm-size 512M
- # Override access to PCI bus by attaching a filesystem mount to the
- # container.
- --mount type=tmpfs,destination=/sys/bus/pci/devices
- # Mount vfio to be able to bind to see binded interfaces. We cannot use
- # --device=/dev/vfio as this does not see newly binded interfaces.
- --volume /dev/vfio:/dev/vfio
- # Mount nested_vm image to be able to run VM tests.
- --volume /var/lib/vm/vhost-nested.img:/var/lib/vm/vhost-nested.img
- # Mount docker.sock to be able to use docker deamon of the host.
- --volume /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
- # Image of csit-sut-dcr
- snergster/csit-vpp-device-test:latest
-
- Container name is catenated from **csit-** prefix and uuid generated uniquely
- for each container instance.
-
-- *Connectivity*: Over SSH only, using <host>[:<port>] format. Currently using
- *root* user account as primary.
- ::
-
- ssh -p <port> root@10.30.51.<node>
-
-Container required to run as ``--privileged`` due to ability to create nested
-containers and have full read/write access to sysfs (for bind/unbind). Docker
-automatically pick free network port (``--publish-all``) for ability to connect
-over ssh. To be able to limit access to PCI bus, container is creating tmpfs
-mount type in PCI bus tree. CSIT reservation script is dynamically linking only
-PCI devices (NIC cards) that are reserved for particular container. This
-way it is not colliding with other containers. To make vfio work, access to
-``/dev/vfio`` must be granted.
-
-.. todo: Change default user to testuser with non-privileged and install sudo.
-
-Environment initialization
---------------------------
-
-All 1-node servers are to be managed and provisioned via the [ansiblelink]_ set
-of playbooks with *vpp-device* role. Full playbooks can be found under
-[fdiocsitansible]_ directory. This way we are able to track all configuration
-changes of physical servers in gerrit (in structured yaml format) as well as we
-are able to extend *vpp-device* to additional servers with less effort or
-re-stage servers in case of failure.
-
-SR-IOV VF initialization is done via ``systemd`` service during host system boot
-up. Service with name *csit-initialize-vfs.service* is created under systemd
-system context (``/etc/systemd/system/``). By default service is calling
-``/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh`` with single parameter:
-
-- **start**: Creates maximum number of :abbr:`virtual functions (VFs)` (detected
- from ``sriov_totalvfs``) for each whitelisted PCI device.
-- **stop**: Removes all :abbr:`VFs` for all whitelisted PCI device.
-
-Service is considered active even when all of its processes exited successfully.
-Stopping service will automatically remove :abbr:`VFs`.
-
-::
-
- [Unit]
- Description=CSIT Initialize SR-IOV VFs
- After=network.target
-
- [Service]
- Type=one-shot
- RemainAfterExit=True
- ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh start
- ExecStop=/usr/local/bin/csit-initialize-vfs.sh stop
-
- [Install]
- WantedBy=default.target
-
-Script is driven by two array variables ``pci_blacklist``/``pci_whitelist``.
-They MUST store all PCI addresses in **<domain>:<bus>:<device>.<func>** format,
-where:
-
-- **pci_blacklist**: PCI addresses to be skipped from :abbr:`VFs`
- initialization (usefull for e.g. excluding management network interfaces).
-- **pci_whitelist**: PCI addresses to be included for :abbr:`VFs`
- initialization.
-
-VF reservation
---------------
-
-During topology initialization phase of script, mutex is used to avoid multiple
-instances of script to interact with each other during resources allocation.
-Mutal exclusion ensure that no two distinct instances of script will get same
-resource list.
-
-Reservation function reads the list of all available virtual function network
-devices in system:
-
-::
-
- net_path="/sys/bus/pci/devices/*/net/*"
-
- for netdev in \
- $(find ${net_path} -type d -name . -o -prune -exec basename '{}' ';');
- do
- if grep -q "${pci_id}" "/sys/class/net/${netdev}/device/device"; then
- # found VF
- fi
- done
-
-Where ``${pci_id}`` is ID of white-listed VF PCI ID. For more information please
-see [pciids]_. This act as security constraint to prevent taking other unwanted
-interfaces.
-The output list of all VF network devices is split into two lists for TG and
-SUT side of connection. First two items from each TG or SUT network devices
-list are taken to expose directly to namespace of container. This can be done
-via commands:
-
-::
-
- $ ip link set ${netdev} netns ${DCR_CPIDS[tg]}
- $ ip link set ${netdev} netns ${DCR_CPIDS[dut1]}
-
-In this stage also symbolic links to PCI devices under sysfs bus directory tree
-are created in running containers. Once VF devices are assigned to container
-namespace and PCI deivces are linked to running containers and mutex is exited.
-Selected VF network device automatically dissapear from parent container
-namespace, so another instance of script will not find device under that
-namespace.
-
-Once Docker container exits, network device is returned back into parent
-namespace and can be reused.
-
-Network traffic isolation - Intel i40evf
-----------------------------------------
-
-In a virtualized environment, on Intel(R) Server Adapters that support SR-IOV,
-the virtual function (VF) may be subject to malicious behavior. Software-
-generated layer two frames, like IEEE 802.3x (link flow control), IEEE 802.1Qbb
-(priority based flow-control), and others of this type, are not expected and
-can throttle traffic between the host and the virtual switch, reducing
-performance. To resolve this issue, configure all SR-IOV enabled ports for
-VLAN tagging. This configuration allows unexpected, and potentially malicious,
-frames to be dropped. [inteli40e]_
-
-To configure VLAN tagging for the ports on an SR-IOV enabled adapter,
-use the following command. The VLAN configuration SHOULD be done
-before the VF driver is loaded or the VM is booted. [inteli40e]_
-
-::
-
- $ ip link set dev <PF netdev id> vf <id> vlan <vlan id>
-
-For example, the following instructions will configure PF eth0 and
-the first VF on VLAN 10.
-
-::
-
- $ ip link set dev eth0 vf 0 vlan 10
-
-VLAN Tag Packet Steering allows to send all packets with a specific VLAN tag to
-a particular SR-IOV virtual function (VF). Further, this feature allows to
-designate a particular VF as trusted, and allows that trusted VF to request
-selective promiscuous mode on the Physical Function (PF). [inteli40e]_
-
-To set a VF as trusted or untrusted, enter the following command in the
-Hypervisor:
-
-::
-
- $ ip link set dev eth0 vf 1 trust [on|off]
-
-Once the VF is designated as trusted, use the following commands in the VM
-to set the VF to promiscuous mode. [inteli40e]_
-
-- For promiscuous all:
- ::
-
- $ ip link set eth2 promisc on
-
-- For promiscuous Multicast:
- ::
-
- $ ip link set eth2 allmulti on
-
-.. note::
-
- By default, the ethtool priv-flag vf-true-promisc-support is set to
- *off*, meaning that promiscuous mode for the VF will be limited. To set the
- promiscuous mode for the VF to true promiscuous and allow the VF to see
- all ingress traffic, use the following command.
- $ ethtool set-priv-flags p261p1 vf-true-promisc-support on
- The vf-true-promisc-support priv-flag does not enable promiscuous mode;
- rather, it designates which type of promiscuous mode (limited or true)
- you will get when you enable promiscuous mode using the ip link commands
- above. Note that this is a global setting that affects the entire device.
- However,the vf-true-promisc-support priv-flag is only exposed to the first
- PF of the device. The PF remains in limited promiscuous mode (unless it
- is in MFP mode) regardless of the vf-true-promisc-support setting.
- [inteli40e]_
-
-Service described earlier *csit-initialize-vfs.service* is responsible for
-assigning 802.1Q vlan tagging to each vitual function via physical function
-from list of white-listed PCI addresses by following (simplified) code.
-
-::
-
- pci_idx=0
- for pci_addr in ${pci_whitelist[@]}; do
- pci_path="/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pci_addr}"
- pf=$(basename "${pci_path}"/net/*)
- for vf in $(seq "${sriov_totalvfs}"); do
- # PCI address index in array (pairing siblings).
- vlan_pf_idx=$(( pci_idx % (${#pci_whitelist[@]} / 2) ))
- # 802.1Q base offset.
- vlan_bs_off=1100
- # 802.1Q PF PCI address offset.
- vlan_pf_off=$(( vlan_pf_idx * 100 + vlan_bs_off ))
- # 802.1Q VF PCI address offset.
- vlan_vf_off=$(( vlan_pf_off + vf - 1 ))
- # VLAN string.
- vlan_str="vlan ${vlan_vf_off}"
- # MAC string.
- mac5="$(printf '%x' ${pci_idx})"
- mac6="$(printf '%x' $(( vf - 1 )))"
- mac_str="mac ba:dc:0f:fe:${mac5}:${mac6}"
- # Set 802.1Q VLAN id and MAC address
- ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1 )) ${mac_str} ${vlan_str}
- ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1 )) trust on
- ip link set ${pf} vf $(( vf - 1 )) spoof off
- done
- pci_idx=$(( pci_idx + 1 ))
- done
-
-Assignment starts at VLAN 1100 and incrementing by 1 for each VF and by 100 for
-each white-listed PCI address up to the middle of the PCI list. Second half of
-the lists is assumed to be directly (cable) paired siblings and assigned with
-same 802.1Q VLANs as its siblings.
-
-Open tasks
-----------
-
-Security
-~~~~~~~~
-
-.. note::
-
- Switch to non-privileged containers: As of now all three container
- flavors are using privileged containers to make it working. Explore options
- to switch containers to non-privileged with explicit rather implicit
- privileges.
-
-.. note::
-
- Switch to testuser account intead of root.
-
-Maintainability
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-.. note::
-
- Docker image distribution: Create jenkins jobs with full pipiline of
- CI/CD for CSIT Docker images.
-
-Stability
-~~~~~~~~~
-
-.. note::
-
- Implement queueing mechanism: Currently there is no mechanics that
- would place starving jobs in queue in case of no resources available.
-
-.. note::
-
- Replace reservation script with Docker network plugin written in
- GOLANG/SH/Python - platform independent.
-
-Links
------
-
-.. [TWSLink] `TWS <https://wiki.fd.io/view/CSIT/TWS>`_
-.. [dockerhub] `Docker hub <https://hub.docker.com/>`_
-.. [fdiocsitgerrit] `FD.io/CSIT gerrit <https://gerrit.fd.io/r/CSIT>`_
-.. [fdioregistry] `FD.io registy <registry.fdiopoc.net>`_
-.. [JenkinsSlaveDcrFile] `jenkins-slave-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/ubuntu18/Dockerfile>`_
-.. [CsitShimDcrFile] `csit-shim-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/csit-shim/Dockerfile>`_
-.. [CsitSutDcrFile] `csit-sut-dcr-file <https://github.com/snergfdio/multivppcache/blob/master/csit-sut/Dockerfile>`_
-.. [ansiblelink] `ansible <https://www.ansible.com/>`_
-.. [fdiocsitansible] `Fd.io/CSIT ansible <https://git.fd.io/csit/tree/resources/tools/testbed-setup/ansible>`_
-.. [inteli40e] `Intel i40e <https://downloadmirror.intel.com/26370/eng/readme.txt>`_
-.. [pciids] `pci ids <http://pci-ids.ucw.cz/v2.2/pci.ids>`_