diff options
| author |   imarom <imarom@cisco.com> | 2016-03-21 16:03:47 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | imarom <imarom@cisco.com> | 2016-03-21 16:03:47 +0200 |
| commit | b89efa188810bf95a9d245e69e2961b5721c3b0f (patch) | |
| tree | 454273ac6c4ae972ebb8a2c86b893296970b4fa9 /scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py | |
| parent | f72c6df9d2e9998ae1f3529d729ab7930b35785a (diff) | |
scapy python 2/3
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py | 2486 |
1 files changed, 2486 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py b/scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e6c00496 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/external_libs/scapy-2.3.1/python2/scapy/crypto/cert.py @@ -0,0 +1,2486 @@ +## This file is part of Scapy +## See http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy for more informations +## Copyright (C) Arnaud Ebalard <arno@natisbad.org> +## This program is published under a GPLv2 license + +""" +Cryptographic certificates. +""" + +import os, sys, math, socket, struct, hmac, string, time, random, tempfile +from subprocess import Popen, PIPE +from scapy.utils import strxor +try: + HAS_HASHLIB=True + import hashlib +except: + HAS_HASHLIB=False + +from Crypto.PublicKey import * +from Crypto.Cipher import * +from Crypto.Hash import * +from Crypto.Util import number + +# Maximum allowed size in bytes for a certificate file, to avoid +# loading huge file when importing a cert +MAX_KEY_SIZE=50*1024 +MAX_CERT_SIZE=50*1024 +MAX_CRL_SIZE=10*1024*1024 # some are that big + +##################################################################### +# Some helpers +##################################################################### + +def popen3(cmd): + p = Popen(cmd, shell=False, stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, + close_fds=True) + return p.stdout, p.stdin, p.stderr + +def warning(m): + print "WARNING: %s" % m + +def randstring(l): + """ + Returns a random string of length l (l >= 0) + """ + tmp = map(lambda x: struct.pack("B", random.randrange(0, 256, 1)), [""]*l) + return "".join(tmp) + +def zerofree_randstring(l): + """ + Returns a random string of length l (l >= 0) without zero in it. + """ + tmp = map(lambda x: struct.pack("B", random.randrange(1, 256, 1)), [""]*l) + return "".join(tmp) + +def strand(s1, s2): + """ + Returns the binary AND of the 2 provided strings s1 and s2. s1 and s2 + must be of same length. + """ + return "".join(map(lambda x,y:chr(ord(x)&ord(y)), s1, s2)) + +# OS2IP function defined in RFC 3447 for octet string to integer conversion +def pkcs_os2ip(x): + """ + Accepts a byte string as input parameter and return the associated long + value: + + Input : x octet string to be converted + + Output: x corresponding nonnegative integer + + Reverse function is pkcs_i2osp() + """ + return number.bytes_to_long(x) + +# IP2OS function defined in RFC 3447 for octet string to integer conversion +def pkcs_i2osp(x,xLen): + """ + Converts a long (the first parameter) to the associated byte string + representation of length l (second parameter). Basically, the length + parameters allow the function to perform the associated padding. + + Input : x nonnegative integer to be converted + xLen intended length of the resulting octet string + + Output: x corresponding nonnegative integer + + Reverse function is pkcs_os2ip(). + """ + z = number.long_to_bytes(x) + padlen = max(0, xLen-len(z)) + return '\x00'*padlen + z + +# for every hash function a tuple is provided, giving access to +# - hash output length in byte +# - associated hash function that take data to be hashed as parameter +# XXX I do not provide update() at the moment. +# - DER encoding of the leading bits of digestInfo (the hash value +# will be concatenated to create the complete digestInfo). +# +# Notes: +# - MD4 asn.1 value should be verified. Also, as stated in +# PKCS#1 v2.1, MD4 should not be used. +# - hashlib is available from http://code.krypto.org/python/hashlib/ +# - 'tls' one is the concatenation of both md5 and sha1 hashes used +# by SSL/TLS when signing/verifying things +_hashFuncParams = { + "md2" : (16, + lambda x: MD2.new(x).digest(), + '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x02\x05\x00\x04\x10'), + "md4" : (16, + lambda x: MD4.new(x).digest(), + '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x04\x05\x00\x04\x10'), # is that right ? + "md5" : (16, + lambda x: MD5.new(x).digest(), + '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05\x05\x00\x04\x10'), + "sha1" : (20, + lambda x: SHA.new(x).digest(), + '\x30\x21\x30\x09\x06\x05\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a\x05\x00\x04\x14'), + "tls" : (36, + lambda x: MD5.new(x).digest() + SHA.new(x).digest(), + '') } + +if HAS_HASHLIB: + _hashFuncParams["sha224"] = (28, + lambda x: hashlib.sha224(x).digest(), + '\x30\x2d\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x04\x05\x00\x04\x1c') + _hashFuncParams["sha256"] = (32, + lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x).digest(), + '\x30\x31\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x05\x00\x04\x20') + _hashFuncParams["sha384"] = (48, + lambda x: hashlib.sha384(x).digest(), + '\x30\x41\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x02\x05\x00\x04\x30') + _hashFuncParams["sha512"] = (64, + lambda x: hashlib.sha512(x).digest(), + '\x30\x51\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\x05\x00\x04\x40') +else: + warning("hashlib support is not available. Consider installing it") + warning("if you need sha224, sha256, sha384 and sha512 algs.") + +def pkcs_mgf1(mgfSeed, maskLen, h): + """ + Implements generic MGF1 Mask Generation function as described in + Appendix B.2.1 of RFC 3447. The hash function is passed by name. + valid values are 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls, 'sha256', + 'sha384' and 'sha512'. Returns None on error. + + Input: + mgfSeed: seed from which mask is generated, an octet string + maskLen: intended length in octets of the mask, at most 2^32 * hLen + hLen (see below) + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of + the hash function output. + + Output: + an octet string of length maskLen + """ + + # steps are those of Appendix B.2.1 + if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h): + warning("pkcs_mgf1: invalid hash (%s) provided") + return None + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] + hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + if maskLen > 2**32 * hLen: # 1) + warning("pkcs_mgf1: maskLen > 2**32 * hLen") + return None + T = "" # 2) + maxCounter = math.ceil(float(maskLen) / float(hLen)) # 3) + counter = 0 + while counter < maxCounter: + C = pkcs_i2osp(counter, 4) + T += hFunc(mgfSeed + C) + counter += 1 + return T[:maskLen] + + +def pkcs_emsa_pss_encode(M, emBits, h, mgf, sLen): + """ + Implements EMSA-PSS-ENCODE() function described in Sect. 9.1.1 of RFC 3447 + + Input: + M : message to be encoded, an octet string + emBits: maximal bit length of the integer resulting of pkcs_os2ip(EM), + where EM is the encoded message, output of the function. + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of + the hash function output. + mgf : the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask + sLen : intended length in octets of the salt + + Output: + encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = ceil(emBits/8) + + On error, None is returned. + """ + + # 1) is not done + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] # 2) + hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + mHash = hFunc(M) + emLen = int(math.ceil(emBits/8.)) + if emLen < hLen + sLen + 2: # 3) + warning("encoding error (emLen < hLen + sLen + 2)") + return None + salt = randstring(sLen) # 4) + MPrime = '\x00'*8 + mHash + salt # 5) + H = hFunc(MPrime) # 6) + PS = '\x00'*(emLen - sLen - hLen - 2) # 7) + DB = PS + '\x01' + salt # 8) + dbMask = mgf(H, emLen - hLen - 1) # 9) + maskedDB = strxor(DB, dbMask) # 10) + l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8 # 11) + rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits + andMask = l*'\x00' + if rem: + j = chr(reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem)))) + andMask += j + l += 1 + maskedDB = strand(maskedDB[:l], andMask) + maskedDB[l:] + EM = maskedDB + H + '\xbc' # 12) + return EM # 13) + + +def pkcs_emsa_pss_verify(M, EM, emBits, h, mgf, sLen): + """ + Implements EMSA-PSS-VERIFY() function described in Sect. 9.1.2 of RFC 3447 + + Input: + M : message to be encoded, an octet string + EM : encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = ceil(emBits/8) + emBits: maximal bit length of the integer resulting of pkcs_os2ip(EM) + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of + the hash function output. + mgf : the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask + sLen : intended length in octets of the salt + + Output: + True if the verification is ok, False otherwise. + """ + + # 1) is not done + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] # 2) + hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + mHash = hFunc(M) + emLen = int(math.ceil(emBits/8.)) # 3) + if emLen < hLen + sLen + 2: + return False + if EM[-1] != '\xbc': # 4) + return False + l = emLen - hLen - 1 # 5) + maskedDB = EM[:l] + H = EM[l:l+hLen] + l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8 # 6) + rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits + andMask = l*'\xff' + if rem: + val = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem))) + j = chr(~val & 0xff) + andMask += j + l += 1 + if strand(maskedDB[:l], andMask) != '\x00'*l: + return False + dbMask = mgf(H, emLen - hLen - 1) # 7) + DB = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask) # 8) + l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8 # 9) + rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits + andMask = l*'\x00' + if rem: + j = chr(reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem)))) + andMask += j + l += 1 + DB = strand(DB[:l], andMask) + DB[l:] + l = emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 # 10) + if DB[:l] != '\x00'*(l-1) + '\x01': + return False + salt = DB[-sLen:] # 11) + MPrime = '\x00'*8 + mHash + salt # 12) + HPrime = hFunc(MPrime) # 13) + return H == HPrime # 14) + + +def pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, emLen, h): # section 9.2 of RFC 3447 + """ + Implements EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE() function described in Sect. + 9.2 of RFC 3447. + + Input: + M : message to be encode, an octet string + emLen: intended length in octets of the encoded message, at least + tLen + 11, where tLen is the octet length of the DER encoding + T of a certain value computed during the encoding operation. + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of + the hash function output. + + Output: + encoded message, an octet string of length emLen + + On error, None is returned. + """ + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] # 1) + hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + H = hFunc(M) + hLeadingDigestInfo = _hashFuncParams[h][2] # 2) + T = hLeadingDigestInfo + H + tLen = len(T) + if emLen < tLen + 11: # 3) + warning("pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode: intended encoded message length too short") + return None + PS = '\xff'*(emLen - tLen - 3) # 4) + EM = '\x00' + '\x01' + PS + '\x00' + T # 5) + return EM # 6) + + +# XXX should add other pgf1 instance in a better fashion. + +def create_ca_file(anchor_list, filename): + """ + Concatenate all the certificates (PEM format for the export) in + 'anchor_list' and write the result to file 'filename'. On success + 'filename' is returned, None otherwise. + + If you are used to OpenSSL tools, this function builds a CAfile + that can be used for certificate and CRL check. + + Also see create_temporary_ca_file(). + """ + try: + f = open(filename, "w") + for a in anchor_list: + s = a.output(fmt="PEM") + f.write(s) + f.close() + except: + return None + return filename + +def create_temporary_ca_file(anchor_list): + """ + Concatenate all the certificates (PEM format for the export) in + 'anchor_list' and write the result to file to a temporary file + using mkstemp() from tempfile module. On success 'filename' is + returned, None otherwise. + + If you are used to OpenSSL tools, this function builds a CAfile + that can be used for certificate and CRL check. + + Also see create_temporary_ca_file(). + """ + try: + f, fname = tempfile.mkstemp() + for a in anchor_list: + s = a.output(fmt="PEM") + l = os.write(f, s) + os.close(f) + except: + return None + return fname + +def create_temporary_ca_path(anchor_list, folder): + """ + Create a CA path folder as defined in OpenSSL terminology, by + storing all certificates in 'anchor_list' list in PEM format + under provided 'folder' and then creating the associated links + using the hash as usually done by c_rehash. + + Note that you can also include CRL in 'anchor_list'. In that + case, they will also be stored under 'folder' and associated + links will be created. + + In folder, the files are created with names of the form + 0...ZZ.pem. If you provide an empty list, folder will be created + if it does not already exist, but that's all. + + The number of certificates written to folder is returned on + success, None on error. + """ + # We should probably avoid writing duplicate anchors and also + # check if they are all certs. + try: + if not os.path.isdir(folder): + os.makedirs(folder) + except: + return None + + l = len(anchor_list) + if l == 0: + return None + fmtstr = "%%0%sd.pem" % math.ceil(math.log(l, 10)) + i = 0 + try: + for a in anchor_list: + fname = os.path.join(folder, fmtstr % i) + f = open(fname, "w") + s = a.output(fmt="PEM") + f.write(s) + f.close() + i += 1 + except: + return None + + r,w,e=popen3(["c_rehash", folder]) + r.close(); w.close(); e.close() + + return l + + +##################################################################### +# Public Key Cryptography related stuff +##################################################################### + +class OSSLHelper: + def _apply_ossl_cmd(self, osslcmd, rawdata): + r,w,e=popen3(osslcmd) + w.write(rawdata) + w.close() + res = r.read() + r.close() + e.close() + return res + +class _EncryptAndVerify: + ### Below are encryption methods + + def _rsaep(self, m): + """ + Internal method providing raw RSA encryption, i.e. simple modular + exponentiation of the given message representative 'm', a long + between 0 and n-1. + + This is the encryption primitive RSAEP described in PKCS#1 v2.1, + i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.1.1. + + Input: + m: message representative, a long between 0 and n-1, where + n is the key modulus. + + Output: + ciphertext representative, a long between 0 and n-1 + + Not intended to be used directly. Please, see encrypt() method. + """ + + n = self.modulus + if type(m) is int: + m = long(m) + if type(m) is not long or m > n-1: + warning("Key._rsaep() expects a long between 0 and n-1") + return None + + return self.key.encrypt(m, "")[0] + + + def _rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(self, M): + """ + Implements RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT() function described in section + 7.2.1 of RFC 3447. + + Input: + M: message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen, where + mLen <= k - 11 (k denotes the length in octets of the key modulus) + + Output: + ciphertext, an octet string of length k + + On error, None is returned. + """ + + # 1) Length checking + mLen = len(M) + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + if mLen > k - 11: + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(): message too " + "long (%d > %d - 11)" % (mLen, k)) + return None + + # 2) EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding + PS = zerofree_randstring(k - mLen - 3) # 2.a) + EM = '\x00' + '\x02' + PS + '\x00' + M # 2.b) + + # 3) RSA encryption + m = pkcs_os2ip(EM) # 3.a) + c = self._rsaep(m) # 3.b) + C = pkcs_i2osp(c, k) # 3.c) + + return C # 4) + + + def _rsaes_oaep_encrypt(self, M, h=None, mgf=None, L=None): + """ + Internal method providing RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT as defined in Sect. + 7.1.1 of RFC 3447. Not intended to be used directly. Please, see + encrypt() method for type "OAEP". + + + Input: + M : message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen + where mLen <= k - 2*hLen - 2 (k denotes the length in octets + of the RSA modulus and hLen the length in octets of the hash + function output) + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of + the hash function output. 'sha1' is used by default if not + provided. + mgf: the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask + L : optional label to be associated with the message; the default + value for L, if not provided is the empty string + + Output: + ciphertext, an octet string of length k + + On error, None is returned. + """ + # The steps below are the one described in Sect. 7.1.1 of RFC 3447. + # 1) Length Checking + # 1.a) is not done + mLen = len(M) + if h is None: + h = "sha1" + if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h): + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(): unknown hash function %s.", h) + return None + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] + hFun = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + if mLen > k - 2*hLen - 2: # 1.b) + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(): message too long.") + return None + + # 2) EME-OAEP encoding + if L is None: # 2.a) + L = "" + lHash = hFun(L) + PS = '\x00'*(k - mLen - 2*hLen - 2) # 2.b) + DB = lHash + PS + '\x01' + M # 2.c) + seed = randstring(hLen) # 2.d) + if mgf is None: # 2.e) + mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x,y,h) + dbMask = mgf(seed, k - hLen - 1) + maskedDB = strxor(DB, dbMask) # 2.f) + seedMask = mgf(maskedDB, hLen) # 2.g) + maskedSeed = strxor(seed, seedMask) # 2.h) + EM = '\x00' + maskedSeed + maskedDB # 2.i) + + # 3) RSA Encryption + m = pkcs_os2ip(EM) # 3.a) + c = self._rsaep(m) # 3.b) + C = pkcs_i2osp(c, k) # 3.c) + + return C # 4) + + + def encrypt(self, m, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, L=None): + """ + Encrypt message 'm' using 't' encryption scheme where 't' can be: + + - None: the message 'm' is directly applied the RSAEP encryption + primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 + Sect 5.1.1. Simply put, the message undergo a modular + exponentiation using the public key. Additionnal method + parameters are just ignored. + + - 'pkcs': the message 'm' is applied RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT encryption + scheme as described in section 7.2.1 of RFC 3447. In that + context, other parameters ('h', 'mgf', 'l') are not used. + + - 'oaep': the message 'm' is applied the RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT encryption + scheme, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect + 7.1.1. In that context, + + o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use. + Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", + "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, + sha1 is used. + + o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf + is derived from the provided hash function using the + generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details). + + o 'L' is the optional label to be associated with the + message. If not provided, the default value is used, i.e + the empty string. No check is done on the input limitation + of the hash function regarding the size of 'L' (for + instance, 2^61 - 1 for SHA-1). You have been warned. + """ + + if t is None: # Raw encryption + m = pkcs_os2ip(m) + c = self._rsaep(m) + return pkcs_i2osp(c, self.modulusLen/8) + + elif t == "pkcs": + return self._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(m) + + elif t == "oaep": + return self._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(m, h, mgf, L) + + else: + warning("Key.encrypt(): Unknown encryption type (%s) provided" % t) + return None + + ### Below are verification related methods + + def _rsavp1(self, s): + """ + Internal method providing raw RSA verification, i.e. simple modular + exponentiation of the given signature representative 'c', an integer + between 0 and n-1. + + This is the signature verification primitive RSAVP1 described in + PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.2.2. + + Input: + s: signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1, + where n is the key modulus. + + Output: + message representative, an integer between 0 and n-1 + + Not intended to be used directly. Please, see verify() method. + """ + return self._rsaep(s) + + def _rsassa_pss_verify(self, M, S, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None): + """ + Implements RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY() function described in Sect 8.1.2 + of RFC 3447 + + Input: + M: message whose signature is to be verified + S: signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where k + is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n. + + Output: + True is the signature is valid. False otherwise. + """ + + # Set default parameters if not provided + if h is None: # By default, sha1 + h = "sha1" + if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h): + warning("Key._rsassa_pss_verify(): unknown hash function " + "provided (%s)" % h) + return False + if mgf is None: # use mgf1 with underlying hash function + mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h) + if sLen is None: # use Hash output length (A.2.3 of RFC 3447) + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] + sLen = hLen + + # 1) Length checking + modBits = self.modulusLen + k = modBits / 8 + if len(S) != k: + return False + + # 2) RSA verification + s = pkcs_os2ip(S) # 2.a) + m = self._rsavp1(s) # 2.b) + emLen = math.ceil((modBits - 1) / 8.) # 2.c) + EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, emLen) + + # 3) EMSA-PSS verification + Result = pkcs_emsa_pss_verify(M, EM, modBits - 1, h, mgf, sLen) + + return Result # 4) + + + def _rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(self, M, S, h): + """ + Implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY() function as described in + Sect. 8.2.2 of RFC 3447. + + Input: + M: message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string + S: signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where + k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n + h: hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). + + Output: + True if the signature is valid. False otherwise. + """ + + # 1) Length checking + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + if len(S) != k: + warning("invalid signature (len(S) != k)") + return False + + # 2) RSA verification + s = pkcs_os2ip(S) # 2.a) + m = self._rsavp1(s) # 2.b) + EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k) # 2.c) + + # 3) EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding + EMPrime = pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, k, h) + if EMPrime is None: + warning("Key._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(): unable to encode.") + return False + + # 4) Comparison + return EM == EMPrime + + + def verify(self, M, S, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None): + """ + Verify alleged signature 'S' is indeed the signature of message 'M' using + 't' signature scheme where 't' can be: + + - None: the alleged signature 'S' is directly applied the RSAVP1 signature + primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect + 5.2.1. Simply put, the provided signature is applied a moular + exponentiation using the public key. Then, a comparison of the + result is done against 'M'. On match, True is returned. + Additionnal method parameters are just ignored. + + - 'pkcs': the alleged signature 'S' and message 'M' are applied + RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY signature verification scheme as + described in Sect. 8.2.2 of RFC 3447. In that context, + the hash function name is passed using 'h'. Possible values are + "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" + and "sha512". If none is provided, sha1 is used. Other additionnal + parameters are ignored. + + - 'pss': the alleged signature 'S' and message 'M' are applied + RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY signature scheme as described in Sect. 8.1.2. + of RFC 3447. In that context, + + o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use. + Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", + "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, sha1 + is used. + + o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf + is derived from the provided hash function using the + generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details). + + o 'sLen' is the length in octet of the salt. You can overload the + default value (the octet length of the hash value for provided + algorithm) by providing another one with that parameter. + """ + if t is None: # RSAVP1 + S = pkcs_os2ip(S) + n = self.modulus + if S > n-1: + warning("Signature to be verified is too long for key modulus") + return False + m = self._rsavp1(S) + if m is None: + return False + l = int(math.ceil(math.log(m, 2) / 8.)) # Hack + m = pkcs_i2osp(m, l) + return M == m + + elif t == "pkcs": # RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY + if h is None: + h = "sha1" + return self._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(M, S, h) + + elif t == "pss": # RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY + return self._rsassa_pss_verify(M, S, h, mgf, sLen) + + else: + warning("Key.verify(): Unknown signature type (%s) provided" % t) + return None + +class _DecryptAndSignMethods(OSSLHelper): + ### Below are decryption related methods. Encryption ones are inherited + ### from PubKey + + def _rsadp(self, c): + """ + Internal method providing raw RSA decryption, i.e. simple modular + exponentiation of the given ciphertext representative 'c', a long + between 0 and n-1. + + This is the decryption primitive RSADP described in PKCS#1 v2.1, + i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.1.2. + + Input: + c: ciphertest representative, a long between 0 and n-1, where + n is the key modulus. + + Output: + ciphertext representative, a long between 0 and n-1 + + Not intended to be used directly. Please, see encrypt() method. + """ + + n = self.modulus + if type(c) is int: + c = long(c) + if type(c) is not long or c > n-1: + warning("Key._rsaep() expects a long between 0 and n-1") + return None + + return self.key.decrypt(c) + + + def _rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(self, C): + """ + Implements RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT() function described in section + 7.2.2 of RFC 3447. + + Input: + C: ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where + k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n. + + Output: + an octet string of length k at most k - 11 + + on error, None is returned. + """ + + # 1) Length checking + cLen = len(C) + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + if cLen != k or k < 11: + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt() decryption error " + "(cLen != k or k < 11)") + return None + + # 2) RSA decryption + c = pkcs_os2ip(C) # 2.a) + m = self._rsadp(c) # 2.b) + EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k) # 2.c) + + # 3) EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding + + # I am aware of the note at the end of 7.2.2 regarding error + # conditions reporting but the one provided below are for _local_ + # debugging purposes. --arno + + if EM[0] != '\x00': + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error " + "(first byte is not 0x00)") + return None + + if EM[1] != '\x02': + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error " + "(second byte is not 0x02)") + return None + + tmp = EM[2:].split('\x00', 1) + if len(tmp) != 2: + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error " + "(no 0x00 to separate PS from M)") + return None + + PS, M = tmp + if len(PS) < 8: + warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error " + "(PS is less than 8 byte long)") + return None + + return M # 4) + + + def _rsaes_oaep_decrypt(self, C, h=None, mgf=None, L=None): + """ + Internal method providing RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT as defined in Sect. + 7.1.2 of RFC 3447. Not intended to be used directly. Please, see + encrypt() method for type "OAEP". + + + Input: + C : ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where + k = 2*hLen + 2 (k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus + and hLen the length in octets of the hash function output) + h : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls', + 'sha256', 'sha384'). 'sha1' is used if none is provided. + mgf: the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask + L : optional label whose association with the message is to be + verified; the default value for L, if not provided is the empty + string. + + Output: + message, an octet string of length k mLen, where mLen <= k - 2*hLen - 2 + + On error, None is returned. + """ + # The steps below are the one described in Sect. 7.1.2 of RFC 3447. + + # 1) Length Checking + # 1.a) is not done + if h is None: + h = "sha1" + if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h): + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): unknown hash function %s.", h) + return None + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] + hFun = _hashFuncParams[h][1] + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + cLen = len(C) + if cLen != k: # 1.b) + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(cLen != k)") + return None + if k < 2*hLen + 2: + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(k < 2*hLen + 2)") + return None + + # 2) RSA decryption + c = pkcs_os2ip(C) # 2.a) + m = self._rsadp(c) # 2.b) + EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k) # 2.c) + + # 3) EME-OAEP decoding + if L is None: # 3.a) + L = "" + lHash = hFun(L) + Y = EM[:1] # 3.b) + if Y != '\x00': + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(Y is not zero)") + return None + maskedSeed = EM[1:1+hLen] + maskedDB = EM[1+hLen:] + if mgf is None: + mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h) + seedMask = mgf(maskedDB, hLen) # 3.c) + seed = strxor(maskedSeed, seedMask) # 3.d) + dbMask = mgf(seed, k - hLen - 1) # 3.e) + DB = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask) # 3.f) + + # I am aware of the note at the end of 7.1.2 regarding error + # conditions reporting but the one provided below are for _local_ + # debugging purposes. --arno + + lHashPrime = DB[:hLen] # 3.g) + tmp = DB[hLen:].split('\x01', 1) + if len(tmp) != 2: + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(0x01 separator not found)") + return None + PS, M = tmp + if PS != '\x00'*len(PS): + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(invalid padding string)") + return None + if lHash != lHashPrime: + warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. " + "(invalid hash)") + return None + return M # 4) + + + def decrypt(self, C, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, L=None): + """ + Decrypt ciphertext 'C' using 't' decryption scheme where 't' can be: + + - None: the ciphertext 'C' is directly applied the RSADP decryption + primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 + Sect 5.1.2. Simply, put the message undergo a modular + exponentiation using the private key. Additionnal method + parameters are just ignored. + + - 'pkcs': the ciphertext 'C' is applied RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT + decryption scheme as described in section 7.2.2 of RFC 3447. + In that context, other parameters ('h', 'mgf', 'l') are not + used. + + - 'oaep': the ciphertext 'C' is applied the RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT decryption + scheme, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect + 7.1.2. In that context, + + o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use. + Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", + "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, + sha1 is used by default. + + o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf + is derived from the provided hash function using the + generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details). + + o 'L' is the optional label to be associated with the + message. If not provided, the default value is used, i.e + the empty string. No check is done on the input limitation + of the hash function regarding the size of 'L' (for + instance, 2^61 - 1 for SHA-1). You have been warned. + """ + if t is None: + C = pkcs_os2ip(C) + c = self._rsadp(C) + l = int(math.ceil(math.log(c, 2) / 8.)) # Hack + return pkcs_i2osp(c, l) + + elif t == "pkcs": + return self._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(C) + + elif t == "oaep": + return self._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(C, h, mgf, L) + + else: + warning("Key.decrypt(): Unknown decryption type (%s) provided" % t) + return None + + ### Below are signature related methods. Verification ones are inherited from + ### PubKey + + def _rsasp1(self, m): + """ + Internal method providing raw RSA signature, i.e. simple modular + exponentiation of the given message representative 'm', an integer + between 0 and n-1. + + This is the signature primitive RSASP1 described in PKCS#1 v2.1, + i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.2.1. + + Input: + m: message representative, an integer between 0 and n-1, where + n is the key modulus. + + Output: + signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1 + + Not intended to be used directly. Please, see sign() method. + """ + return self._rsadp(m) + + + def _rsassa_pss_sign(self, M, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None): + """ + Implements RSASSA-PSS-SIGN() function described in Sect. 8.1.1 of + RFC 3447. + + Input: + M: message to be signed, an octet string + + Output: + signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in + octets of the RSA modulus n. + + On error, None is returned. + """ + + # Set default parameters if not provided + if h is None: # By default, sha1 + h = "sha1" + if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h): + warning("Key._rsassa_pss_sign(): unknown hash function " + "provided (%s)" % h) + return None + if mgf is None: # use mgf1 with underlying hash function + mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h) + if sLen is None: # use Hash output length (A.2.3 of RFC 3447) + hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0] + sLen = hLen + + # 1) EMSA-PSS encoding + modBits = self.modulusLen + k = modBits / 8 + EM = pkcs_emsa_pss_encode(M, modBits - 1, h, mgf, sLen) + if EM is None: + warning("Key._rsassa_pss_sign(): unable to encode") + return None + + # 2) RSA signature + m = pkcs_os2ip(EM) # 2.a) + s = self._rsasp1(m) # 2.b) + S = pkcs_i2osp(s, k) # 2.c) + + return S # 3) + + + def _rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(self, M, h): + """ + Implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN() function as described in + Sect. 8.2.1 of RFC 3447. + + Input: + M: message to be signed, an octet string + h: hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls' + 'sha256', 'sha384'). + + Output: + the signature, an octet string. + """ + + # 1) EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding + k = self.modulusLen / 8 + EM = pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, k, h) + if EM is None: + warning("Key._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(): unable to encode") + return None + + # 2) RSA signature + m = pkcs_os2ip(EM) # 2.a) + s = self._rsasp1(m) # 2.b) + S = pkcs_i2osp(s, k) # 2.c) + + return S # 3) + + + def sign(self, M, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None): + """ + Sign message 'M' using 't' signature scheme where 't' can be: + + - None: the message 'M' is directly applied the RSASP1 signature + primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect + 5.2.1. Simply put, the message undergo a modular exponentiation + using the private key. Additionnal method parameters are just + ignored. + + - 'pkcs': the message 'M' is applied RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN signature + scheme as described in Sect. 8.2.1 of RFC 3447. In that context, + the hash function name is passed using 'h'. Possible values are + "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" + and "sha512". If none is provided, sha1 is used. Other additionnal + parameters are ignored. + + - 'pss' : the message 'M' is applied RSASSA-PSS-SIGN signature scheme as + described in Sect. 8.1.1. of RFC 3447. In that context, + + o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use. + Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", + "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, sha1 + is used. + + o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf + is derived from the provided hash function using the + generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details). + + o 'sLen' is the length in octet of the salt. You can overload the + default value (the octet length of the hash value for provided + algorithm) by providing another one with that parameter. + """ + + if t is None: # RSASP1 + M = pkcs_os2ip(M) + n = self.modulus + if M > n-1: + warning("Message to be signed is too long for key modulus") + return None + s = self._rsasp1(M) + if s is None: + return None + return pkcs_i2osp(s, self.modulusLen/8) + + elif t == "pkcs": # RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN + if h is None: + h = "sha1" + return self._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(M, h) + + elif t == "pss": # RSASSA-PSS-SIGN + return self._rsassa_pss_sign(M, h, mgf, sLen) + + else: + warning("Key.sign(): Unknown signature type (%s) provided" % t) + return None + + +def openssl_parse_RSA(fmt="PEM"): + return popen3(['openssl', 'rsa', '-text', '-pubin', '-inform', fmt, '-noout']) +def openssl_convert_RSA(infmt="PEM", outfmt="DER"): + return ['openssl', 'rsa', '-pubin', '-inform', infmt, '-outform', outfmt] + +class PubKey(OSSLHelper, _EncryptAndVerify): + # Below are the fields we recognize in the -text output of openssl + # and from which we extract information. We expect them in that + # order. Number of spaces does matter. + possible_fields = [ "Modulus (", + "Exponent:" ] + possible_fields_count = len(possible_fields) + + def __init__(self, keypath): + error_msg = "Unable to import key." + + # XXX Temporary hack to use PubKey inside Cert + if type(keypath) is tuple: + e, m, mLen = keypath + self.modulus = m + self.modulusLen = mLen + self.pubExp = e + return + + fields_dict = {} + for k in self.possible_fields: + fields_dict[k] = None + + self.keypath = None + rawkey = None + + if (not '\x00' in keypath) and os.path.isfile(keypath): # file + self.keypath = keypath + key_size = os.path.getsize(keypath) + if key_size > MAX_KEY_SIZE: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + f = open(keypath) + rawkey = f.read() + f.close() + except: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: + rawkey = keypath + + if rawkey is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.rawkey = rawkey + + key_header = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----" + key_footer = "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" + l = rawkey.split(key_header, 1) + if len(l) == 2: # looks like PEM + tmp = l[1] + l = tmp.split(key_footer, 1) + if len(l) == 2: + tmp = l[0] + rawkey = "%s%s%s\n" % (key_header, tmp, key_footer) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + r,w,e = openssl_parse_RSA("PEM") + w.write(rawkey) + w.close() + textkey = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res == '': + self.format = "PEM" + self.pemkey = rawkey + self.textkey = textkey + cmd = openssl_convert_RSA_cmd("PEM", "DER") + self.derkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: # not PEM, try DER + r,w,e = openssl_parse_RSA("DER") + w.write(rawkey) + w.close() + textkey = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + if res == '': + self.format = "DER" + self.derkey = rawkey + self.textkey = textkey + cmd = openssl_convert_RSA_cmd("DER", "PEM") + self.pemkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + cmd = openssl_convert_RSA_cmd("DER", "DER") + self.derkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + else: + try: # Perhaps it is a cert + c = Cert(keypath) + except: + raise Exception(error_msg) + # TODO: + # Reconstruct a key (der and pem) and provide: + # self.format + # self.derkey + # self.pemkey + # self.textkey + # self.keypath + + self.osslcmdbase = ['openssl', 'rsa', '-pubin', '-inform', self.format] + + self.keypath = keypath + + # Parse the -text output of openssl to make things available + l = self.textkey.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: + raise Exception(error_msg) + cur, tmp = l + i = 0 + k = self.possible_fields[i] # Modulus ( + cur = cur[len(k):] + '\n' + while k: + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: # Over + fields_dict[k] = cur + break + l, tmp = l + + newkey = 0 + # skip fields we have already seen, this is the purpose of 'i' + for j in range(i, self.possible_fields_count): + f = self.possible_fields[j] + if l.startswith(f): + fields_dict[k] = cur + cur = l[len(f):] + '\n' + k = f + newkey = 1 + i = j+1 + break + if newkey == 1: + continue + cur += l + '\n' + + # modulus and modulus length + v = fields_dict["Modulus ("] + self.modulusLen = None + if v: + v, rem = v.split(' bit):', 1) + self.modulusLen = int(v) + rem = rem.replace('\n','').replace(' ','').replace(':','') + self.modulus = long(rem, 16) + if self.modulus is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # public exponent + v = fields_dict["Exponent:"] + self.pubExp = None + if v: + self.pubExp = long(v.split('(', 1)[0]) + if self.pubExp is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.key = RSA.construct((self.modulus, self.pubExp, )) + + def __str__(self): + return self.derkey + + +class Key(OSSLHelper, _DecryptAndSignMethods, _EncryptAndVerify): + # Below are the fields we recognize in the -text output of openssl + # and from which we extract information. We expect them in that + # order. Number of spaces does matter. + possible_fields = [ "Private-Key: (", + "modulus:", + "publicExponent:", + "privateExponent:", + "prime1:", + "prime2:", + "exponent1:", + "exponent2:", + "coefficient:" ] + possible_fields_count = len(possible_fields) + + def __init__(self, keypath): + error_msg = "Unable to import key." + + fields_dict = {} + for k in self.possible_fields: + fields_dict[k] = None + + self.keypath = None + rawkey = None + + if (not '\x00' in keypath) and os.path.isfile(keypath): + self.keypath = keypath + key_size = os.path.getsize(keypath) + if key_size > MAX_KEY_SIZE: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + f = open(keypath) + rawkey = f.read() + f.close() + except: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: + rawkey = keypath + + if rawkey is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.rawkey = rawkey + + # Let's try to get file format : PEM or DER. + fmtstr = 'openssl rsa -text -inform %s -noout' + convertstr = 'openssl rsa -inform %s -outform %s' + key_header = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" + key_footer = "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" + l = rawkey.split(key_header, 1) + if len(l) == 2: # looks like PEM + tmp = l[1] + l = tmp.split(key_footer, 1) + if len(l) == 2: + tmp = l[0] + rawkey = "%s%s%s\n" % (key_header, tmp, key_footer) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "PEM").split(" ")) + w.write(rawkey) + w.close() + textkey = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res == '': + self.format = "PEM" + self.pemkey = rawkey + self.textkey = textkey + cmd = (convertstr % ("PEM", "DER")).split(" ") + self.derkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: # not PEM, try DER + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "DER").split(" ")) + w.write(rawkey) + w.close() + textkey = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + if res == '': + self.format = "DER" + self.derkey = rawkey + self.textkey = textkey + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "PEM")).split(" ") + self.pemkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "DER")).split(" ") + self.derkey = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawkey) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.osslcmdbase = ['openssl', 'rsa', '-inform', self.format] + + r,w,e = popen3(["openssl", "asn1parse", "-inform", "DER"]) + w.write(self.derkey) + w.close() + self.asn1parsekey = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res != '': + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.keypath = keypath + + # Parse the -text output of openssl to make things available + l = self.textkey.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: + raise Exception(error_msg) + cur, tmp = l + i = 0 + k = self.possible_fields[i] # Private-Key: ( + cur = cur[len(k):] + '\n' + while k: + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: # Over + fields_dict[k] = cur + break + l, tmp = l + + newkey = 0 + # skip fields we have already seen, this is the purpose of 'i' + for j in range(i, self.possible_fields_count): + f = self.possible_fields[j] + if l.startswith(f): + fields_dict[k] = cur + cur = l[len(f):] + '\n' + k = f + newkey = 1 + i = j+1 + break + if newkey == 1: + continue + cur += l + '\n' + + # modulus length + v = fields_dict["Private-Key: ("] + self.modulusLen = None + if v: + self.modulusLen = int(v.split(' bit', 1)[0]) + if self.modulusLen is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # public exponent + v = fields_dict["publicExponent:"] + self.pubExp = None + if v: + self.pubExp = long(v.split('(', 1)[0]) + if self.pubExp is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + tmp = {} + for k in ["modulus:", "privateExponent:", "prime1:", "prime2:", + "exponent1:", "exponent2:", "coefficient:"]: + v = fields_dict[k] + if v: + s = v.replace('\n', '').replace(' ', '').replace(':', '') + tmp[k] = long(s, 16) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.modulus = tmp["modulus:"] + self.privExp = tmp["privateExponent:"] + self.prime1 = tmp["prime1:"] + self.prime2 = tmp["prime2:"] + self.exponent1 = tmp["exponent1:"] + self.exponent2 = tmp["exponent2:"] + self.coefficient = tmp["coefficient:"] + + self.key = RSA.construct((self.modulus, self.pubExp, self.privExp)) + + def __str__(self): + return self.derkey + + +# We inherit from PubKey to get access to all encryption and verification +# methods. To have that working, we simply need Cert to provide +# modulusLen and key attribute. +# XXX Yes, it is a hack. +class Cert(OSSLHelper, _EncryptAndVerify): + # Below are the fields we recognize in the -text output of openssl + # and from which we extract information. We expect them in that + # order. Number of spaces does matter. + possible_fields = [ " Version:", + " Serial Number:", + " Signature Algorithm:", + " Issuer:", + " Not Before:", + " Not After :", + " Subject:", + " Public Key Algorithm:", + " Modulus (", + " Exponent:", + " X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:", + " X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:", + " keyid:", + " DirName:", + " serial:", + " X509v3 Basic Constraints:", + " X509v3 Key Usage:", + " X509v3 Extended Key Usage:", + " X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:", + " Authority Information Access:", + " Signature Algorithm:" ] + possible_fields_count = len(possible_fields) + + def __init__(self, certpath): + error_msg = "Unable to import certificate." + + fields_dict = {} + for k in self.possible_fields: + fields_dict[k] = None + + self.certpath = None + rawcert = None + + if (not '\x00' in certpath) and os.path.isfile(certpath): # file + self.certpath = certpath + cert_size = os.path.getsize(certpath) + if cert_size > MAX_CERT_SIZE: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + f = open(certpath) + rawcert = f.read() + f.close() + except: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: + rawcert = certpath + + if rawcert is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.rawcert = rawcert + + # Let's try to get file format : PEM or DER. + fmtstr = 'openssl x509 -text -inform %s -noout' + convertstr = 'openssl x509 -inform %s -outform %s' + cert_header = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" + cert_footer = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----" + l = rawcert.split(cert_header, 1) + if len(l) == 2: # looks like PEM + tmp = l[1] + l = tmp.split(cert_footer, 1) + if len(l) == 2: + tmp = l[0] + rawcert = "%s%s%s\n" % (cert_header, tmp, cert_footer) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "PEM").split(" ")) + w.write(rawcert) + w.close() + textcert = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res == '': + self.format = "PEM" + self.pemcert = rawcert + self.textcert = textcert + cmd = (convertstr % ("PEM", "DER")).split(" ") + self.dercert = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcert) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: # not PEM, try DER + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "DER").split(" ")) + w.write(rawcert) + w.close() + textcert = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + if res == '': + self.format = "DER" + self.dercert = rawcert + self.textcert = textcert + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "PEM")).split(" ") + self.pemcert = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcert) + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "DER")).split(" ") + self.dercert = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcert) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.osslcmdbase = ['openssl', 'x509', '-inform', self.format] + + r,w,e = popen3('openssl asn1parse -inform DER'.split(' ')) + w.write(self.dercert) + w.close() + self.asn1parsecert = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res != '': + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Grab _raw_ X509v3 Authority Key Identifier, if any. + tmp = self.asn1parsecert.split(":X509v3 Authority Key Identifier", 1) + self.authorityKeyID = None + if len(tmp) == 2: + tmp = tmp[1] + tmp = tmp.split("[HEX DUMP]:", 1)[1] + self.authorityKeyID=tmp.split('\n',1)[0] + + # Grab _raw_ X509v3 Subject Key Identifier, if any. + tmp = self.asn1parsecert.split(":X509v3 Subject Key Identifier", 1) + self.subjectKeyID = None + if len(tmp) == 2: + tmp = tmp[1] + tmp = tmp.split("[HEX DUMP]:", 1)[1] + self.subjectKeyID=tmp.split('\n',1)[0] + + # Get tbsCertificate using the worst hack. output of asn1parse + # looks like that: + # + # 0:d=0 hl=4 l=1298 cons: SEQUENCE + # 4:d=1 hl=4 l=1018 cons: SEQUENCE + # ... + # + l1,l2 = self.asn1parsecert.split('\n', 2)[:2] + hl1 = int(l1.split("hl=",1)[1].split("l=",1)[0]) + rem = l2.split("hl=",1)[1] + hl2, rem = rem.split("l=",1) + hl2 = int(hl2) + l = int(rem.split("cons",1)[0]) + self.tbsCertificate = self.dercert[hl1:hl1+hl2+l] + + # Parse the -text output of openssl to make things available + tmp = self.textcert.split('\n', 2)[2] + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: + raise Exception(error_msg) + cur, tmp = l + i = 0 + k = self.possible_fields[i] # Version: + cur = cur[len(k):] + '\n' + while k: + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: # Over + fields_dict[k] = cur + break + l, tmp = l + + newkey = 0 + # skip fields we have already seen, this is the purpose of 'i' + for j in range(i, self.possible_fields_count): + f = self.possible_fields[j] + if l.startswith(f): + fields_dict[k] = cur + cur = l[len(f):] + '\n' + k = f + newkey = 1 + i = j+1 + break + if newkey == 1: + continue + cur += l + '\n' + + # version + v = fields_dict[" Version:"] + self.version = None + if v: + self.version = int(v[1:2]) + if self.version is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # serial number + v = fields_dict[" Serial Number:"] + self.serial = None + if v: + v = v.replace('\n', '').strip() + if "0x" in v: + v = v.split("0x", 1)[1].split(')', 1)[0] + v = v.replace(':', '').upper() + if len(v) % 2: + v = '0' + v + self.serial = v + if self.serial is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Signature Algorithm + v = fields_dict[" Signature Algorithm:"] + self.sigAlg = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.sigAlg = v + if self.sigAlg is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # issuer + v = fields_dict[" Issuer:"] + self.issuer = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.issuer = v + if self.issuer is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # not before + v = fields_dict[" Not Before:"] + self.notBefore_str = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.notBefore_str = v + if self.notBefore_str is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + self.notBefore = time.strptime(self.notBefore_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z") + except: + self.notBefore = time.strptime(self.notBefore_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y") + self.notBefore_str_simple = time.strftime("%x", self.notBefore) + + # not after + v = fields_dict[" Not After :"] + self.notAfter_str = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.notAfter_str = v + if self.notAfter_str is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + self.notAfter = time.strptime(self.notAfter_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z") + except: + self.notAfter = time.strptime(self.notAfter_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y") + self.notAfter_str_simple = time.strftime("%x", self.notAfter) + + # subject + v = fields_dict[" Subject:"] + self.subject = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.subject = v + if self.subject is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Public Key Algorithm + v = fields_dict[" Public Key Algorithm:"] + self.pubKeyAlg = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.pubKeyAlg = v + if self.pubKeyAlg is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Modulus + v = fields_dict[" Modulus ("] + self.modulus = None + if v: + v,t = v.split(' bit):',1) + self.modulusLen = int(v) + t = t.replace(' ', '').replace('\n', ''). replace(':', '') + self.modulus_hexdump = t + self.modulus = long(t, 16) + if self.modulus is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Exponent + v = fields_dict[" Exponent:"] + self.exponent = None + if v: + v = v.split('(',1)[0] + self.exponent = long(v) + if self.exponent is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Public Key instance + self.key = RSA.construct((self.modulus, self.exponent, )) + + # Subject Key Identifier + + # Authority Key Identifier: keyid, dirname and serial + self.authorityKeyID_keyid = None + self.authorityKeyID_dirname = None + self.authorityKeyID_serial = None + if self.authorityKeyID: # (hex version already done using asn1parse) + v = fields_dict[" keyid:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip().replace(':', '') + self.authorityKeyID_keyid = v + v = fields_dict[" DirName:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + self.authorityKeyID_dirname = v + v = fields_dict[" serial:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip().replace(':', '') + self.authorityKeyID_serial = v + + # Basic constraints + self.basicConstraintsCritical = False + self.basicConstraints=None + v = fields_dict[" X509v3 Basic Constraints:"] + if v: + self.basicConstraints = {} + v,t = v.split('\n',2)[:2] + if "critical" in v: + self.basicConstraintsCritical = True + if "CA:" in t: + self.basicConstraints["CA"] = t.split('CA:')[1][:4] == "TRUE" + if "pathlen:" in t: + self.basicConstraints["pathlen"] = int(t.split('pathlen:')[1]) + + # X509v3 Key Usage + self.keyUsage = [] + v = fields_dict[" X509v3 Key Usage:"] + if v: + # man 5 x509v3_config + ku_mapping = {"Digital Signature": "digitalSignature", + "Non Repudiation": "nonRepudiation", + "Key Encipherment": "keyEncipherment", + "Data Encipherment": "dataEncipherment", + "Key Agreement": "keyAgreement", + "Certificate Sign": "keyCertSign", + "CRL Sign": "cRLSign", + "Encipher Only": "encipherOnly", + "Decipher Only": "decipherOnly"} + v = v.split('\n',2)[1] + l = map(lambda x: x.strip(), v.split(',')) + while l: + c = l.pop() + if ku_mapping.has_key(c): + self.keyUsage.append(ku_mapping[c]) + else: + self.keyUsage.append(c) # Add it anyway + print "Found unknown X509v3 Key Usage: '%s'" % c + print "Report it to arno (at) natisbad.org for addition" + + # X509v3 Extended Key Usage + self.extKeyUsage = [] + v = fields_dict[" X509v3 Extended Key Usage:"] + if v: + # man 5 x509v3_config: + eku_mapping = {"TLS Web Server Authentication": "serverAuth", + "TLS Web Client Authentication": "clientAuth", + "Code Signing": "codeSigning", + "E-mail Protection": "emailProtection", + "Time Stamping": "timeStamping", + "Microsoft Individual Code Signing": "msCodeInd", + "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing": "msCodeCom", + "Microsoft Trust List Signing": "msCTLSign", + "Microsoft Encrypted File System": "msEFS", + "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto": "msSGC", + "Netscape Server Gated Crypto": "nsSGC", + "IPSec End System": "iPsecEndSystem", + "IPSec Tunnel": "iPsecTunnel", + "IPSec User": "iPsecUser"} + v = v.split('\n',2)[1] + l = map(lambda x: x.strip(), v.split(',')) + while l: + c = l.pop() + if eku_mapping.has_key(c): + self.extKeyUsage.append(eku_mapping[c]) + else: + self.extKeyUsage.append(c) # Add it anyway + print "Found unknown X509v3 Extended Key Usage: '%s'" % c + print "Report it to arno (at) natisbad.org for addition" + + # CRL Distribution points + self.cRLDistributionPoints = [] + v = fields_dict[" X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:"] + if v: + v = v.split("\n\n", 1)[0] + v = v.split("URI:")[1:] + self.CRLDistributionPoints = map(lambda x: x.strip(), v) + + # Authority Information Access: list of tuples ("method", "location") + self.authorityInfoAccess = [] + v = fields_dict[" Authority Information Access:"] + if v: + v = v.split("\n\n", 1)[0] + v = v.split("\n")[1:] + for e in v: + method, location = map(lambda x: x.strip(), e.split(" - ", 1)) + self.authorityInfoAccess.append((method, location)) + + # signature field + v = fields_dict[" Signature Algorithm:" ] + self.sig = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[1] + v = v.replace(' ', '').replace('\n', '') + self.sig = "".join(map(lambda x: chr(int(x, 16)), v.split(':'))) + self.sigLen = len(self.sig) + if self.sig is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + def isIssuerCert(self, other): + """ + True if 'other' issued 'self', i.e.: + - self.issuer == other.subject + - self is signed by other + """ + # XXX should be done on raw values, instead of their textual repr + if self.issuer != other.subject: + return False + + # Sanity check regarding modulus length and the + # signature length + keyLen = (other.modulusLen + 7)/8 + if keyLen != self.sigLen: + return False + + unenc = other.encrypt(self.sig) # public key encryption, i.e. decrypt + + # XXX Check block type (00 or 01 and type of padding) + unenc = unenc[1:] + if not '\x00' in unenc: + return False + pos = unenc.index('\x00') + unenc = unenc[pos+1:] + + found = None + for k in _hashFuncParams.keys(): + if self.sigAlg.startswith(k): + found = k + break + if not found: + return False + hlen, hfunc, digestInfo = _hashFuncParams[k] + + if len(unenc) != (hlen+len(digestInfo)): + return False + + if not unenc.startswith(digestInfo): + return False + + h = unenc[-hlen:] + myh = hfunc(self.tbsCertificate) + + return h == myh + + def chain(self, certlist): + """ + Construct the chain of certificates leading from 'self' to the + self signed root using the certificates in 'certlist'. If the + list does not provide all the required certs to go to the root + the function returns a incomplete chain starting with the + certificate. This fact can be tested by tchecking if the last + certificate of the returned chain is self signed (if c is the + result, c[-1].isSelfSigned()) + """ + d = {} + for c in certlist: + # XXX we should check if we have duplicate + d[c.subject] = c + res = [self] + cur = self + while not cur.isSelfSigned(): + if d.has_key(cur.issuer): + possible_issuer = d[cur.issuer] + if cur.isIssuerCert(possible_issuer): + res.append(possible_issuer) + cur = possible_issuer + else: + break + return res + + def remainingDays(self, now=None): + """ + Based on the value of notBefore field, returns the number of + days the certificate will still be valid. The date used for the + comparison is the current and local date, as returned by + time.localtime(), except if 'now' argument is provided another + one. 'now' argument can be given as either a time tuple or a string + representing the date. Accepted format for the string version + are: + + - '%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z' e.g. 'Jan 30 07:38:59 2008 GMT' + - '%m/%d/%y' e.g. '01/30/08' (less precise) + + If the certificate is no more valid at the date considered, then, + a negative value is returned representing the number of days + since it has expired. + + The number of days is returned as a float to deal with the unlikely + case of certificates that are still just valid. + """ + if now is None: + now = time.localtime() + elif type(now) is str: + try: + if '/' in now: + now = time.strptime(now, '%m/%d/%y') + else: + now = time.strptime(now, '%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z') + except: + warning("Bad time string provided '%s'. Using current time" % now) + now = time.localtime() + + now = time.mktime(now) + nft = time.mktime(self.notAfter) + diff = (nft - now)/(24.*3600) + return diff + + + # return SHA-1 hash of cert embedded public key + # !! At the moment, the trailing 0 is in the hashed string if any + def keyHash(self): + m = self.modulus_hexdump + res = [] + i = 0 + l = len(m) + while i<l: # get a string version of modulus + res.append(struct.pack("B", int(m[i:i+2], 16))) + i += 2 + return sha.new("".join(res)).digest() + + def output(self, fmt="DER"): + if fmt == "DER": + return self.dercert + elif fmt == "PEM": + return self.pemcert + elif fmt == "TXT": + return self.textcert + + def export(self, filename, fmt="DER"): + """ + Export certificate in 'fmt' format (PEM, DER or TXT) to file 'filename' + """ + f = open(filename, "wb") + f.write(self.output(fmt)) + f.close() + + def isSelfSigned(self): + """ + Return True if the certificate is self signed: + - issuer and subject are the same + - the signature of the certificate is valid. + """ + if self.issuer == self.subject: + return self.isIssuerCert(self) + return False + + # Print main informations stored in certificate + def show(self): + print "Serial: %s" % self.serial + print "Issuer: " + self.issuer + print "Subject: " + self.subject + print "Validity: %s to %s" % (self.notBefore_str_simple, + self.notAfter_str_simple) + + def __repr__(self): + return "[X.509 Cert. Subject:%s, Issuer:%s]" % (self.subject, self.issuer) + + def __str__(self): + return self.dercert + + def verifychain(self, anchors, untrusted=None): + """ + Perform verification of certificate chains for that certificate. The + behavior of verifychain method is mapped (and also based) on openssl + verify userland tool (man 1 verify). + A list of anchors is required. untrusted parameter can be provided + a list of untrusted certificates that can be used to reconstruct the + chain. + + If you have a lot of certificates to verify against the same + list of anchor, consider constructing this list as a cafile + and use .verifychain_from_cafile() instead. + """ + cafile = create_temporary_ca_file(anchors) + if not cafile: + return False + untrusted_file = None + if untrusted: + untrusted_file = create_temporary_ca_file(untrusted) # hack + if not untrusted_file: + os.unlink(cafile) + return False + res = self.verifychain_from_cafile(cafile, + untrusted_file=untrusted_file) + os.unlink(cafile) + if untrusted_file: + os.unlink(untrusted_file) + return res + + def verifychain_from_cafile(self, cafile, untrusted_file=None): + """ + Does the same job as .verifychain() but using the list of anchors + from the cafile. This is useful (because more efficient) if + you have a lot of certificates to verify do it that way: it + avoids the creation of a cafile from anchors at each call. + + As for .verifychain(), a list of untrusted certificates can be + passed (as a file, this time) + """ + cmd = ["openssl", "verify", "-CAfile", cafile] + if untrusted_file: + cmd += ["-untrusted", untrusted_file] + try: + pemcert = self.output(fmt="PEM") + cmdres = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, pemcert) + except: + return False + return cmdres.endswith("\nOK\n") or cmdres.endswith(": OK\n") + + def verifychain_from_capath(self, capath, untrusted_file=None): + """ + Does the same job as .verifychain_from_cafile() but using the list + of anchors in capath directory. The directory should contain + certificates files in PEM format with associated links as + created using c_rehash utility (man c_rehash). + + As for .verifychain_from_cafile(), a list of untrusted certificates + can be passed as a file (concatenation of the certificates in + PEM format) + """ + cmd = ["openssl", "verify", "-CApath", capath] + if untrusted_file: + cmd += ["-untrusted", untrusted_file] + try: + pemcert = self.output(fmt="PEM") + cmdres = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, pemcert) + except: + return False + return cmdres.endswith("\nOK\n") or cmdres.endswith(": OK\n") + + def is_revoked(self, crl_list): + """ + Given a list of trusted CRL (their signature has already been + verified with trusted anchors), this function returns True if + the certificate is marked as revoked by one of those CRL. + + Note that if the Certificate was on hold in a previous CRL and + is now valid again in a new CRL and bot are in the list, it + will be considered revoked: this is because _all_ CRLs are + checked (not only the freshest) and revocation status is not + handled. + + Also note that the check on the issuer is performed on the + Authority Key Identifier if available in _both_ the CRL and the + Cert. Otherwise, the issuers are simply compared. + """ + for c in crl_list: + if (self.authorityKeyID is not None and + c.authorityKeyID is not None and + self.authorityKeyID == c.authorityKeyID): + return self.serial in map(lambda x: x[0], c.revoked_cert_serials) + elif (self.issuer == c.issuer): + return self.serial in map(lambda x: x[0], c.revoked_cert_serials) + return False + +def print_chain(l): + llen = len(l) - 1 + if llen < 0: + return "" + c = l[llen] + llen -= 1 + s = "_ " + if not c.isSelfSigned(): + s = "_ ... [Missing Root]\n" + else: + s += "%s [Self Signed]\n" % c.subject + i = 1 + while (llen != -1): + c = l[llen] + s += "%s\_ %s" % (" "*i, c.subject) + if llen != 0: + s += "\n" + i += 2 + llen -= 1 + print s + +# import popen2 +# a=popen3("openssl crl -text -inform DER -noout ", capturestderr=True) +# a.tochild.write(open("samples/klasa1.crl").read()) +# a.tochild.close() +# a.poll() + +class CRL(OSSLHelper): + # Below are the fields we recognize in the -text output of openssl + # and from which we extract information. We expect them in that + # order. Number of spaces does matter. + possible_fields = [ " Version", + " Signature Algorithm:", + " Issuer:", + " Last Update:", + " Next Update:", + " CRL extensions:", + " X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:", + " X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:", + " keyid:", + " DirName:", + " serial:", + " X509v3 CRL Number:", + "Revoked Certificates:", + "No Revoked Certificates.", + " Signature Algorithm:" ] + possible_fields_count = len(possible_fields) + + def __init__(self, crlpath): + error_msg = "Unable to import CRL." + + fields_dict = {} + for k in self.possible_fields: + fields_dict[k] = None + + self.crlpath = None + rawcrl = None + + if (not '\x00' in crlpath) and os.path.isfile(crlpath): + self.crlpath = crlpath + cert_size = os.path.getsize(crlpath) + if cert_size > MAX_CRL_SIZE: + raise Exception(error_msg) + try: + f = open(crlpath) + rawcrl = f.read() + f.close() + except: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: + rawcrl = crlpath + + if rawcrl is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.rawcrl = rawcrl + + # Let's try to get file format : PEM or DER. + fmtstr = 'openssl crl -text -inform %s -noout' + convertstr = 'openssl crl -inform %s -outform %s' + crl_header = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----" + crl_footer = "-----END X509 CRL-----" + l = rawcrl.split(crl_header, 1) + if len(l) == 2: # looks like PEM + tmp = l[1] + l = tmp.split(crl_footer, 1) + if len(l) == 2: + tmp = l[0] + rawcrl = "%s%s%s\n" % (crl_header, tmp, crl_footer) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "PEM").split(" ")) + w.write(rawcrl) + w.close() + textcrl = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res == '': + self.format = "PEM" + self.pemcrl = rawcrl + self.textcrl = textcrl + cmd = (convertstr % ("PEM", "DER")).split(" ") + self.dercrl = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcrl) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + else: # not PEM, try DER + r,w,e = popen3((fmtstr % "DER").split(' ')) + w.write(rawcrl) + w.close() + textcrl = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + if res == '': + self.format = "DER" + self.dercrl = rawcrl + self.textcrl = textcrl + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "PEM")).split(" ") + self.pemcrl = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcrl) + cmd = (convertstr % ("DER", "DER")).split(" ") + self.dercrl = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, rawcrl) + else: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + self.osslcmdbase = ['openssl', 'crl', '-inform', self.format] + + r,w,e = popen3(('openssl asn1parse -inform DER').split(" ")) + w.write(self.dercrl) + w.close() + self.asn1parsecrl = r.read() + r.close() + res = e.read() + e.close() + if res != '': + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # Grab _raw_ X509v3 Authority Key Identifier, if any. + tmp = self.asn1parsecrl.split(":X509v3 Authority Key Identifier", 1) + self.authorityKeyID = None + if len(tmp) == 2: + tmp = tmp[1] + tmp = tmp.split("[HEX DUMP]:", 1)[1] + self.authorityKeyID=tmp.split('\n',1)[0] + + # Parse the -text output of openssl to make things available + tmp = self.textcrl.split('\n', 1)[1] + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: + raise Exception(error_msg) + cur, tmp = l + i = 0 + k = self.possible_fields[i] # Version + cur = cur[len(k):] + '\n' + while k: + l = tmp.split('\n', 1) + if len(l) != 2: # Over + fields_dict[k] = cur + break + l, tmp = l + + newkey = 0 + # skip fields we have already seen, this is the purpose of 'i' + for j in range(i, self.possible_fields_count): + f = self.possible_fields[j] + if l.startswith(f): + fields_dict[k] = cur + cur = l[len(f):] + '\n' + k = f + newkey = 1 + i = j+1 + break + if newkey == 1: + continue + cur += l + '\n' + + # version + v = fields_dict[" Version"] + self.version = None + if v: + self.version = int(v[1:2]) + if self.version is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # signature algorithm + v = fields_dict[" Signature Algorithm:"] + self.sigAlg = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.sigAlg = v + if self.sigAlg is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # issuer + v = fields_dict[" Issuer:"] + self.issuer = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.issuer = v + if self.issuer is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + # last update + v = fields_dict[" Last Update:"] + self.lastUpdate_str = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.lastUpdate_str = v + if self.lastUpdate_str is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + self.lastUpdate = time.strptime(self.lastUpdate_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z") + self.lastUpdate_str_simple = time.strftime("%x", self.lastUpdate) + + # next update + v = fields_dict[" Next Update:"] + self.nextUpdate_str = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip() + self.nextUpdate_str = v + if self.nextUpdate_str is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + self.nextUpdate = time.strptime(self.nextUpdate_str, + "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z") + self.nextUpdate_str_simple = time.strftime("%x", self.nextUpdate) + + # XXX Do something for Issuer Alternative Name + + # Authority Key Identifier: keyid, dirname and serial + self.authorityKeyID_keyid = None + self.authorityKeyID_dirname = None + self.authorityKeyID_serial = None + if self.authorityKeyID: # (hex version already done using asn1parse) + v = fields_dict[" keyid:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip().replace(':', '') + self.authorityKeyID_keyid = v + v = fields_dict[" DirName:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + self.authorityKeyID_dirname = v + v = fields_dict[" serial:"] + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[0] + v = v.strip().replace(':', '') + self.authorityKeyID_serial = v + + # number + v = fields_dict[" X509v3 CRL Number:"] + self.number = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',2)[1] + v = v.strip() + self.number = int(v) + + # Get the list of serial numbers of revoked certificates + self.revoked_cert_serials = [] + v = fields_dict["Revoked Certificates:"] + t = fields_dict["No Revoked Certificates."] + if (t is None and v is not None): + v = v.split("Serial Number: ")[1:] + for r in v: + s,d = r.split('\n', 1) + s = s.split('\n', 1)[0] + d = d.split("Revocation Date:", 1)[1] + d = time.strptime(d.strip(), "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z") + self.revoked_cert_serials.append((s,d)) + + # signature field + v = fields_dict[" Signature Algorithm:" ] + self.sig = None + if v: + v = v.split('\n',1)[1] + v = v.replace(' ', '').replace('\n', '') + self.sig = "".join(map(lambda x: chr(int(x, 16)), v.split(':'))) + self.sigLen = len(self.sig) + if self.sig is None: + raise Exception(error_msg) + + def __str__(self): + return self.dercrl + + # Print main informations stored in CRL + def show(self): + print "Version: %d" % self.version + print "sigAlg: " + self.sigAlg + print "Issuer: " + self.issuer + print "lastUpdate: %s" % self.lastUpdate_str_simple + print "nextUpdate: %s" % self.nextUpdate_str_simple + + def verify(self, anchors): + """ + Return True if the CRL is signed by one of the provided + anchors. False on error (invalid signature, missing anchorand, ...) + """ + cafile = create_temporary_ca_file(anchors) + if cafile is None: + return False + try: + cmd = self.osslcmdbase + ["-noout", "-CAfile", cafile] + cmdres = self._apply_ossl_cmd(cmd, self.rawcrl) + except: + os.unlink(cafile) + return False + os.unlink(cafile) + return "verify OK" in cmdres + + + |