diff options
author | Neale Ranns <nranns@cisco.com> | 2020-11-18 11:13:27 +0000 |
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committer | Neale Ranns <neale@graphiant.com> | 2021-07-02 15:45:21 +0000 |
commit | 9de8028a0bc0b27032d6e42292baaa8b183f2495 (patch) | |
tree | c2a1ca32a469de496fe4ffa0ebda4ab41ab2e3b1 | |
parent | 0577ff1c39662f720450154fe409bdad16204c63 (diff) |
ipsec: ADD/update IPSec documentation
Type: docs
Signed-off-by: Neale Ranns <nranns@cisco.com>
Change-Id: Ica576e13953a3c720a7c093af649d1dd380cc2c0
l--------- | docs/gettingstarted/developers/ipsec.rst | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.rst | 199 |
2 files changed, 200 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/gettingstarted/developers/ipsec.rst b/docs/gettingstarted/developers/ipsec.rst new file mode 120000 index 00000000000..46a12cdeacc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/gettingstarted/developers/ipsec.rst @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../../../src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.rst
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.rst b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d7e02740fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.rst @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +.. _ipsec: + +.. toctree:: + +IP Security +=========== + +This is not a description on how IPSec works. Please read: + + - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4301 + - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4302 + - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4303 + + +I would also suggest this: + + - https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/RouteBasedVPN + + +If you're interested in cryptography, I would recommend this excellent +introductory lecture series (there is also a book, but you'll have to +buy it, IMHO it's worth it): + + - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1usFRN4LCMcfIV7UjHNuQg/featured + + +IPSec VPNs come in two flavours; policy and route based, the +difference is how the Security Association (SA) is chosen. + + +Route Base VPNs +--------------- + +There are two aspects of a route based VPN; all packets to a +particular peer are encrypted by the same SA and routing +decides the peer to which to forward traffic (as routing always +does). Therefore, routing is choosing the SA. Of course the same must +be true in reverse, that all packets from a given peer are decrypted +with the same SA. Another way of expressing this is to say a peer is +'protected' by this SA (really a pair of SAs; one for rx and tx). + +The 'standard' [#i1]_ way of representing this protected peer is by +using a point-to-point virtual interface to which the peer is +attached and the SA pair is associated. Prefixes +that require protection are routed through this virtual interface and +hence implicitly to the peer. + +There are three components to the model: + +- The SAs; An **ipsec_sa_t**, use the force, read the source. +- The virtual interface +- The protection - the association of the SAs to the interface. + + +The protection is represented by a **ipsec_tun_protect_t**. The "tun" +part comes from the fact that the protected interface is usually a +tunnel. IMO It would have been better if the author had not assumed +this [#i2]_. +The protection associates a single TX SA and up to four RX SAs to an +interface. Four is as many as can fit on one cache-line. Multiple RX +SAs mean that a peer can be using any SA in the set, this is +particularly useful during rekeying because it is not possible for the +peers to swap their RX and TX SAs at exactly the same moment in the +traffic stream. Instead they can add the new RX immediately, then swap +the TX after a short delay, then remove the old RX after another short +delay. This will minimize, if not eliminate, packet loss. + +The virtual interface can be represented in two ways: + + - interface + encap + SA = (interface + encap) + SA = ipip-interface + SA transport mode + +or + + - interface + encap + SA = interface + (encap + SA) = IPSec-interface + SA tunnel mode + +It's a question of where you add the parenthesis, from the perspective +of the external user the effect is identical. + +The IPSec interface serves as the encap-free interface to be used in +conjunction with an encap-describing tunnel mode SA. VPP supports both models. + +A route based VPN could impose 0, 1 or 2 encaps. the support matrix for these use cases is: + +.. code-block:: console + + + | 0 | 1 | 2 | + -------------------------- + ipip | N | Y | Y | + ipsec | P | Y | P | + +Where P = potentially. + +Ipsec could potentially support 0 encap (i.e. transport mode) since +neither the interface nor the SA *requires* encap. However, for a +route based VPN to use transport mode is probably wrong since one +shouldn't use transport mode for transit traffic, since without encap +it is not guaranteed to return. IPSec could potentially support 2 +encaps, but that would require the SA to describe both, something it +does not do at this time. + +Internally the difference is that the mid-chain adjacency for the IPSec +interface has no associated encap (whereas for an ipip tunnel it +describes the peer). Consequently, features on the output arc see +packets without any encap. Since the protecting SAs are in tunnel +mode, they apply the encap. The mid-chain adj is stacked only once the +protecting SA is known, since only then is the peer known. Otherwise +the VLIB graph nodes used are the same: + +.. code-block:: console + + (routing) --> ipX-michain --> espX-encrypt --> adj-midchain-tx --> (routing) + + where X = 4 or 6. + + +Some benefits to the ipsec interface: + +- it is slightly more efficient since the encapsulating IP header has its checksum updated only once. +- even when the interface is admin up traffic cannot be sent to a peer + unless the SA is available (since it's the SA that determines the + encap). With ipip interfaces a client must use the admin state to + prevent sending until the SA is available. + +The best recommendations I can make are: + +- pick a model that supports your use case +- make sure any other features you wish to use are supported by the model +- choose the model that best fits your control plane's model. + + +Multi-point Interfaces +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +As mentioned above route based VPNs protect all packets destined to +a given peer with the same SA pair. This protection was modelled using +a virtual p2p interface, so one could legitimately reason that +all traffic through the interface is protected with the SA pair or all +traffic to the peer is protected, since they are one in the +same. However, when we consider multi-point interfaces, we have to +think of protection applying to the peers on the link. + +When using IPSec protection on a P2MP link the **ipsec_tun_protect_t** +will be specific to a particular peer (in the P2P case this peer is +the usual special all zero address). + +All other aspects of using route based VPNs remains the same. The +routes are resolved via specific peers on the interface, i.e. + +.. code-block:: console + + ip route add 10.0.0.0/8 via 192.168.1.1 mipip0 + + +rather than + +.. code-block:: console + + ip route add 10.0.0.0/8 via ipip0 + + +but one should always use a next-hop on a multi-access interface, so +this is not a restriction. + +The data-path is unchanged, in both P2P and P2MP case the SA to +use for TX comes from the adjacency, and for RX it's the SPI that +matches to the SA and interface. + + +Policy Based VPNs +----------------- + +At the risk of stating the obvious, in a policy based VPN the SA is +chosen based on a specific IPSec policy. A policy describes what +attributes of the packets to match and what action to take if +matched. Actions are: + +- bypass: Ignore it +- discard: Drop it +- protect: Either encrypt or decrypt with a specific SA + +The 'resolve' action which (as per-RFC4301) states that an IKE session +should be initiated, is not supported. + +Policies are stored in a security policy database (SPD). An SPD is +attached to an interface. Packets that ingress and egress the +interface are matched against the policies in the attached SPD. +This is IPSec as described in RFC4301. + + +.. rubric:: Footnotes: + +.. [#i1] Standard in inverted commas because, at least to my + knowledge, there is no official standard (RFC) that states it + should be this way. It is probably this way because routers + model/implement/restrict/etc IPSec as an interface + input/output feature. +.. [#i2] That's a self criticism. + |