ipsec: fix AES CBC IV generation (CVE-2022-46397)stable/2001

For AES-CBC, the IV must be unpredictable (see NIST SP800-38a Appendix
C). Chaining IVs like is done by ipsecmb and native backends for the
VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_INIT_IV is fully predictable.
Encrypt a counter as part of the message, making the (predictable)
counter-generated IV unpredictable.

Fixes: VPP-2037
Type: fix

Change-Id: If4f192d62bf97dda553e7573331c75efa11822ae
Signed-off-by: Benoît Ganne <bganne@cisco.com>

2 files changed, 28 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c
index 3c2fdf4ec3c..8b3aac97a15 100644
--- a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c
+++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c
@@ -203,6 +203,24 @@ esp_get_ip6_hdr_len (ip6_header_t * ip6, ip6_ext_header_t ** ext_hdr)
   return len;
 }
 
+/* IPsec IV generation: IVs requirements differ depending of the
+ * encryption mode: IVs must be unpredictable for AES-CBC whereas it can
+ * be predictable but should never be reused with the same key material
+ * for CTR and GCM.
+ * We use a packet counter as the IV for CTR and GCM, and to ensure the
+ * IV is unpredictable for CBC, it is then encrypted using the same key
+ * as the message. You can refer to NIST SP800-38a and NIST SP800-38d
+ * for more details. */
+static_always_inline void *
+esp_generate_iv (ipsec_sa_t * sa, void *payload, int iv_sz)
+{
+  ASSERT (iv_sz >= sizeof (u64));
+  u64 *iv = (u64 *) (payload - iv_sz);
+  clib_memset_u8 (iv, 0, iv_sz);
+  *iv = sa->iv_counter++;
+  return iv;
+}
+
 static_always_inline void
 esp_process_ops (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
 		 vnet_crypto_op_t * ops, vlib_buffer_t * b[], u16 * nexts)
@@ -495,6 +513,7 @@ esp_encrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
 	  vnet_crypto_op_t *op;
 	  vec_add2_aligned (ptd->crypto_ops, op, 1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES);
 	  vnet_crypto_op_init (op, sa0->crypto_enc_op_id);
+	  void *pkt_iv = esp_generate_iv (sa0, payload, iv_sz);
 	  op->src = op->dst = payload;
 	  op->key_index = sa0->crypto_key_index;
 	  op->len = payload_len - icv_sz;
@@ -513,16 +532,19 @@ esp_encrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
 	      op->tag = payload + op->len;
 	      op->tag_len = 16;
 
-	      u64 *iv = (u64 *) (payload - iv_sz);
 	      nonce->salt = sa0->salt;
-	      nonce->iv = *iv = clib_host_to_net_u64 (sa0->gcm_iv_counter++);
+	      nonce->iv = *(u64 *) pkt_iv;
 	      op->iv = (u8 *) nonce;
 	      nonce++;
 	    }
 	  else
 	    {
-	      op->iv = payload - iv_sz;
-	      op->flags = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_INIT_IV;
+	      /* construct zero iv in front of the IP header */
+	      op->iv = pkt_iv - hdr_len - iv_sz;
+	      clib_memset_u8 (op->iv, 0, iv_sz);
+	      /* include iv field in crypto */
+	      op->src -= iv_sz;
+	      op->len += iv_sz;
 	    }
 	}
 
diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec_sa.h b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec_sa.h
index e0d74e1309e..2468ea48998 100644
--- a/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec_sa.h
+++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec_sa.h
@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ typedef struct
   /* data accessed by dataplane code should be above this comment */
     CLIB_CACHE_LINE_ALIGN_MARK (cacheline1);
 
+  u64 iv_counter;
+
   union
   {
     ip4_header_t ip4_hdr;
@@ -163,7 +165,6 @@ typedef struct
 
   /* Salt used in GCM modes - stored in network byte order */
   u32 salt;
-  u64 gcm_iv_counter;
 } ipsec_sa_t;
 
 STATIC_ASSERT_OFFSET_OF (ipsec_sa_t, cacheline1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES);