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authorAhmed Abdelsalam <ahabdels@cisco.com>2019-06-20 11:18:57 +0000
committerNeale Ranns <nranns@cisco.com>2019-07-28 14:17:52 +0000
commitbe83704c5b1482dfd2ba38423662a9da5a8d8f81 (patch)
tree3f057ac50b73f3fa90f501d46ec9f6196eb44f8e /src/vnet/srv6
parent0ae1d80f9a42158b8904e87179966713dfe9b650 (diff)
sr: ipv6 segment routing header (srh) update
SRH has passed WG review in IETF and currently an IESG document. This patch updates the SRH definition to be compliant with IETF. - Change "first_segment" to "last_entry" - Change "reserved" to "tag" Change-Id: I1765c968671655c5646f6de478d1f7196abbc040 Type: fix Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <ahabdels@cisco.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/vnet/srv6')
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/vnet/srv6/ietf_draft_05.txt1564
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/vnet/srv6/sr.h4
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/vnet/srv6/sr_packet.h19
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/vnet/srv6/sr_policy_rewrite.c12
4 files changed, 18 insertions, 1581 deletions
diff --git a/src/vnet/srv6/ietf_draft_05.txt b/src/vnet/srv6/ietf_draft_05.txt
deleted file mode 100755
index e9bff04fa0a..00000000000
--- a/src/vnet/srv6/ietf_draft_05.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1564 +0,0 @@
-Network Working Group S. Previdi, Ed.
-Internet-Draft C. Filsfils
-Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
-Expires: August 5, 2017 B. Field
- Comcast
- I. Leung
- Rogers Communications
- J. Linkova
- Google
- E. Aries
- Facebook
- T. Kosugi
- NTT
- E. Vyncke
- Cisco Systems, Inc.
- D. Lebrun
- Universite Catholique de Louvain
- February 1, 2017
-
-
- IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)
- draft-ietf-6man-segment-routing-header-05
-
-Abstract
-
- Segment Routing (SR) allows a node to steer a packet through a
- controlled set of instructions, called segments, by prepending an SR
- header to the packet. A segment can represent any instruction,
- topological or service-based. SR allows to enforce a flow through
- any path (topological, or application/service based) while
- maintaining per-flow state only at the ingress node to the SR domain.
-
- Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane with the
- addition of a new type of Routing Extension Header. This draft
- describes the Segment Routing Extension Header Type and how it is
- used by SR capable nodes.
-
-Requirements Language
-
- The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
- "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
- document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
-
-Status of This Memo
-
- This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
- provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH) February 2017
-
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2017.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
- document authors. All rights reserved.
-
- This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
- Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
- (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
- publication of this document. Please review these documents
- carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
- to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
- include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
- the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
- described in the Simplified BSD License.
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Segment Routing Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2.1. Data Planes supporting Segment Routing . . . . . . . . . 4
- 2.2. Segment Routing (SR) Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 2.2.1. SR Domain in a Service Provider Network . . . . . . . 5
- 2.2.2. SR Domain in a Overlay Network . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 3. Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH) . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 3.1. SRH TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 3.1.1. Ingress Node TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 3.1.2. Egress Node TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 3.1.3. Opaque Container TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 3.1.4. Padding TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 3.1.5. HMAC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 3.2. SRH and RFC2460 behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 4. SRH Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 4.1. Source SR Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 4.2. Transit Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 4.3. SR Segment Endpoint Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
-
-
-
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-
-
- 5.1. Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 5.1.1. Source routing threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 5.1.2. Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 5.1.3. Service stealing threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 5.1.4. Topology disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 5.1.5. ICMP Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 5.2. Security fields in SRH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 5.2.1. Selecting a hash algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 5.2.2. Performance impact of HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 5.2.3. Pre-shared key management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 5.3. Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 5.3.1. Nodes within the SR domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 5.3.2. Nodes outside of the SR domain . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 5.3.3. SR path exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 5.3.4. Impact of BCP-38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 7. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
-
-1. Segment Routing Documents
-
- Segment Routing terminology is defined in
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].
-
- Segment Routing use cases are described in [RFC7855] and
- [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].
-
- Segment Routing protocol extensions are defined in
- [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions], and
- [I-D.ietf-ospf-ospfv3-segment-routing-extensions].
-
-2. Introduction
-
- Segment Routing (SR), defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing],
- allows a node to steer a packet through a controlled set of
- instructions, called segments, by prepending an SR header to the
- packet. A segment can represent any instruction, topological or
- service-based. SR allows to enforce a flow through any path
- (topological or service/application based) while maintaining per-flow
- state only at the ingress node to the SR domain. Segments can be
- derived from different components: IGP, BGP, Services, Contexts,
- Locators, etc. The list of segment forming the path is called the
- Segment List and is encoded in the packet header.
-
-
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-
- SR allows the use of strict and loose source based routing paradigms
- without requiring any additional signaling protocols in the
- infrastructure hence delivering an excellent scalability property.
-
- The source based routing model described in
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] is inherited from the ones proposed
- by [RFC1940] and [RFC2460]. The source based routing model offers
- the support for explicit routing capability.
-
-2.1. Data Planes supporting Segment Routing
-
- Segment Routing (SR), can be instantiated over MPLS
- ([I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]) and IPv6. This document
- defines its instantiation over the IPv6 data-plane based on the use-
- cases defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].
-
- This document defines a new type of Routing Header (originally
- defined in [RFC2460]) called the Segment Routing Header (SRH) in
- order to convey the Segment List in the packet header as defined in
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]. Mechanisms through which segment
- are known and advertised are outside the scope of this document.
-
- A segment is materialized by an IPv6 address. A segment identifies a
- topological instruction or a service instruction. A segment can be
- either:
-
- o global: a global segment represents an instruction supported by
- all nodes in the SR domain and it is instantiated through an IPv6
- address globally known in the SR domain.
-
- o local: a local segment represents an instruction supported only by
- the node who originates it and it is instantiated through an IPv6
- address that is known only by the local node.
-
-2.2. Segment Routing (SR) Domain
-
- We define the concept of the Segment Routing Domain (SR Domain) as
- the set of nodes participating into the source based routing model.
- These nodes may be connected to the same physical infrastructure
- (e.g.: a Service Provider's network) as well as nodes remotely
- connected to each other (e.g.: an enterprise VPN or an overlay).
-
- A non-exhaustive list of examples of SR Domains is:
-
- o The network of an operator, service provider, content provider,
- enterprise including nodes, links and Autonomous Systems.
-
-
-
-
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-
- o A set of nodes connected as an overlay over one or more transit
- providers. The overlay nodes exchange SR-enabled traffic with
- segments belonging solely to the overlay routers (the SR domain).
- None of the segments in the SR-enabled packets exchanged by the
- overlay belong to the transit networks
-
- The source based routing model through its instantiation of the
- Segment Routing Header (SRH) defined in this document equally applies
- to all the above examples.
-
- It is assumed in this document that the SRH is added to the packet by
- its source, consistently with the source routing model defined in
- [RFC2460]. For example:
-
- o At the node originating the packet (host, server).
-
- o At the ingress node of an SR domain where the ingress node
- receives an IPv6 packet and encapsulates it into an outer IPv6
- header followed by a Segment Routing header.
-
-2.2.1. SR Domain in a Service Provider Network
-
- The following figure illustrates an SR domain consisting of an
- operator's network infrastructure.
-
- (-------------------------- Operator 1 -----------------------)
- ( )
- ( (-----AS 1-----) (-------AS 2-------) (----AS 3-------) )
- ( ( ) ( ) ( ) )
- A1--(--(--11---13--14-)--(-21---22---23--24-)--(-31---32---34--)--)--Z1
- ( ( /|\ /|\ /| ) ( |\ /|\ /|\ /| ) ( |\ /|\ /| \ ) )
- A2--(--(/ | \/ | \/ | ) ( | \/ | \/ | \/ | ) ( | \/ | \/ | \)--)--Z2
- ( ( | /\ | /\ | ) ( | /\ | /\ | /\ | ) ( | /\ | /\ | ) )
- ( ( |/ \|/ \| ) ( |/ \|/ \|/ \| ) ( |/ \|/ \| ) )
- A3--(--(--15---17--18-)--(-25---26---27--28-)--(-35---36---38--)--)--Z3
- ( ( ) ( ) ( ) )
- ( (--------------) (------------------) (---------------) )
- ( )
- (-------------------------------------------------------------)
-
- Figure 1: Service Provider SR Domain
-
- Figure 1 describes an operator network including several ASes and
- delivering connectivity between endpoints. In this scenario, Segment
- Routing is used within the operator networks and across the ASes
- boundaries (all being under the control of the same operator). In
- this case segment routing can be used in order to address use cases
- such as end-to-end traffic engineering, fast re-route, egress peer
-
-
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-
-
- engineering, data-center traffic engineering as described in
- [RFC7855], [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases] and
- [I-D.ietf-spring-resiliency-use-cases].
-
- Typically, an IPv6 packet received at ingress (i.e.: from outside the
- SR domain), is classified according to network operator policies and
- such classification results into an outer header with an SRH applied
- to the incoming packet. The SRH contains the list of segment
- representing the path the packet must take inside the SR domain.
- Thus, the SA of the packet is the ingress node, the DA (due to SRH
- procedures described in Section 4) is set as the first segment of the
- path and the last segment of the path is the egress node of the SR
- domain.
-
- The path may include intra-AS as well as inter-AS segments. It has
- to be noted that all nodes within the SR domain are under control of
- the same administration. When the packet reaches the egress point of
- the SR domain, the outer header and its SRH are removed so that the
- destination of the packet is unaware of the SR domain the packet has
- traversed.
-
- The outer header with the SRH is no different from any other
- tunneling encapsulation mechanism and allows a network operator to
- implement traffic engineering mechanisms so to efficiently steer
- traffic across his infrastructure.
-
-2.2.2. SR Domain in a Overlay Network
-
- The following figure illustrates an SR domain consisting of an
- overlay network over multiple operator's networks.
-
- (--Operator 1---) (-----Operator 2-----) (--Operator 3---)
- ( ) ( ) ( )
- A1--(--11---13--14--)--(--21---22---23--24--)--(-31---32---34--)--C1
- ( /|\ /|\ /| ) ( |\ /|\ /|\ /| ) ( |\ /|\ /| \ )
- A2--(/ | \/ | \/ | ) ( | \/ | \/ | \/ | ) ( | \/ | \/ | \)--C2
- ( | /\ | /\ | ) ( | /\ | /\ | /\ | ) ( | /\ | /\ | )
- ( |/ \|/ \| ) ( |/ \|/ \|/ \| ) ( |/ \|/ \| )
- A3--(--15---17--18--)--(--25---26---27--28--)--(-35---36---38--)--C3
- ( ) ( | | | ) ( )
- (---------------) (--|----|---------|--) (---------------)
- | | |
- B1 B2 B3
-
- Figure 2: Overlay SR Domain
-
-
-
-
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-
- Figure 2 describes an overlay consisting of nodes connected to three
- different network operators and forming a single overlay network
- where Segment routing packets are exchanged.
-
- The overlay consists of nodes A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2 and C3.
- These nodes are connected to their respective network operator and
- form an overlay network.
-
- Each node may originate packets with an SRH which contains, in the
- segment list of the SRH or in the DA, segments identifying other
- overlay nodes. This implies that packets with an SRH may traverse
- operator's networks but, obviously, these SRHs cannot contain an
- address/segment of the transit operators 1, 2 and 3. The SRH
- originated by the overlay can only contain address/segment under the
- administration of the overlay (e.g. address/segments supported by A1,
- A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1,C2 or C3).
-
- In this model, the operator network nodes are transit nodes and,
- according to [RFC2460], MUST NOT inspect the routing extension header
- since they are not the DA of the packet.
-
- It is a common practice in operators networks to filter out, at
- ingress, any packet whose DA is the address of an internal node and
- it is also possible that an operator would filter out any packet
- destined to an internal address and having an extension header in it.
-
- This common practice does not impact the SR-enabled traffic between
- the overlay nodes as the intermediate transit networks never see a
- destination address belonging to their infrastructure. These SR-
- enabled overlay packets will thus never be filtered by the transit
- operators.
-
- In all cases, transit packets (i.e.: packets whose DA is outside the
- domain of the operator's network) will be forwarded accordingly
- without introducing any security concern in the operator's network.
- This is similar to tunneled packets.
-
-3. Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH)
-
- A new type of the Routing Header (originally defined in [RFC2460]) is
- defined: the Segment Routing Header (SRH) which has a new Routing
- Type, (suggested value 4) to be assigned by IANA.
-
- The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is defined as follows:
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type | Segments Left |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | First Segment | Flags | RESERVED |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | Segment List[0] (128 bits IPv6 address) |
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | |
- ...
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | Segment List[n] (128 bits IPv6 address) |
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // //
- // Optional Type Length Value objects (variable) //
- // //
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Next Header: 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
- immediately following the SRH.
-
- o Hdr Ext Len: 8-bit unsigned integer, is the length of the SRH
- header in 8-octet units, not including the first 8 octets.
-
- o Routing Type: TBD, to be assigned by IANA (suggested value: 4).
-
- o Segments Left. Defined in [RFC2460], it contains the index, in
- the Segment List, of the next segment to inspect. Segments Left
- is decremented at each segment.
-
- o First Segment: contains the index, in the Segment List, of the
- first segment of the path which is in fact the last element of the
- Segment List.
-
- o Flags: 8 bits of flags. Following flags are defined:
-
-
-
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- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- |U|P|O|A|H| U |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- U: Unused and for future use. SHOULD be unset on transmission
- and MUST be ignored on receipt.
-
- P-flag: Protected flag. Set when the packet has been rerouted
- through FRR mechanism by an SR endpoint node.
-
- O-flag: OAM flag. When set, it indicates that this packet is
- an operations and management (OAM) packet.
-
- A-flag: Alert flag. If present, it means important Type Length
- Value (TLV) objects are present. See Section 3.1 for details
- on TLVs objects.
-
- H-flag: HMAC flag. If set, the HMAC TLV is present and is
- encoded as the last TLV of the SRH. In other words, the last
- 36 octets of the SRH represent the HMAC information. See
- Section 3.1.5 for details on the HMAC TLV.
-
- o RESERVED: SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be ignored on
- receipt.
-
- o Segment List[n]: 128 bit IPv6 addresses representing the nth
- segment in the Segment List. The Segment List is encoded starting
- from the last segment of the path. I.e., the first element of the
- segment list (Segment List [0]) contains the last segment of the
- path while the last segment of the Segment List (Segment List[n])
- contains the first segment of the path. The index contained in
- "Segments Left" identifies the current active segment.
-
- o Type Length Value (TLV) are described in Section 3.1.
-
-3.1. SRH TLVs
-
- This section defines TLVs of the Segment Routing Header.
-
- Type Length Value (TLV) contain optional information that may be used
- by the node identified in the DA of the packet. It has to be noted
- that the information carried in the TLVs is not intended to be used
- by the routing layer. Typically, TLVs carry information that is
- consumed by other components (e.g.: OAM) than the routing function.
-
- Each TLV has its own length, format and semantic. The code-point
- allocated (by IANA) to each TLV defines both the format and the
-
-
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-
- semantic of the information carried in the TLV. Multiple TLVs may be
- encoded in the same SRH.
-
- The "Length" field of the TLV is primarily used to skip the TLV while
- inspecting the SRH in case the node doesn't support or recognize the
- TLV codepoint. The "Length" defines the TLV length in octets and not
- including the "Type" and "Length" fields.
-
- The primary scope of TLVs is to give the receiver of the packet
- information related to the source routed path (e.g.: where the packet
- entered in the SR domain and where it is expected to exit).
-
- Additional TLVs may be defined in the future.
-
-3.1.1. Ingress Node TLV
-
- The Ingress Node TLV is optional and identifies the node this packet
- traversed when entered the SR domain. The Ingress Node TLV has
- following format:
-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Type | Length | RESERVED | Flags |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | Ingress Node (16 octets) |
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 1).
-
- o Length: 18.
-
- o RESERVED: 8 bits. SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
- ignored on receipt.
-
- o Flags: 8 bits. No flags are defined in this document.
-
- o Ingress Node: 128 bits. Defines the node where the packet is
- expected to enter the SR domain. In the encapsulation case
- described in Section 2.2.1, this information corresponds to the SA
- of the encapsulating header.
-
-
-
-
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-
-3.1.2. Egress Node TLV
-
- The Egress Node TLV is optional and identifies the node this packet
- is expected to traverse when exiting the SR domain. The Egress Node
- TLV has following format:
-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Type | Length | RESERVED | Flags |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | Egress Node (16 octets) |
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 2).
-
- o Length: 18.
-
- o RESERVED: 8 bits. SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
- ignored on receipt.
-
- o Flags: 8 bits. No flags are defined in this document.
-
- o Egress Node: 128 bits. Defines the node where the packet is
- expected to exit the SR domain. In the encapsulation case
- described in Section 2.2.1, this information corresponds to the
- last segment of the SRH in the encapsulating header.
-
-3.1.3. Opaque Container TLV
-
- The Opaque Container TLV is optional and has the following format:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Type | Length | RESERVED | Flags |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | |
- | Opaque Container (16 octets) |
- | |
- | |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 3).
-
- o Length: 18.
-
- o RESERVED: 8 bits. SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
- ignored on receipt.
-
- o Flags: 8 bits. No flags are defined in this document.
-
- o Opaque Container: 128 bits of opaque data not relevant for the
- routing layer. Typically, this information is consumed by a non-
- routing component of the node receiving the packet (i.e.: the node
- in the DA).
-
-3.1.4. Padding TLV
-
- The Padding TLV is optional and with the purpose of aligning the SRH
- on a 8 octet boundary. The Padding TLV has the following format:
-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Type | Length | Padding (variable) |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // Padding (variable) //
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 4).
-
- o Length: 1 to 7
-
-
-
-
-
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-
- o Padding: from 1 to 7 octets of padding. Padding bits have no
- semantic. They SHOULD be set to 0 on transmission and MUST be
- ignored on receipt.
-
- The following applies to the Padding TLV:
-
- o Padding TLV is optional and MAY only appear once in the SRH. If
- present, it MUST have a length between 1 and 7 octets.
-
- o The Padding TLV is used in order to align the SRH total length on
- the 8 octet boundary.
-
- o When present, the Padding TLV MUST appear as the last TLV before
- the HMAC TLV (if HMAC TLV is present).
-
- o When present, the Padding TLV MUST have a length from 1 to 7 in
- order to align the SRH total lenght on a 8-octet boundary.
-
- o When a router inspecting the SRH encounters the Padding TLV, it
- MUST assume that no other TLV (other than the HMAC) follow the
- Padding TLV.
-
-3.1.5. HMAC TLV
-
- HMAC TLV is optional and contains the HMAC information. The HMAC TLV
- has the following format:
-
- 0 1 2 3
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | Type | Length | RESERVED |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | HMAC Key ID (4 octets) |
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- | //
- | HMAC (32 octets) //
- | //
- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
- where:
-
- o Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 5).
-
- o Length: 38.
-
- o RESERVED: 2 octets. SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
- ignored on receipt.
-
-
-
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-
- o HMAC Key ID: 4 octets.
-
- o HMAC: 32 octets.
-
- o HMAC and HMAC Key ID usage is described in Section 5
-
- The Following applies to the HMAC TLV:
-
- o When present, the HMAC TLV MUST be encoded as the last TLV of the
- SRH.
-
- o If the HMAC TLV is present, the SRH H-Flag (Figure 4) MUST be set.
-
- o When the H-flag is set in the SRH, the router inspecting the SRH
- MUST find the HMAC TLV in the last 38 octets of the SRH.
-
-3.2. SRH and RFC2460 behavior
-
- The SRH being a new type of the Routing Header, it also has the same
- properties:
-
- SHOULD only appear once in the packet.
-
- Only the router whose address is in the DA field of the packet
- header MUST inspect the SRH.
-
- Therefore, Segment Routing in IPv6 networks implies that the segment
- identifier (i.e.: the IPv6 address of the segment) is moved into the
- DA of the packet.
-
- The DA of the packet changes at each segment termination/completion
- and therefore the final DA of the packet MUST be encoded as the last
- segment of the path.
-
-4. SRH Procedures
-
- In this section we describe the different procedures on the SRH.
-
-4.1. Source SR Node
-
- A Source SR Node can be any node originating an IPv6 packet with its
- IPv6 and Segment Routing Headers. This include either:
-
- A host originating an IPv6 packet.
-
- An SR domain ingress router encapsulating a received IPv6 packet
- into an outer IPv6 header followed by an SRH.
-
-
-
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-
- The mechanism through which a Segment List is derived is outside of
- the scope of this document. As an example, the Segment List may be
- obtained through:
-
- Local path computation.
-
- Local configuration.
-
- Interaction with a centralized controller delivering the path.
-
- Any other mechanism.
-
- The following are the steps of the creation of the SRH:
-
- Next Header and Hdr Ext Len fields are set according to [RFC2460].
-
- Routing Type field is set as TBD (to be allocated by IANA,
- suggested value 4).
-
- The Segment List is built with the FIRST segment of the path
- encoded in the LAST element of the Segment List. Subsequent
- segments are encoded on top of the first segment. Finally, the
- LAST segment of the path is encoded in the FIRST element of the
- Segment List. In other words, the Segment List is encoded in the
- reverse order of the path.
-
- The final DA of the packet is encoded as the last segment of the
- path (encoded in the first element of the Segment List).
-
- The DA of the packet is set with the value of the first segment
- (found in the last element of the segment list).
-
- The Segments Left field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
- elements in the Segment List.
-
- The First Segment field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
- elements in the Segment List.
-
- The packet is sent out towards the first segment (i.e.:
- represented in the packet DA).
-
- HMAC TLV may be set according to Section 5.
-
-4.2. Transit Node
-
- According to [RFC2460], the only node who is allowed to inspect the
- Routing Extension Header (and therefore the SRH), is the node
- corresponding to the DA of the packet. Any other transit node MUST
-
-
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- NOT inspect the underneath routing header and MUST forward the packet
- towards the DA and according to the IPv6 routing table.
-
- In the example case described in Section 2.2.2, when SR capable nodes
- are connected through an overlay spanning multiple third-party
- infrastructure, it is safe to send SRH packets (i.e.: packet having a
- Segment Routing Header) between each other overlay/SR-capable nodes
- as long as the segment list does not include any of the transit
- provider nodes. In addition, as a generic security measure, any
- service provider will block any packet destined to one of its
- internal routers, especially if these packets have an extended header
- in it.
-
-4.3. SR Segment Endpoint Node
-
- The SR segment endpoint node is the node whose address is in the DA.
- The segment endpoint node inspects the SRH and does:
-
- 1. IF DA = myself (segment endpoint)
- 2. IF Segments Left > 0 THEN
- decrement Segments Left
- update DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
- 3. ELSE continue IPv6 processing of the packet
- End of processing.
- 4. Forward the packet out
-
-5. Security Considerations
-
- This section analyzes the security threat model, the security issues
- and proposed solutions related to the new Segment Routing Header.
-
- The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is simply another type of the
- routing header as described in RFC 2460 [RFC2460] and is:
-
- o Added by an SR edge router when entering the segment routing
- domain or by the originating host itself. The source host can
- even be outside the SR domain;
-
- o inspected and acted upon when reaching the destination address of
- the IP header per RFC 2460 [RFC2460].
-
- Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], routers on the path that simply forward an
- IPv6 packet (i.e. the IPv6 destination address is none of theirs)
- will never inspect and process the content of the SRH. Routers whose
- one interface IPv6 address equals the destination address field of
- the IPv6 packet MUST parse the SRH and, if supported and if the local
- configuration allows it, MUST act accordingly to the SRH content.
-
-
-
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- According to RFC2460 [RFC2460], the default behavior of a non SR-
- capable router upon receipt of an IPv6 packet with SRH destined to an
- address of its, is to:
-
- o ignore the SRH completely if the Segment Left field is 0 and
- proceed to process the next header in the IPv6 packet;
-
- o discard the IPv6 packet if Segment Left field is greater than 0,
- it MAY send a Parameter Problem ICMP message back to the Source
- Address.
-
-5.1. Threat model
-
-5.1.1. Source routing threats
-
- Using an SRH is similar to source routing, therefore it has some
- well-known security issues as described in RFC4942 [RFC4942] section
- 2.1.1 and RFC5095 [RFC5095]:
-
- o amplification attacks: where a packet could be forged in such a
- way to cause looping among a set of SR-enabled routers causing
- unnecessary traffic, hence a Denial of Service (DoS) against
- bandwidth;
-
- o reflection attack: where a hacker could force an intermediate node
- to appear as the immediate attacker, hence hiding the real
- attacker from naive forensic;
-
- o bypass attack: where an intermediate node could be used as a
- stepping stone (for example in a De-Militarized Zone) to attack
- another host (for example in the datacenter or any back-end
- server).
-
-5.1.2. Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH
-
- First of all, the reader must remember this specific part of section
- 1 of RFC5095 [RFC5095], "A side effect is that this also eliminates
- benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be facilitated
- by future Routing Header specifications.". In short, it is not
- forbidden to create new secure type of Routing Header; for example,
- RFC 6554 (RPL) [RFC6554] also creates a new Routing Header type for a
- specific application confined in a single network.
-
- In the segment routing architecture described in
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] there are basically two kinds of
- nodes (routers and hosts):
-
-
-
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- o nodes within the SR domain, which is within one single
- administrative domain, i.e., where all nodes are trusted anyway
- else the damage caused by those nodes could be worse than
- amplification attacks: traffic interception, man-in-the-middle
- attacks, more server DoS by dropping packets, and so on.
-
- o nodes outside of the SR domain, which is outside of the
- administrative segment routing domain hence they cannot be trusted
- because there is no physical security for those nodes, i.e., they
- can be replaced by hostile nodes or can be coerced in wrong
- behaviors.
-
- The main use case for SR consists of the single administrative domain
- where only trusted nodes with SR enabled and configured participate
- in SR: this is the same model as in RFC6554 [RFC6554]. All non-
- trusted nodes do not participate as either SR processing is not
- enabled by default or because they only process SRH from nodes within
- their domain.
-
- Moreover, all SR nodes ignore SRH created by outsiders based on
- topology information (received on a peering or internal interface) or
- on presence and validity of the HMAC field. Therefore, if
- intermediate nodes ONLY act on valid and authorized SRH (such as
- within a single administrative domain), then there is no security
- threat similar to RH-0. Hence, the RFC 5095 [RFC5095] attacks are
- not applicable.
-
-5.1.3. Service stealing threat
-
- Segment routing is used for added value services, there is also a
- need to prevent non-participating nodes to use those services; this
- is called 'service stealing prevention'.
-
-5.1.4. Topology disclosure
-
- The SRH may also contains IPv6 addresses of some intermediate SR-
- nodes in the path towards the destination, this obviously reveals
- those addresses to the potentially hostile attackers if those
- attackers are able to intercept packets containing SRH. On the other
- hand, if the attacker can do a traceroute whose probes will be
- forwarded along the SR path, then there is little learned by
- intercepting the SRH itself.
-
-5.1.5. ICMP Generation
-
- Per section 4.4 of RFC2460 [RFC2460], when destination nodes (i.e.
- where the destination address is one of theirs) receive a Routing
- Header with unsupported Routing Type, the required behavior is:
-
-
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- o If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header
- and proceed to process the next header in the packet.
-
- o If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and
- send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's
- Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Routing Type.
-
- This required behavior could be used by an attacker to force the
- generation of ICMP message by any node. The attacker could send
- packets with SRH (with Segment Left set to 0) destined to a node not
- supporting SRH. Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], the destination node could
- generate an ICMP message, causing a local CPU utilization and if the
- source of the offending packet with SRH was spoofed could lead to a
- reflection attack without any amplification.
-
- It must be noted that this is a required behavior for any unsupported
- Routing Type and not limited to SRH packets. So, it is not specific
- to SRH and the usual rate limiting for ICMP generation is required
- anyway for any IPv6 implementation and has been implemented and
- deployed for many years.
-
-5.2. Security fields in SRH
-
- This section summarizes the use of specific fields in the SRH. They
- are based on a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC).
-
- The security-related fields in the SRH are instantiated by the HMAC
- TLV, containing:
-
- o HMAC Key-id, 32 bits wide;
-
- o HMAC, 256 bits wide (optional, exists only if HMAC Key-id is not
- 0).
-
- The HMAC field is the output of the HMAC computation (per RFC 2104
- [RFC2104]) using a pre-shared key identified by HMAC Key-id and of
- the text which consists of the concatenation of:
-
- o the source IPv6 address;
-
- o First Segment field;
-
- o an octet of bit flags;
-
- o HMAC Key-id;
-
- o all addresses in the Segment List.
-
-
-
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- The purpose of the HMAC TLV is to verify the validity, the integrity
- and the authorization of the SRH itself. If an outsider of the SR
- domain does not have access to a current pre-shared secret, then it
- cannot compute the right HMAC field and the first SR router on the
- path processing the SRH and configured to check the validity of the
- HMAC will simply reject the packet.
-
- The HMAC TLV is located at the end of the SRH simply because only the
- router on the ingress of the SR domain needs to process it, then all
- other SR nodes can ignore it (based on local policy) because they
- trust the upstream router. This is to speed up forwarding operations
- because SR routers which do not validate the SRH do not need to parse
- the SRH until the end.
-
- The HMAC Key-id field allows for the simultaneous existence of
- several hash algorithms (SHA-256, SHA3-256 ... or future ones) as
- well as pre-shared keys. The HMAC Key-id field is opaque, i.e., it
- has neither syntax nor semantic except as an index to the right
- combination of pre-shared key and hash algorithm and except that a
- value of 0 means that there is no HMAC field. Having an HMAC Key-id
- field allows for pre-shared key roll-over when two pre-shared keys
- are supported for a while when all SR nodes converged to a fresher
- pre-shared key. It could also allow for interoperation among
- different SR domains if allowed by local policy and assuming a
- collision-free HMAC Key Id allocation.
-
- When a specific SRH is linked to a time-related service (such as
- turbo-QoS for a 1-hour period) where the DA, Segment ID (SID) are
- identical, then it is important to refresh the shared-secret
- frequently as the HMAC validity period expires only when the HMAC
- Key-id and its associated shared-secret expires.
-
-5.2.1. Selecting a hash algorithm
-
- The HMAC field in the HMAC TLV is 256 bit wide. Therefore, the HMAC
- MUST be based on a hash function whose output is at least 256 bits.
- If the output of the hash function is 256, then this output is simply
- inserted in the HMAC field. If the output of the hash function is
- larger than 256 bits, then the output value is truncated to 256 by
- taking the least-significant 256 bits and inserting them in the HMAC
- field.
-
- SRH implementations can support multiple hash functions but MUST
- implement SHA-2 [FIPS180-4] in its SHA-256 variant.
-
- NOTE: SHA-1 is currently used by some early implementations used for
- quick interoperations testing, the 160-bit hash value must then be
-
-
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- right-hand padded with 96 bits set to 0. The authors understand that
- this is not secure but is ok for limited tests.
-
-5.2.2. Performance impact of HMAC
-
- While adding an HMAC to each and every SR packet increases the
- security, it has a performance impact. Nevertheless, it must be
- noted that:
-
- o the HMAC field is used only when SRH is added by a device (such as
- a home set-up box) which is outside of the segment routing domain.
- If the SRH is added by a router in the trusted segment routing
- domain, then, there is no need for an HMAC field, hence no
- performance impact.
-
- o when present, the HMAC field MUST only be checked and validated by
- the first router of the segment routing domain, this router is
- named 'validating SR router'. Downstream routers may not inspect
- the HMAC field.
-
- o this validating router can also have a cache of <IPv6 header +
- SRH, HMAC field value> to improve the performance. It is not the
- same use case as in IPsec where HMAC value was unique per packet,
- in SRH, the HMAC value is unique per flow.
-
- o Last point, hash functions such as SHA-2 have been optimized for
- security and performance and there are multiple implementations
- with good performance.
-
- With the above points in mind, the performance impact of using HMAC
- is minimized.
-
-5.2.3. Pre-shared key management
-
- The field HMAC Key-id allows for:
-
- o key roll-over: when there is a need to change the key (the hash
- pre-shared secret), then multiple pre-shared keys can be used
- simultaneously. The validating routing can have a table of <HMAC
- Key-id, pre-shared secret> for the currently active and future
- keys.
-
- o different algorithms: by extending the previous table to <HMAC
- Key-id, hash function, pre-shared secret>, the validating router
- can also support simultaneously several hash algorithms (see
- section Section 5.2.1)
-
- The pre-shared secret distribution can be done:
-
-
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- o in the configuration of the validating routers, either by static
- configuration or any SDN oriented approach;
-
- o dynamically using a trusted key distribution such as [RFC6407]
-
- The intent of this document is NOT to define yet-another-key-
- distribution-protocol.
-
-5.3. Deployment Models
-
-5.3.1. Nodes within the SR domain
-
- An SR domain is defined as a set of interconnected routers where all
- routers at the perimeter are configured to add and act on SRH. Some
- routers inside the SR domain can also act on SRH or simply forward
- IPv6 packets.
-
- The routers inside an SR domain can be trusted to generate SRH and to
- process SRH received on interfaces that are part of the SR domain.
- These nodes MUST drop all SRH packets received on an interface that
- is not part of the SR domain and containing an SRH whose HMAC field
- cannot be validated by local policies. This includes obviously
- packet with an SRH generated by a non-cooperative SR domain.
-
- If the validation fails, then these packets MUST be dropped, ICMP
- error messages (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
- limited) and SHOULD be logged.
-
-5.3.2. Nodes outside of the SR domain
-
- Nodes outside of the SR domain cannot be trusted for physical
- security; hence, they need to request by some trusted means (outside
- of the scope of this document) a complete SRH for each new connection
- (i.e. new destination address). The received SRH MUST include an
- HMAC TLV which is computed correctly (see Section 5.2).
-
- When an outside node sends a packet with an SRH and towards an SR
- domain ingress node, the packet MUST contain the HMAC TLV (with a
- Key-id and HMAC fields) and the the destination address MUST be an
- address of an SR domain ingress node .
-
- The ingress SR router, i.e., the router with an interface address
- equals to the destination address, MUST verify the HMAC TLV.
-
- If the validation is successful, then the packet is simply forwarded
- as usual for an SR packet. As long as the packet travels within the
- SR domain, no further HMAC check needs to be done. Subsequent
-
-
-
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- routers in the SR domain MAY verify the HMAC TLV when they process
- the SRH (i.e. when they are the destination).
-
- If the validation fails, then this packet MUST be dropped, an ICMP
- error message (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
- limited) and SHOULD be logged.
-
-5.3.3. SR path exposure
-
- As the intermediate SR nodes addresses appears in the SRH, if this
- SRH is visible to an outsider then he/she could reuse this knowledge
- to launch an attack on the intermediate SR nodes or get some insider
- knowledge on the topology. This is especially applicable when the
- path between the source node and the first SR domain ingress router
- is on the public Internet.
-
- The first remark is to state that 'security by obscurity' is never
- enough; in other words, the security policy of the SR domain MUST
- assume that the internal topology and addressing is known by the
- attacker. A simple traceroute will also give the same information
- (with even more information as all intermediate nodes between SID
- will also be exposed). IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
- [RFC4303] cannot be use to protect the SRH as per RFC4303 the ESP
- header must appear after any routing header (including SRH).
-
- To prevent a user to leverage the gained knowledge by intercepting
- SRH, it it recommended to apply an infrastructure Access Control List
- (iACL) at the edge of the SR domain. This iACL will drop all packets
- from outside the SR-domain whose destination is any address of any
- router inside the domain. This security policy should be tuned for
- local operations.
-
-5.3.4. Impact of BCP-38
-
- BCP-38 [RFC2827], also known as "Network Ingress Filtering", checks
- whether the source address of packets received on an interface is
- valid for this interface. The use of loose source routing such as
- SRH forces packets to follow a path which differs from the expected
- routing. Therefore, if BCP-38 was implemented in all routers inside
- the SR domain, then SR packets could be received by an interface
- which is not expected one and the packets could be dropped.
-
- As an SR domain is usually a subset of one administrative domain, and
- as BCP-38 is only deployed at the ingress routers of this
- administrative domain and as packets arriving at those ingress
- routers have been normally forwarded using the normal routing
- information, then there is no reason why this ingress router should
-
-
-
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- drop the SRH packet based on BCP-38. Routers inside the domain
- commonly do not apply BCP-38; so, this is not a problem.
-
-6. IANA Considerations
-
- This document makes the following registrations in the Internet
- Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters "Routing Type" registry
- maintained by IANA:
-
- Suggested Description Reference
- Value
- ----------------------------------------------------------
- 4 Segment Routing Header (SRH) This document
-
- In addition, this document request IANA to create and maintain a new
- Registry: "Segment Routing Header Type-Value Objects". The following
- code-points are requested from the registry:
-
- Registry: Segment Routing Header Type-Value Objects
-
- Suggested Description Reference
- Value
- -----------------------------------------------------
- 1 Ingress Node TLV This document
- 2 Egress Node TLV This document
- 3 Opaque Container TLV This document
- 4 Padding TLV This document
- 5 HMAC TLV This document
-
-7. Manageability Considerations
-
- TBD
-
-8. Contributors
-
- Dave Barach, John Leddy, John Brzozowski, Pierre Francois, Nagendra
- Kumar, Mark Townsley, Christian Martin, Roberta Maglione, James
- Connolly, Aloys Augustin contributed to the content of this document.
-
-9. Acknowledgements
-
- The authors would like to thank Ole Troan, Bob Hinden, Fred Baker,
- Brian Carpenter, Alexandru Petrescu and Punit Kumar Jaiswal for their
- comments to this document.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 24]
-
-Internet-Draft IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH) February 2017
-
-
-10. References
-
-10.1. Normative References
-
- [FIPS180-4]
- National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS
- 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", March 2012,
- <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/
- fips-180-4.pdf>.
-
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
- Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
-
- [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
- (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
- December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
-
- [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
- RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
-
- [RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
- of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5095>.
-
- [RFC6407] Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
- of Interpretation", RFC 6407, DOI 10.17487/RFC6407,
- October 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407>.
-
-10.2. Informative References
-
- [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions]
- Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Bashandy, A., Gredler, H.,
- Litkowski, S., Decraene, B., and j. jefftant@gmail.com,
- "IS-IS Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-ietf-isis-
- segment-routing-extensions-09 (work in progress), October
- 2016.
-
- [I-D.ietf-ospf-ospfv3-segment-routing-extensions]
- Psenak, P., Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Gredler, H.,
- Shakir, R., Henderickx, W., and J. Tantsura, "OSPFv3
- Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-
- segment-routing-extensions-07 (work in progress), October
- 2016.
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 25]
-
-Internet-Draft IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH) February 2017
-
-
- [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases]
- Brzozowski, J., Leddy, J., Townsley, W., Filsfils, C., and
- R. Maglione, "IPv6 SPRING Use Cases", draft-ietf-spring-
- ipv6-use-cases-08 (work in progress), January 2017.
-
- [I-D.ietf-spring-resiliency-use-cases]
- Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., and R. Shakir,
- "Resiliency use cases in SPRING networks", draft-ietf-
- spring-resiliency-use-cases-08 (work in progress), October
- 2016.
-
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
- Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S.,
- and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", draft-ietf-
- spring-segment-routing-10 (work in progress), November
- 2016.
-
- [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]
- Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Bashandy, A., Decraene, B.,
- Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., Shakir, R.,
- jefftant@gmail.com, j., and E. Crabbe, "Segment Routing
- with MPLS data plane", draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-
- mpls-06 (work in progress), January 2017.
-
- [RFC1940] Estrin, D., Li, T., Rekhter, Y., Varadhan, K., and D.
- Zappala, "Source Demand Routing: Packet Format and
- Forwarding Specification (Version 1)", RFC 1940,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC1940, May 1996,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1940>.
-
- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
-
- [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
- Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
- Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
- May 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.
-
- [RFC4942] Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
- Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC4942, September 2007,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4942>.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 26]
-
-Internet-Draft IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH) February 2017
-
-
- [RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6
- Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol
- for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554,
- DOI 10.17487/RFC6554, March 2012,
- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6554>.
-
- [RFC7855] Previdi, S., Ed., Filsfils, C., Ed., Decraene, B.,
- Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., and R. Shakir, "Source
- Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) Problem Statement
- and Requirements", RFC 7855, DOI 10.17487/RFC7855, May
- 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7855>.
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Stefano Previdi (editor)
- Cisco Systems, Inc.
- Via Del Serafico, 200
- Rome 00142
- Italy
-
- Email: sprevidi@cisco.com
-
-
- Clarence Filsfils
- Cisco Systems, Inc.
- Brussels
- BE
-
- Email: cfilsfil@cisco.com
-
-
- Brian Field
- Comcast
- 4100 East Dry Creek Road
- Centennial, CO 80122
- US
-
- Email: Brian_Field@cable.comcast.com
-
-
- Ida Leung
- Rogers Communications
- 8200 Dixie Road
- Brampton, ON L6T 0C1
- CA
-
- Email: Ida.Leung@rci.rogers.com
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 27]
-
-Internet-Draft IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH) February 2017
-
-
- Jen Linkova
- Google
- 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
- Mountain View, CA 94043
- US
-
- Email: furry@google.com
-
-
- Ebben Aries
- Facebook
- US
-
- Email: exa@fb.com
-
-
- Tomoya Kosugi
- NTT
- 3-9-11, Midori-Cho Musashino-Shi,
- Tokyo 180-8585
- JP
-
- Email: kosugi.tomoya@lab.ntt.co.jp
-
-
- Eric Vyncke
- Cisco Systems, Inc.
- De Kleetlaann 6A
- Diegem 1831
- Belgium
-
- Email: evyncke@cisco.com
-
-
- David Lebrun
- Universite Catholique de Louvain
- Place Ste Barbe, 2
- Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
- Belgium
-
- Email: david.lebrun@uclouvain.be
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Previdi, et al. Expires August 5, 2017 [Page 28] \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/vnet/srv6/sr.h b/src/vnet/srv6/sr.h
index 2353b284363..9ca0348cb87 100755
--- a/src/vnet/srv6/sr.h
+++ b/src/vnet/srv6/sr.h
@@ -302,11 +302,11 @@ ip6_sr_compute_rewrite_string_insert (ip6_address_t * sl)
srh = (ip6_sr_header_t *) rs;
srh->type = ROUTING_HEADER_TYPE_SR;
srh->segments_left = vec_len (sl);
- srh->first_segment = vec_len (sl);
+ srh->last_entry = vec_len (sl);
srh->length = ((sizeof (ip6_sr_header_t) +
((vec_len (sl) + 1) * sizeof (ip6_address_t))) / 8) - 1;
srh->flags = 0x00;
- srh->reserved = 0x0000;
+ srh->tag = 0x0000;
addrp = srh->segments + vec_len (sl);
vec_foreach (this_address, sl)
{
diff --git a/src/vnet/srv6/sr_packet.h b/src/vnet/srv6/sr_packet.h
index 7af4ad4d9c0..d2fb0898530 100755
--- a/src/vnet/srv6/sr_packet.h
+++ b/src/vnet/srv6/sr_packet.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type | Segments Left |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- * | First Segment | Flags | RESERVED |
+ * | Last Entry | Flags | Tag |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | |
* | Segment List[0] (128 bits IPv6 address) |
@@ -61,13 +61,12 @@
*
* o Routing Type: TBD, to be assigned by IANA (suggested value: 4).
*
- * o Segments Left. Defined in [RFC2460], it contains the index, in
+ * o Segments Left. Defined in [RFC8200], it contains the index, in
* the Segment List, of the next segment to inspect. Segments Left
* is decremented at each segment.
*
- * o First Segment: contains the index, in the Segment List, of the
- * first segment of the path which is in fact the last element of the
- * Segment List.
+ * o Last Entry: contains the index (zero based), in the Segment List,
+ * of the the last element of the Segment List
*
* o Flags: 8 bits of flags. Following flags are defined:
*
@@ -94,8 +93,10 @@
* 36 octets of the SRH represent the HMAC information. See
* Section 3.1.5 for details on the HMAC TLV.
*
- * o RESERVED: SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be ignored on
- * receipt.
+ * o Tag: tag a packet as part of a class or group of packets, e.g.,
+ * packets sharing the same set of properties. When tag is not used
+ * at source it MUST be set to zero on transmission. When tag is not
+ * used during SRH Processing it SHOULD be ignored.
*
* o Segment List[n]: 128 bit IPv6 addresses representing the nth
* segment in the Segment List. The Segment List is encoded starting
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ typedef struct
u8 segments_left;
/* Pointer to the first segment in the header */
- u8 first_segment;
+ u8 last_entry;
/* Flag bits */
#define IP6_SR_HEADER_FLAG_PROTECTED (0x40)
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ typedef struct
/* values 0x0, 0x4 - 0x7 are reserved */
u8 flags;
- u16 reserved;
+ u16 tag;
/* The segment elts */
ip6_address_t segments[0];
diff --git a/src/vnet/srv6/sr_policy_rewrite.c b/src/vnet/srv6/sr_policy_rewrite.c
index e9c42211209..aa2f0670c51 100755
--- a/src/vnet/srv6/sr_policy_rewrite.c
+++ b/src/vnet/srv6/sr_policy_rewrite.c
@@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ compute_rewrite_encaps (ip6_address_t * sl)
srh->protocol = IP_PROTOCOL_IPV6;
srh->type = ROUTING_HEADER_TYPE_SR;
srh->segments_left = vec_len (sl) - 1;
- srh->first_segment = vec_len (sl) - 1;
+ srh->last_entry = vec_len (sl) - 1;
srh->length = ((sizeof (ip6_sr_header_t) +
(vec_len (sl) * sizeof (ip6_address_t))) / 8) - 1;
srh->flags = 0x00;
- srh->reserved = 0x00;
+ srh->tag = 0x0000;
addrp = srh->segments + vec_len (sl) - 1;
vec_foreach (this_address, sl)
{
@@ -226,11 +226,11 @@ compute_rewrite_insert (ip6_address_t * sl)
srh = (ip6_sr_header_t *) rs;
srh->type = ROUTING_HEADER_TYPE_SR;
srh->segments_left = vec_len (sl);
- srh->first_segment = vec_len (sl);
+ srh->last_entry = vec_len (sl);
srh->length = ((sizeof (ip6_sr_header_t) +
((vec_len (sl) + 1) * sizeof (ip6_address_t))) / 8) - 1;
srh->flags = 0x00;
- srh->reserved = 0x0000;
+ srh->tag = 0x0000;
addrp = srh->segments + vec_len (sl);
vec_foreach (this_address, sl)
{
@@ -265,11 +265,11 @@ compute_rewrite_bsid (ip6_address_t * sl)
srh = (ip6_sr_header_t *) rs;
srh->type = ROUTING_HEADER_TYPE_SR;
srh->segments_left = vec_len (sl) - 1;
- srh->first_segment = vec_len (sl) - 1;
+ srh->last_entry = vec_len (sl) - 1;
srh->length = ((sizeof (ip6_sr_header_t) +
(vec_len (sl) * sizeof (ip6_address_t))) / 8) - 1;
srh->flags = 0x00;
- srh->reserved = 0x0000;
+ srh->tag = 0x0000;
addrp = srh->segments + vec_len (sl) - 1;
vec_foreach (this_address, sl)
{