diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_input.c | 514 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c | 117 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.h | 21 |
5 files changed, 445 insertions, 217 deletions
diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.c b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.c index 40c2c090e9e..926da2c06b4 100644 --- a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.c +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ wg_main_t wg_main; wg_async_post_next_t wg_encrypt_async_next; +wg_async_post_next_t wg_decrypt_async_next; void wg_set_async_mode (u32 is_enabled) @@ -39,15 +40,23 @@ wg_set_async_mode (u32 is_enabled) static void wireguard_register_post_node (vlib_main_t *vm) + { wg_async_post_next_t *eit; + wg_async_post_next_t *dit; eit = &wg_encrypt_async_next; + dit = &wg_decrypt_async_next; eit->wg4_post_next = vnet_crypto_register_post_node (vm, "wg4-output-tun-post-node"); eit->wg6_post_next = vnet_crypto_register_post_node (vm, "wg6-output-tun-post-node"); + + dit->wg4_post_next = + vnet_crypto_register_post_node (vm, "wg4-input-post-node"); + dit->wg6_post_next = + vnet_crypto_register_post_node (vm, "wg6-input-post-node"); } static clib_error_t * diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.h b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.h index aaec3d47b23..965c34aca50 100644 --- a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.h +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ typedef struct } wg_async_post_next_t; extern wg_async_post_next_t wg_encrypt_async_next; +extern wg_async_post_next_t wg_decrypt_async_next; extern wg_main_t wg_main; /** diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_input.c b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_input.c index 10827ca0e64..dbdcaa0f45a 100644 --- a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_input.c +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_input.c @@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ _ (HANDSHAKE_SEND, "Failed while sending Handshake") \ _ (HANDSHAKE_RECEIVE, "Failed while receiving Handshake") \ _ (TOO_BIG, "Packet too big") \ - _ (UNDEFINED, "Undefined error") + _ (UNDEFINED, "Undefined error") \ + _ (CRYPTO_ENGINE_ERROR, "crypto engine error (packet dropped)") typedef enum { @@ -56,6 +57,12 @@ typedef struct index_t peer; } wg_input_trace_t; +typedef struct +{ + index_t peer; + u16 next; +} wg_input_post_trace_t; + u8 * format_wg_message_type (u8 * s, va_list * args) { @@ -88,6 +95,22 @@ format_wg_input_trace (u8 * s, va_list * args) return s; } +/* post-node packet trace format function */ +static u8 * +format_wg_input_post_trace (u8 *s, va_list *args) +{ + CLIB_UNUSED (vlib_main_t * vm) = va_arg (*args, vlib_main_t *); + CLIB_UNUSED (vlib_node_t * node) = va_arg (*args, vlib_node_t *); + + wg_input_post_trace_t *t = va_arg (*args, wg_input_post_trace_t *); + + s = format (s, "WG input post: \n"); + s = format (s, " peer: %u\n", t->peer); + s = format (s, " next: %u\n", t->next); + + return s; +} + typedef enum { WG_INPUT_NEXT_HANDOFF_HANDSHAKE, @@ -298,6 +321,76 @@ wg_handshake_process (vlib_main_t *vm, wg_main_t *wmp, vlib_buffer_t *b, return WG_INPUT_ERROR_NONE; } +static_always_inline int +wg_input_post_process (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_buffer_t *b, u16 *next, + wg_peer_t *peer, message_data_t *data, + bool *is_keepalive) +{ + next[0] = WG_INPUT_NEXT_PUNT; + + noise_keypair_t *kp = + wg_get_active_keypair (&peer->remote, data->receiver_index); + + if (!noise_counter_recv (&kp->kp_ctr, data->counter)) + { + return -1; + } + + u16 encr_len = b->current_length - sizeof (message_data_t); + u16 decr_len = encr_len - NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; + + vlib_buffer_advance (b, sizeof (message_data_t)); + b->current_length = decr_len; + vnet_buffer_offload_flags_clear (b, VNET_BUFFER_OFFLOAD_F_UDP_CKSUM); + + /* Keepalive packet has zero length */ + if (decr_len == 0) + { + *is_keepalive = true; + return -1; + } + + wg_timers_data_received (peer); + + ip46_address_t src_ip; + u8 is_ip4_inner = is_ip4_header (vlib_buffer_get_current (b)); + if (is_ip4_inner) + { + ip46_address_set_ip4 ( + &src_ip, &((ip4_header_t *) vlib_buffer_get_current (b))->src_address); + } + else + { + ip46_address_set_ip6 ( + &src_ip, &((ip6_header_t *) vlib_buffer_get_current (b))->src_address); + } + + const fib_prefix_t *allowed_ip; + bool allowed = false; + + /* + * we could make this into an ACL, but the expectation + * is that there aren't many allowed IPs and thus a linear + * walk is faster than an ACL + */ + vec_foreach (allowed_ip, peer->allowed_ips) + { + if (fib_prefix_is_cover_addr_46 (allowed_ip, &src_ip)) + { + allowed = true; + break; + } + } + if (allowed) + { + vnet_buffer (b)->sw_if_index[VLIB_RX] = peer->wg_sw_if_index; + next[0] = + is_ip4_inner ? WG_INPUT_NEXT_IP4_INPUT : WG_INPUT_NEXT_IP6_INPUT; + } + + return 0; +} + static_always_inline void wg_input_process_ops (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vnet_crypto_op_t *ops, vlib_buffer_t *b[], u16 *nexts, @@ -326,9 +419,148 @@ wg_input_process_ops (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, } } +always_inline void +wg_prepare_sync_dec_op (vlib_main_t *vm, vnet_crypto_op_t **crypto_ops, + u8 *src, u32 src_len, u8 *dst, u8 *aad, u32 aad_len, + vnet_crypto_key_index_t key_index, u32 bi, u8 *iv) +{ + vnet_crypto_op_t _op, *op = &_op; + u8 src_[] = {}; + + vec_add2_aligned (crypto_ops[0], op, 1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES); + vnet_crypto_op_init (op, VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC); + + op->tag_len = NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; + op->tag = src + src_len; + op->src = !src ? src_ : src; + op->len = src_len; + op->dst = dst; + op->key_index = key_index; + op->aad = aad; + op->aad_len = aad_len; + op->iv = iv; + op->user_data = bi; + op->flags |= VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_HMAC_CHECK; +} + +static_always_inline void +wg_input_add_to_frame (vlib_main_t *vm, vnet_crypto_async_frame_t *f, + u32 key_index, u32 crypto_len, i16 crypto_start_offset, + u32 buffer_index, u16 next_node, u8 *iv, u8 *tag, + u8 flags) +{ + vnet_crypto_async_frame_elt_t *fe; + u16 index; + + ASSERT (f->n_elts < VNET_CRYPTO_FRAME_SIZE); + + index = f->n_elts; + fe = &f->elts[index]; + f->n_elts++; + fe->key_index = key_index; + fe->crypto_total_length = crypto_len; + fe->crypto_start_offset = crypto_start_offset; + fe->iv = iv; + fe->tag = tag; + fe->flags = flags; + f->buffer_indices[index] = buffer_index; + f->next_node_index[index] = next_node; +} + +static_always_inline enum noise_state_crypt +wg_input_process (vlib_main_t *vm, wg_per_thread_data_t *ptd, + vnet_crypto_op_t **crypto_ops, + vnet_crypto_async_frame_t **async_frame, vlib_buffer_t *b, + u32 buf_idx, noise_remote_t *r, uint32_t r_idx, + uint64_t nonce, uint8_t *src, size_t srclen, uint8_t *dst, + u32 from_idx, u8 *iv, f64 time, u8 is_async, + u16 async_next_node) +{ + noise_keypair_t *kp; + enum noise_state_crypt ret = SC_FAILED; + + if ((kp = wg_get_active_keypair (r, r_idx)) == NULL) + { + goto error; + } + + /* We confirm that our values are within our tolerances. These values + * are the same as the encrypt routine. + * + * kp_ctr isn't locked here, we're happy to accept a racy read. */ + if (wg_birthdate_has_expired_opt (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME, + time) || + kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES) + goto error; + + /* Decrypt, then validate the counter. We don't want to validate the + * counter before decrypting as we do not know the message is authentic + * prior to decryption. */ + + clib_memset (iv, 0, 4); + clib_memcpy (iv + 4, &nonce, sizeof (nonce)); + + if (is_async) + { + if (NULL == *async_frame || + vnet_crypto_async_frame_is_full (*async_frame)) + { + *async_frame = vnet_crypto_async_get_frame ( + vm, VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TAG16_AAD0_DEC); + /* Save the frame to the list we'll submit at the end */ + vec_add1 (ptd->async_frames, *async_frame); + } + + wg_input_add_to_frame (vm, *async_frame, kp->kp_recv_index, srclen, + src - b->data, buf_idx, async_next_node, iv, + src + srclen, VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_HMAC_CHECK); + } + else + { + wg_prepare_sync_dec_op (vm, crypto_ops, src, srclen, dst, NULL, 0, + kp->kp_recv_index, from_idx, iv); + } + + /* If we've received the handshake confirming data packet then move the + * next keypair into current. If we do slide the next keypair in, then + * we skip the REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV check. This is safe to do as a + * data packet can't confirm a session that we are an INITIATOR of. */ + if (kp == r->r_next) + { + clib_rwlock_writer_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock); + if (kp == r->r_next && kp->kp_local_index == r_idx) + { + noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_previous); + r->r_previous = r->r_current; + r->r_current = r->r_next; + r->r_next = NULL; + + ret = SC_CONN_RESET; + clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock); + goto error; + } + clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock); + } + + /* Similar to when we encrypt, we want to notify the caller when we + * are approaching our tolerances. We notify if: + * - we're the initiator and the current keypair is older than + * REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV seconds. */ + ret = SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH; + kp = r->r_current; + if (kp != NULL && kp->kp_valid && kp->kp_is_initiator && + wg_birthdate_has_expired_opt (kp->kp_birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV, + time)) + goto error; + + ret = SC_OK; +error: + return ret; +} + always_inline uword wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, - vlib_frame_t *frame, u8 is_ip4) + vlib_frame_t *frame, u8 is_ip4, u16 async_next_node) { wg_main_t *wmp = &wg_main; wg_per_thread_data_t *ptd = @@ -346,9 +578,13 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, u32 other_bi[VLIB_FRAME_SIZE]; /* buffer index for drop or handoff */ u16 other_nexts[VLIB_FRAME_SIZE], *other_next = other_nexts, n_other = 0; u16 data_nexts[VLIB_FRAME_SIZE], *data_next = data_nexts, n_data = 0; + u16 n_async = 0; + const u8 is_async = wg_op_mode_is_set_ASYNC (); + vnet_crypto_async_frame_t *async_frame = NULL; vlib_get_buffers (vm, from, bufs, n_left_from); vec_reset_length (ptd->crypto_ops); + vec_reset_length (ptd->async_frames); f64 time = clib_time_now (&vm->clib_time) + vm->time_offset; @@ -381,6 +617,7 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, { message_data_t *data = vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0]); u8 *iv_data = b[0]->pre_data; + u32 buf_idx = from[b - bufs]; peer_idx = wg_index_table_lookup (&wmp->index_table, data->receiver_index); @@ -399,7 +636,7 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, { other_next[n_other] = WG_INPUT_NEXT_ERROR; b[0]->error = node->errors[WG_INPUT_ERROR_PEER]; - other_bi[n_other] = from[b - bufs]; + other_bi[n_other] = buf_idx; n_other += 1; goto out; } @@ -416,7 +653,7 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, if (PREDICT_TRUE (thread_index != peer->input_thread_index)) { other_next[n_other] = WG_INPUT_NEXT_HANDOFF_DATA; - other_bi[n_other] = from[b - bufs]; + other_bi[n_other] = buf_idx; n_other += 1; goto next; } @@ -426,48 +663,49 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, if (PREDICT_FALSE (decr_len >= WG_DEFAULT_DATA_SIZE)) { b[0]->error = node->errors[WG_INPUT_ERROR_TOO_BIG]; - other_bi[n_other] = from[b - bufs]; + other_bi[n_other] = buf_idx; n_other += 1; goto out; } - enum noise_state_crypt state_cr = noise_sync_remote_decrypt ( - vm, crypto_ops, &peer->remote, data->receiver_index, data->counter, - data->encrypted_data, decr_len, data->encrypted_data, n_data, - iv_data, time); + enum noise_state_crypt state_cr = wg_input_process ( + vm, ptd, crypto_ops, &async_frame, b[0], buf_idx, &peer->remote, + data->receiver_index, data->counter, data->encrypted_data, + decr_len, data->encrypted_data, n_data, iv_data, time, is_async, + async_next_node); - if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_CONN_RESET)) - { - wg_timers_handshake_complete (peer); - data_bufs[n_data] = b[0]; - data_bi[n_data] = from[b - bufs]; - n_data += 1; - goto next; - } - else if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH)) - { - wg_send_handshake_from_mt (*peer_idx, false); - data_bufs[n_data] = b[0]; - data_bi[n_data] = from[b - bufs]; - n_data += 1; - goto next; - } - else if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_FAILED)) + if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_FAILED)) { wg_peer_update_flags (*peer_idx, WG_PEER_ESTABLISHED, false); other_next[n_other] = WG_INPUT_NEXT_ERROR; b[0]->error = node->errors[WG_INPUT_ERROR_DECRYPTION]; - other_bi[n_other] = from[b - bufs]; + other_bi[n_other] = buf_idx; n_other += 1; goto out; } - else if (PREDICT_TRUE (state_cr == SC_OK)) + if (!is_async) { data_bufs[n_data] = b[0]; - data_bi[n_data] = from[b - bufs]; + data_bi[n_data] = buf_idx; n_data += 1; + } + else + { + n_async += 1; + } + + if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_CONN_RESET)) + { + wg_timers_handshake_complete (peer); goto next; } + else if (PREDICT_FALSE (state_cr == SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH)) + { + wg_send_handshake_from_mt (*peer_idx, false); + goto next; + } + else if (PREDICT_TRUE (state_cr == SC_OK)) + goto next; } else { @@ -521,21 +759,26 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, /* process after decryption */ b = data_bufs; n_left_from = n_data; - n_data = 0; last_rec_idx = ~0; last_peer_time_idx = NULL; + while (n_left_from > 0) { bool is_keepalive = false; u32 *peer_idx = NULL; - if (data_next[n_data] == WG_INPUT_NEXT_PUNT) + if (PREDICT_FALSE (data_next[0] == WG_INPUT_NEXT_PUNT)) { goto trace; } - else + if (n_left_from > 2) { - data_next[n_data] = WG_INPUT_NEXT_PUNT; + u8 *p; + vlib_prefetch_buffer_header (b[2], LOAD); + p = vlib_buffer_get_current (b[1]); + CLIB_PREFETCH (p, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES, LOAD); + CLIB_PREFETCH (vlib_buffer_get_tail (b[1]), CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES, + LOAD); } message_data_t *data = vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0]); @@ -544,25 +787,13 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, { peer_idx = wg_index_table_lookup (&wmp->index_table, data->receiver_index); - /* already checked and excisting */ peer = wg_peer_get (*peer_idx); last_rec_idx = data->receiver_index; } - noise_keypair_t *kp = - wg_get_active_keypair (&peer->remote, data->receiver_index); - - if (!noise_counter_recv (&kp->kp_ctr, data->counter)) - { - goto trace; - } - - u16 encr_len = b[0]->current_length - sizeof (message_data_t); - u16 decr_len = encr_len - NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; - - vlib_buffer_advance (b[0], sizeof (message_data_t)); - b[0]->current_length = decr_len; - vnet_buffer_offload_flags_clear (b[0], VNET_BUFFER_OFFLOAD_F_UDP_CKSUM); + if (PREDICT_FALSE (wg_input_post_process (vm, b[0], data_next, peer, + data, &is_keepalive) < 0)) + goto trace; if (PREDICT_FALSE (peer_idx && (last_peer_time_idx != peer_idx))) { @@ -571,87 +802,159 @@ wg_input_inline (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, last_peer_time_idx = peer_idx; } - /* Keepalive packet has zero length */ - if (decr_len == 0) + trace: + if (PREDICT_FALSE ((node->flags & VLIB_NODE_FLAG_TRACE) && + (b[0]->flags & VLIB_BUFFER_IS_TRACED))) { - is_keepalive = true; - goto trace; + wg_input_trace_t *t = vlib_add_trace (vm, node, b[0], sizeof (*t)); + t->type = header_type; + t->current_length = b[0]->current_length; + t->is_keepalive = is_keepalive; + t->peer = peer_idx ? *peer_idx : INDEX_INVALID; } - wg_timers_data_received (peer); + b += 1; + n_left_from -= 1; + data_next += 1; + } - ip46_address_t src_ip; - u8 is_ip4_inner = is_ip4_header (vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0])); - if (is_ip4_inner) + if (n_async) + { + /* submit all of the open frames */ + vnet_crypto_async_frame_t **async_frame; + vec_foreach (async_frame, ptd->async_frames) { - ip46_address_set_ip4 ( - &src_ip, - &((ip4_header_t *) vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0]))->src_address); + if (PREDICT_FALSE ( + vnet_crypto_async_submit_open_frame (vm, *async_frame) < 0)) + { + u32 n_drop = (*async_frame)->n_elts; + u32 *bi = (*async_frame)->buffer_indices; + u16 index = n_other; + while (n_drop--) + { + other_bi[index] = bi[0]; + vlib_buffer_t *b = vlib_get_buffer (vm, bi[0]); + other_nexts[index] = drop_next; + b->error = node->errors[WG_INPUT_ERROR_CRYPTO_ENGINE_ERROR]; + bi++; + index++; + } + n_other += (*async_frame)->n_elts; + + vnet_crypto_async_reset_frame (*async_frame); + vnet_crypto_async_free_frame (vm, *async_frame); + } } - else + } + + /* enqueue other bufs */ + if (n_other) + vlib_buffer_enqueue_to_next (vm, node, other_bi, other_next, n_other); + + /* enqueue data bufs */ + if (n_data) + vlib_buffer_enqueue_to_next (vm, node, data_bi, data_nexts, n_data); + + return frame->n_vectors; +} + +always_inline uword +wg_input_post (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vlib_frame_t *frame) +{ + wg_main_t *wmp = &wg_main; + vlib_buffer_t *bufs[VLIB_FRAME_SIZE], **b = bufs; + u16 nexts[VLIB_FRAME_SIZE], *next = nexts; + u32 *from = vlib_frame_vector_args (frame); + u32 n_left = frame->n_vectors; + wg_peer_t *peer = NULL; + u32 *peer_idx = NULL; + u32 *last_peer_time_idx = NULL; + u32 last_rec_idx = ~0; + f64 time = clib_time_now (&vm->clib_time) + vm->time_offset; + + vlib_get_buffers (vm, from, b, n_left); + + if (n_left >= 2) + { + vlib_prefetch_buffer_header (b[0], LOAD); + vlib_prefetch_buffer_header (b[1], LOAD); + } + + while (n_left > 0) + { + if (n_left > 2) { - ip46_address_set_ip6 ( - &src_ip, - &((ip6_header_t *) vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0]))->src_address); + u8 *p; + vlib_prefetch_buffer_header (b[2], LOAD); + p = vlib_buffer_get_current (b[1]); + CLIB_PREFETCH (p, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES, LOAD); } - const fib_prefix_t *allowed_ip; - bool allowed = false; - - /* - * we could make this into an ACL, but the expectation - * is that there aren't many allowed IPs and thus a linear - * walk is fater than an ACL - */ + bool is_keepalive = false; + message_data_t *data = vlib_buffer_get_current (b[0]); - vec_foreach (allowed_ip, peer->allowed_ips) + if (data->receiver_index != last_rec_idx) { - if (fib_prefix_is_cover_addr_46 (allowed_ip, &src_ip)) - { - allowed = true; - break; - } + peer_idx = + wg_index_table_lookup (&wmp->index_table, data->receiver_index); + + peer = wg_peer_get (*peer_idx); + last_rec_idx = data->receiver_index; } - if (allowed) + + if (PREDICT_FALSE (wg_input_post_process (vm, b[0], next, peer, data, + &is_keepalive) < 0)) + goto trace; + + if (PREDICT_FALSE (peer_idx && (last_peer_time_idx != peer_idx))) { - vnet_buffer (b[0])->sw_if_index[VLIB_RX] = peer->wg_sw_if_index; - data_next[n_data] = - is_ip4_inner ? WG_INPUT_NEXT_IP4_INPUT : WG_INPUT_NEXT_IP6_INPUT; + wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_received_opt (peer, time); + wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal (peer); + last_peer_time_idx = peer_idx; } trace: if (PREDICT_FALSE ((node->flags & VLIB_NODE_FLAG_TRACE) && (b[0]->flags & VLIB_BUFFER_IS_TRACED))) { - wg_input_trace_t *t = vlib_add_trace (vm, node, b[0], sizeof (*t)); - t->type = header_type; - t->current_length = b[0]->current_length; - t->is_keepalive = is_keepalive; + wg_input_post_trace_t *t = + vlib_add_trace (vm, node, b[0], sizeof (*t)); + t->next = next[0]; t->peer = peer_idx ? *peer_idx : INDEX_INVALID; } b += 1; - n_left_from -= 1; - n_data += 1; + next += 1; + n_left -= 1; } - /* enqueue other bufs */ - vlib_buffer_enqueue_to_next (vm, node, other_bi, other_next, n_other); - - /* enqueue data bufs */ - vlib_buffer_enqueue_to_next (vm, node, data_bi, data_nexts, n_data); + vlib_buffer_enqueue_to_next (vm, node, from, nexts, frame->n_vectors); return frame->n_vectors; } VLIB_NODE_FN (wg4_input_node) (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vlib_frame_t *frame) { - return wg_input_inline (vm, node, frame, /* is_ip4 */ 1); + return wg_input_inline (vm, node, frame, /* is_ip4 */ 1, + wg_decrypt_async_next.wg4_post_next); } VLIB_NODE_FN (wg6_input_node) (vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vlib_frame_t *frame) { - return wg_input_inline (vm, node, frame, /* is_ip4 */ 0); + return wg_input_inline (vm, node, frame, /* is_ip4 */ 0, + wg_decrypt_async_next.wg6_post_next); +} + +VLIB_NODE_FN (wg4_input_post_node) +(vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vlib_frame_t *from_frame) +{ + return wg_input_post (vm, node, from_frame); +} + +VLIB_NODE_FN (wg6_input_post_node) +(vlib_main_t *vm, vlib_node_runtime_t *node, vlib_frame_t *from_frame) +{ + return wg_input_post (vm, node, from_frame); } /* *INDENT-OFF* */ @@ -694,6 +997,29 @@ VLIB_REGISTER_NODE (wg6_input_node) = [WG_INPUT_NEXT_ERROR] = "error-drop", }, }; + +VLIB_REGISTER_NODE (wg4_input_post_node) = { + .name = "wg4-input-post-node", + .vector_size = sizeof (u32), + .format_trace = format_wg_input_post_trace, + .type = VLIB_NODE_TYPE_INTERNAL, + .sibling_of = "wg4-input", + + .n_errors = ARRAY_LEN (wg_input_error_strings), + .error_strings = wg_input_error_strings, +}; + +VLIB_REGISTER_NODE (wg6_input_post_node) = { + .name = "wg6-input-post-node", + .vector_size = sizeof (u32), + .format_trace = format_wg_input_post_trace, + .type = VLIB_NODE_TYPE_INTERNAL, + .sibling_of = "wg6-input", + + .n_errors = ARRAY_LEN (wg_input_error_strings), + .error_strings = wg_input_error_strings, +}; + /* *INDENT-ON* */ /* diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c index 6efec28fef8..319be6b7720 100644 --- a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c @@ -544,41 +544,6 @@ chacha20poly1305_calc (vlib_main_t * vm, return (op->status == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_COMPLETED); } -always_inline void -wg_prepare_sync_op (vlib_main_t *vm, vnet_crypto_op_t **crypto_ops, u8 *src, - u32 src_len, u8 *dst, u8 *aad, u32 aad_len, u64 nonce, - vnet_crypto_op_id_t op_id, - vnet_crypto_key_index_t key_index, u32 bi, u8 *iv) -{ - vnet_crypto_op_t _op, *op = &_op; - u8 src_[] = {}; - - clib_memset (iv, 0, 4); - clib_memcpy (iv + 4, &nonce, sizeof (nonce)); - - vec_add2_aligned (crypto_ops[0], op, 1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES); - vnet_crypto_op_init (op, op_id); - - op->tag_len = NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN; - if (op_id == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC) - { - op->tag = src + src_len; - op->flags |= VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_HMAC_CHECK; - } - else - op->tag = dst + src_len; - - op->src = !src ? src_ : src; - op->len = src_len; - - op->dst = dst; - op->key_index = key_index; - op->aad = aad; - op->aad_len = aad_len; - op->iv = iv; - op->user_data = bi; -} - enum noise_state_crypt noise_remote_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t * r_idx, uint64_t * nonce, uint8_t * src, size_t srclen, @@ -629,73 +594,6 @@ error: return ret; } -enum noise_state_crypt -noise_sync_remote_decrypt (vlib_main_t *vm, vnet_crypto_op_t **crypto_ops, - noise_remote_t *r, uint32_t r_idx, uint64_t nonce, - uint8_t *src, size_t srclen, uint8_t *dst, u32 bi, - u8 *iv, f64 time) -{ - noise_keypair_t *kp; - enum noise_state_crypt ret = SC_FAILED; - - if ((kp = wg_get_active_keypair (r, r_idx)) == NULL) - { - goto error; - } - - /* We confirm that our values are within our tolerances. These values - * are the same as the encrypt routine. - * - * kp_ctr isn't locked here, we're happy to accept a racy read. */ - if (wg_birthdate_has_expired_opt (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME, - time) || - kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES) - goto error; - - /* Decrypt, then validate the counter. We don't want to validate the - * counter before decrypting as we do not know the message is authentic - * prior to decryption. */ - wg_prepare_sync_op (vm, crypto_ops, src, srclen, dst, NULL, 0, nonce, - VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC, kp->kp_recv_index, - bi, iv); - - /* If we've received the handshake confirming data packet then move the - * next keypair into current. If we do slide the next keypair in, then - * we skip the REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV check. This is safe to do as a - * data packet can't confirm a session that we are an INITIATOR of. */ - if (kp == r->r_next) - { - clib_rwlock_writer_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock); - if (kp == r->r_next && kp->kp_local_index == r_idx) - { - noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_previous); - r->r_previous = r->r_current; - r->r_current = r->r_next; - r->r_next = NULL; - - ret = SC_CONN_RESET; - clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock); - goto error; - } - clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock); - } - - /* Similar to when we encrypt, we want to notify the caller when we - * are approaching our tolerances. We notify if: - * - we're the initiator and the current keypair is older than - * REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV seconds. */ - ret = SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH; - kp = r->r_current; - if (kp != NULL && kp->kp_valid && kp->kp_is_initiator && - wg_birthdate_has_expired_opt (kp->kp_birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV, - time)) - goto error; - - ret = SC_OK; -error: - return ret; -} - /* Private functions - these should not be called outside this file under any * circumstances. */ static noise_keypair_t * @@ -706,21 +604,6 @@ noise_remote_keypair_allocate (noise_remote_t * r) return kp; } -static void -noise_remote_keypair_free (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, - noise_keypair_t ** kp) -{ - noise_local_t *local = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx); - struct noise_upcall *u = &local->l_upcall; - if (*kp) - { - u->u_index_drop ((*kp)->kp_local_index); - vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_send_index); - vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_recv_index); - clib_mem_free (*kp); - } -} - static uint32_t noise_remote_handshake_index_get (noise_remote_t * r) { diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.h b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.h index 33ac189b0c0..e95211b8884 100644 --- a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.h +++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.h @@ -196,12 +196,6 @@ noise_remote_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t *, uint64_t * nonce, uint8_t * src, size_t srclen, uint8_t * dst); -enum noise_state_crypt -noise_sync_remote_decrypt (vlib_main_t *vm, vnet_crypto_op_t **crypto_ops, - noise_remote_t *, uint32_t r_idx, uint64_t nonce, - uint8_t *src, size_t srclen, uint8_t *dst, u32 bi, - u8 *iv, f64 time); - static_always_inline noise_keypair_t * wg_get_active_keypair (noise_remote_t *r, uint32_t r_idx) { @@ -264,6 +258,21 @@ error: return ret; } +static_always_inline void +noise_remote_keypair_free (vlib_main_t *vm, noise_remote_t *r, + noise_keypair_t **kp) +{ + noise_local_t *local = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx); + struct noise_upcall *u = &local->l_upcall; + if (*kp) + { + u->u_index_drop ((*kp)->kp_local_index); + vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_send_index); + vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_recv_index); + clib_mem_free (*kp); + } +} + #endif /* __included_wg_noise_h__ */ /* |