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-rw-r--r--src/vnet/ipsec/ah_decrypt.c7
-rw-r--r--src/vnet/ipsec/esp_decrypt.c29
-rw-r--r--test/template_ipsec.py15
3 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/ah_decrypt.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/ah_decrypt.c
index bc6b5c4ec9d..bbe6b647c52 100644
--- a/src/vnet/ipsec/ah_decrypt.c
+++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/ah_decrypt.c
@@ -303,6 +303,13 @@ ah_decrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm,
if (PREDICT_TRUE (sa0->integ_alg != IPSEC_INTEG_ALG_NONE))
{
+ /* redo the anit-reply check. see esp_decrypt for details */
+ if (ipsec_sa_anti_replay_check (sa0, pd->seq))
+ {
+ b[0]->error = node->errors[AH_DECRYPT_ERROR_REPLAY];
+ next[0] = AH_DECRYPT_NEXT_DROP;
+ goto trace;
+ }
ipsec_sa_anti_replay_advance (sa0, pd->seq);
}
diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_decrypt.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_decrypt.c
index c2b9bf4dc0c..986ac94676c 100644
--- a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_decrypt.c
+++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_decrypt.c
@@ -376,6 +376,35 @@ esp_decrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm,
sa0 = vec_elt_at_index (im->sad, pd->sa_index);
+ /*
+ * redo the anti-reply check
+ * in this frame say we have sequence numbers, s, s+1, s+1, s+1
+ * and s and s+1 are in the window. When we did the anti-replay
+ * check above we did so against the state of the window (W),
+ * after packet s-1. So each of the packets in the sequence will be
+ * accepted.
+ * This time s will be cheked against Ws-1, s+1 chceked against Ws
+ * (i.e. the window state is updated/advnaced)
+ * so this time the successive s+! packet will be dropped.
+ * This is a consequence of batching the decrypts. If the
+ * check-dcrypt-advance process was done for each packet it would
+ * be fine. But we batch the decrypts because it's much more efficient
+ * to do so in SW and if we offload to HW and the process is async.
+ *
+ * You're probably thinking, but this means an attacker can send the
+ * above sequence and cause VPP to perform decrpyts that will fail,
+ * and that's true. But if the attacker can determine s (a valid
+ * sequence number in the window) which is non-trivial, it can generate
+ * a sequence s, s+1, s+2, s+3, ... s+n and nothing will prevent any
+ * implementation, sequential or batching, from decrypting these.
+ */
+ if (ipsec_sa_anti_replay_check (sa0, pd->seq))
+ {
+ b[0]->error = node->errors[ESP_DECRYPT_ERROR_REPLAY];
+ next[0] = ESP_DECRYPT_NEXT_DROP;
+ goto trace;
+ }
+
ipsec_sa_anti_replay_advance (sa0, pd->seq);
esp_footer_t *f = (esp_footer_t *) (b[0]->data + pd->current_data +
diff --git a/test/template_ipsec.py b/test/template_ipsec.py
index 773531fe038..c3fc8bd434f 100644
--- a/test/template_ipsec.py
+++ b/test/template_ipsec.py
@@ -318,6 +318,21 @@ class IpsecTra4(object):
self.assert_error_counter_equal(replay_node_name, replay_count)
#
+ # now send a batch of packets all with the same sequence number
+ # the first packet in the batch is legitimate, the rest bogus
+ #
+ pkts = (Ether(src=self.tra_if.remote_mac,
+ dst=self.tra_if.local_mac) /
+ p.scapy_tra_sa.encrypt(IP(src=self.tra_if.remote_ip4,
+ dst=self.tra_if.local_ip4) /
+ ICMP(),
+ seq_num=35))
+ recv_pkts = self.send_and_expect(self.tra_if, pkts * 8,
+ self.tra_if, n_rx=1)
+ replay_count += 7
+ self.assert_error_counter_equal(replay_node_name, replay_count)
+
+ #
# now move the window over to 257 (more than one byte) and into Case A
#
pkt = (Ether(src=self.tra_if.remote_mac,