diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c | 135 |
1 files changed, 124 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c index ca56158f898..32e687e37c0 100644 --- a/src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c +++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/ikev2_crypto.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <openssl/x509.h> #include <openssl/pem.h> #include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> /* from RFC7296 */ static const char modp_dh_768_prime[] = @@ -255,17 +256,27 @@ static const char modp_dh_2048_256_generator[] = v8 * ikev2_calc_prf (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, v8 * data) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + HMAC_CTX *ctx; +#else HMAC_CTX ctx; +#endif v8 *prf; unsigned int len = 0; prf = vec_new (u8, tr->key_trunc); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + ctx = HMAC_CTX_new (); + HMAC_Init_ex (ctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL); + HMAC_Update (ctx, data, vec_len (data)); + HMAC_Final (ctx, prf, &len); +#else HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx); HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL); HMAC_Update (&ctx, data, vec_len (data)); HMAC_Final (&ctx, prf, &len); HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); - +#endif ASSERT (len == tr->key_trunc); return prf; @@ -317,7 +328,11 @@ v8 * ikev2_calc_integr (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, u8 * data, int len) { v8 *r; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + HMAC_CTX *hctx; +#else HMAC_CTX hctx; +#endif unsigned int l; ASSERT (tr->type == IKEV2_TRANSFORM_TYPE_INTEG); @@ -325,11 +340,18 @@ ikev2_calc_integr (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, u8 * data, int len) r = vec_new (u8, tr->key_len); /* verify integrity of data */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + hctx = HMAC_CTX_new (); + HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL); + HMAC_Update (hctx, (const u8 *) data, len); + HMAC_Final (hctx, r, &l); +#else HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); - HMAC_Init (&hctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md); + HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL); HMAC_Update (&hctx, (const u8 *) data, len); HMAC_Final (&hctx, r, &l); HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); +#endif ASSERT (l == tr->key_len); @@ -339,7 +361,11 @@ ikev2_calc_integr (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, u8 * data, int len) v8 * ikev2_decrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, u8 * data, int len) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; +#else EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; +#endif v8 *r; int out_len = 0, block_size; ikev2_sa_transform_t *tr_encr; @@ -356,23 +382,40 @@ ikev2_decrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, u8 * data, int len) return 0; } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new (); +#else EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&ctx); +#endif + r = vec_new (u8, len - block_size); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_DecryptInit_ex (ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, data); + EVP_DecryptUpdate (ctx, r, &out_len, data + block_size, len - block_size); + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (ctx, r + out_len, &out_len); +#else EVP_DecryptInit_ex (&ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, data); EVP_DecryptUpdate (&ctx, r, &out_len, data + block_size, len - block_size); EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (&ctx, r + out_len, &out_len); - +#endif /* remove padding */ _vec_len (r) -= r[vec_len (r) - 1] + 1; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); +#endif return r; } int ikev2_encrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, v8 * src, u8 * dst) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; +#else EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; +#endif int out_len; int bs; ikev2_sa_transform_t *tr_encr; @@ -385,12 +428,16 @@ ikev2_encrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, v8 * src, u8 * dst) /* generate IV */ RAND_bytes (dst, bs); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new (); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex (ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, dst /* dst */ ); + EVP_EncryptUpdate (ctx, dst + bs, &out_len, src, vec_len (src)); +#else EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&ctx); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex (&ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, dst /* dst */ ); EVP_EncryptUpdate (&ctx, dst + bs, &out_len, src, vec_len (src)); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); +#endif ASSERT (vec_len (src) == out_len); @@ -401,30 +448,54 @@ void ikev2_generate_dh (ikev2_sa_t * sa, ikev2_sa_transform_t * t) { int r; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + BIGNUM *p = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *q = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *g = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *pub_key = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new (); +#endif if (t->dh_group == IKEV2_DH_GROUP_MODP) { DH *dh = DH_new (); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + BN_hex2bn (&p, t->dh_p); + BN_hex2bn (&g, t->dh_g); + DH_set0_pqg (dh, p, q, g); +#else BN_hex2bn (&dh->p, t->dh_p); BN_hex2bn (&dh->g, t->dh_g); +#endif DH_generate_key (dh); if (sa->is_initiator) { sa->i_dh_data = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); + sa->dh_private_key = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + r = BN_bn2bin (pub_key, sa->i_dh_data); + ASSERT (r == t->key_len); + r = BN_bn2bin (priv_key, sa->dh_private_key); + DH_set0_key (dh, pub_key, priv_key); +#else r = BN_bn2bin (dh->pub_key, sa->i_dh_data); ASSERT (r == t->key_len); - - sa->dh_private_key = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); r = BN_bn2bin (dh->priv_key, sa->dh_private_key); ASSERT (r == t->key_len); - +#endif } else { sa->r_dh_data = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + r = BN_bn2bin (pub_key, sa->i_dh_data); + ASSERT (r == t->key_len); + DH_set0_key (dh, pub_key, NULL); +#else r = BN_bn2bin (dh->pub_key, sa->r_dh_data); ASSERT (r == t->key_len); +#endif BIGNUM *ex; sa->dh_shared_key = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); ex = BN_bin2bn (sa->i_dh_data, vec_len (sa->i_dh_data), NULL); @@ -509,15 +580,31 @@ void ikev2_complete_dh (ikev2_sa_t * sa, ikev2_sa_transform_t * t) { int r; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + BIGNUM *p = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *q = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *g = BN_new (); + BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new (); +#endif if (t->dh_group == IKEV2_DH_GROUP_MODP) { DH *dh = DH_new (); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + BN_hex2bn (&p, t->dh_p); + BN_hex2bn (&g, t->dh_g); + DH_set0_pqg (dh, p, q, g); + + priv_key = + BN_bin2bn (sa->dh_private_key, vec_len (sa->dh_private_key), NULL); + DH_set0_key (dh, NULL, priv_key); +#else BN_hex2bn (&dh->p, t->dh_p); BN_hex2bn (&dh->g, t->dh_g); + dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn (sa->dh_private_key, vec_len (sa->dh_private_key), NULL); - +#endif BIGNUM *ex; sa->dh_shared_key = vec_new (u8, t->key_len); ex = BN_bin2bn (sa->r_dh_data, vec_len (sa->r_dh_data), NULL); @@ -582,21 +669,47 @@ ikev2_complete_dh (ikev2_sa_t * sa, ikev2_sa_transform_t * t) int ikev2_verify_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * sigbuf, u8 * data) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new (); +#else EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; +#endif - EVP_VerifyInit (&md_ctx, EVP_sha1 ()); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_VerifyInit (md_ctx, EVP_sha1 ()); + EVP_VerifyUpdate (md_ctx, data, vec_len (data)); +#else + EVP_VerifyInit_ex (&md_ctx, EVP_sha1 (), NULL); EVP_VerifyUpdate (&md_ctx, data, vec_len (data)); +#endif +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + return EVP_VerifyFinal (md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey); +#else return EVP_VerifyFinal (&md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey); +#endif } u8 * ikev2_calc_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * data) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new (); +#else EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; +#endif unsigned int sig_len = 0; u8 *sign; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + EVP_SignInit (md_ctx, EVP_sha1 ()); + EVP_SignUpdate (md_ctx, data, vec_len (data)); + /* get sign len */ + EVP_SignFinal (md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len, pkey); + sign = vec_new (u8, sig_len); + /* calc sign */ + EVP_SignFinal (md_ctx, sign, &sig_len, pkey); +#else EVP_SignInit (&md_ctx, EVP_sha1 ()); EVP_SignUpdate (&md_ctx, data, vec_len (data)); /* get sign len */ @@ -604,7 +717,7 @@ ikev2_calc_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * data) sign = vec_new (u8, sig_len); /* calc sign */ EVP_SignFinal (&md_ctx, sign, &sig_len, pkey); - +#endif return sign; } |