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-rwxr-xr-xsrc/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c985
1 files changed, 985 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c
new file mode 100755
index 00000000000..666618a2a51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/plugins/wireguard/wireguard_noise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,985 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Doc.ai and/or its affiliates.
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020 Matt Dunwoodie <ncon@noconroy.net>.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at:
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <wireguard/wireguard.h>
+
+/* This implements Noise_IKpsk2:
+ *
+ * <- s
+ * ******
+ * -> e, es, s, ss, {t}
+ * <- e, ee, se, psk, {}
+ */
+
+/* Private functions */
+static noise_keypair_t *noise_remote_keypair_allocate (noise_remote_t *);
+static void noise_remote_keypair_free (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t *,
+ noise_keypair_t **);
+static uint32_t noise_remote_handshake_index_get (noise_remote_t *);
+static void noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (noise_remote_t *);
+
+static uint64_t noise_counter_send (noise_counter_t *);
+static bool noise_counter_recv (noise_counter_t *, uint64_t);
+
+static void noise_kdf (uint8_t *, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, const uint8_t *,
+ size_t, size_t, size_t, size_t,
+ const uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
+static bool noise_mix_dh (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
+static bool noise_mix_ss (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t ss[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
+static void noise_mix_hash (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t *, size_t);
+static void noise_mix_psk (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]);
+static void noise_param_init (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
+
+static void noise_msg_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
+ uint32_t key_idx, uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
+static bool noise_msg_decrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
+ uint32_t key_idx, uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
+static void noise_msg_ephemeral (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ const uint8_t src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
+
+static void noise_tai64n_now (uint8_t[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]);
+
+static void secure_zero_memory (void *v, size_t n);
+
+/* Set/Get noise parameters */
+void
+noise_local_init (noise_local_t * l, struct noise_upcall *upcall)
+{
+ clib_memset (l, 0, sizeof (*l));
+ l->l_upcall = *upcall;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_local_set_private (noise_local_t * l,
+ const uint8_t private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ clib_memcpy (l->l_private, private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ l->l_has_identity = curve25519_gen_public (l->l_public, private);
+
+ return l->l_has_identity;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_local_keys (noise_local_t * l, uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ if (l->l_has_identity)
+ {
+ if (public != NULL)
+ clib_memcpy (public, l->l_public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ if (private != NULL)
+ clib_memcpy (private, l->l_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+void
+noise_remote_init (noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t peer_pool_idx,
+ const uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ noise_local_t * l)
+{
+ clib_memset (r, 0, sizeof (*r));
+ clib_memcpy (r->r_public, public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ r->r_peer_idx = peer_pool_idx;
+
+ ASSERT (l != NULL);
+ r->r_local = l;
+ r->r_handshake.hs_state = HS_ZEROED;
+ noise_remote_precompute (r);
+}
+
+bool
+noise_remote_set_psk (noise_remote_t * r,
+ uint8_t psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ int same;
+ same = !clib_memcmp (r->r_psk, psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ if (!same)
+ {
+ clib_memcpy (r->r_psk, psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ }
+ return same == 0;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_remote_keys (noise_remote_t * r, uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ static uint8_t null_psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (public != NULL)
+ clib_memcpy (public, r->r_public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+ if (psk != NULL)
+ clib_memcpy (psk, r->r_psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ ret = clib_memcmp (r->r_psk, null_psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+noise_remote_precompute (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_local_t *l = r->r_local;
+ if (!l->l_has_identity)
+ clib_memset (r->r_ss, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ else if (!curve25519_gen_shared (r->r_ss, l->l_private, r->r_public))
+ clib_memset (r->r_ss, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+ noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
+ secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
+}
+
+/* Handshake functions */
+bool
+noise_create_initiation (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r,
+ uint32_t * s_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t es[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN],
+ uint8_t ets[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
+{
+ noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
+ noise_local_t *l = r->r_local;
+ uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint32_t key_idx;
+ uint8_t *key;
+ int ret = false;
+
+ key_idx =
+ vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
+
+ if (!l->l_has_identity)
+ goto error;
+ noise_param_init (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, r->r_public);
+
+ /* e */
+ curve25519_gen_secret (hs->hs_e);
+ if (!curve25519_gen_public (ue, hs->hs_e))
+ goto error;
+ noise_msg_ephemeral (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, ue);
+
+ /* es */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, key, hs->hs_e, r->r_public))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* s */
+ noise_msg_encrypt (vm, es, l->l_public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key_idx,
+ hs->hs_hash);
+
+ /* ss */
+ if (!noise_mix_ss (hs->hs_ck, key, r->r_ss))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* {t} */
+ noise_tai64n_now (ets);
+ noise_msg_encrypt (vm, ets, ets, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key_idx, hs->hs_hash);
+ noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
+ hs->hs_state = CREATED_INITIATION;
+ hs->hs_local_index = noise_remote_handshake_index_get (r);
+ *s_idx = hs->hs_local_index;
+ ret = true;
+error:
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
+ secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_consume_initiation (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_local_t * l,
+ noise_remote_t ** rp, uint32_t s_idx,
+ uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t es[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN +
+ NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN],
+ uint8_t ets[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN +
+ NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
+{
+ noise_remote_t *r;
+ noise_handshake_t hs;
+ uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t r_public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN];
+ u32 key_idx;
+ uint8_t *key;
+ int ret = false;
+
+ key_idx =
+ vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
+
+ if (!l->l_has_identity)
+ goto error;
+ noise_param_init (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, l->l_public);
+
+ /* e */
+ noise_msg_ephemeral (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, ue);
+
+ /* es */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, key, l->l_private, ue))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* s */
+
+ if (!noise_msg_decrypt (vm, r_public, es,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx,
+ hs.hs_hash))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Lookup the remote we received from */
+ if ((r = l->l_upcall.u_remote_get (r_public)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* ss */
+ if (!noise_mix_ss (hs.hs_ck, key, r->r_ss))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* {t} */
+ if (!noise_msg_decrypt (vm, timestamp, ets,
+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx,
+ hs.hs_hash))
+ goto error;
+ ;
+
+ hs.hs_state = CONSUMED_INITIATION;
+ hs.hs_local_index = 0;
+ hs.hs_remote_index = s_idx;
+ clib_memcpy (hs.hs_e, ue, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+ /* Replay */
+ if (clib_memcmp (timestamp, r->r_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) > 0)
+ clib_memcpy (r->r_timestamp, timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
+ else
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Flood attack */
+ if (wg_birthdate_has_expired (r->r_last_init, REJECT_INTERVAL))
+ r->r_last_init = vlib_time_now (vm);
+ else
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Ok, we're happy to accept this initiation now */
+ noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
+ r->r_handshake = hs;
+ *rp = r;
+ ret = true;
+error:
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
+ secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ secure_zero_memory (&hs, sizeof (hs));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_create_response (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t * s_idx,
+ uint32_t * r_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t en[0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
+{
+ noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
+ uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint32_t key_idx;
+ uint8_t *key;
+ int ret = false;
+
+ key_idx =
+ vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
+
+ if (hs->hs_state != CONSUMED_INITIATION)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* e */
+ curve25519_gen_secret (e);
+ if (!curve25519_gen_public (ue, e))
+ goto error;
+ noise_msg_ephemeral (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, ue);
+
+ /* ee */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, NULL, e, hs->hs_e))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* se */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, NULL, e, r->r_public))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* psk */
+ noise_mix_psk (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, key, r->r_psk);
+
+ /* {} */
+ noise_msg_encrypt (vm, en, NULL, 0, key_idx, hs->hs_hash);
+
+
+ hs->hs_state = CREATED_RESPONSE;
+ hs->hs_local_index = noise_remote_handshake_index_get (r);
+ *r_idx = hs->hs_remote_index;
+ *s_idx = hs->hs_local_index;
+ ret = true;
+error:
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
+ secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ secure_zero_memory (e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_consume_response (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t s_idx,
+ uint32_t r_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ uint8_t en[0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
+{
+ noise_local_t *l = r->r_local;
+ noise_handshake_t hs;
+ uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t preshared_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint32_t key_idx;
+ uint8_t *key;
+ int ret = false;
+
+ key_idx =
+ vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
+
+ if (!l->l_has_identity)
+ goto error;
+
+ hs = r->r_handshake;
+ clib_memcpy (preshared_key, r->r_psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+ if (hs.hs_state != CREATED_INITIATION || hs.hs_local_index != r_idx)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* e */
+ noise_msg_ephemeral (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, ue);
+
+ /* ee */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, NULL, hs.hs_e, ue))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* se */
+ if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, NULL, l->l_private, ue))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* psk */
+ noise_mix_psk (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, key, preshared_key);
+
+ /* {} */
+
+ if (!noise_msg_decrypt
+ (vm, NULL, en, 0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx, hs.hs_hash))
+ goto error;
+
+
+ hs.hs_remote_index = s_idx;
+
+ if (r->r_handshake.hs_state == hs.hs_state &&
+ r->r_handshake.hs_local_index == hs.hs_local_index)
+ {
+ r->r_handshake = hs;
+ r->r_handshake.hs_state = CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
+ ret = true;
+ }
+error:
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
+ secure_zero_memory (&hs, sizeof (hs));
+ secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_remote_begin_session (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
+ noise_keypair_t kp, *next, *current, *previous;
+
+ uint8_t key_send[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t key_recv[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+
+ /* We now derive the keypair from the handshake */
+ if (hs->hs_state == CONSUMED_RESPONSE)
+ {
+ kp.kp_is_initiator = 1;
+ noise_kdf (key_send, key_recv, NULL, NULL,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
+ hs->hs_ck);
+ }
+ else if (hs->hs_state == CREATED_RESPONSE)
+ {
+ kp.kp_is_initiator = 0;
+ noise_kdf (key_recv, key_send, NULL, NULL,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
+ hs->hs_ck);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ kp.kp_valid = 1;
+ kp.kp_send_index = vnet_crypto_key_add (vm,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+ key_send, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ kp.kp_recv_index = vnet_crypto_key_add (vm,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+ key_recv, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ kp.kp_local_index = hs->hs_local_index;
+ kp.kp_remote_index = hs->hs_remote_index;
+ kp.kp_birthdate = vlib_time_now (vm);
+ clib_memset (&kp.kp_ctr, 0, sizeof (kp.kp_ctr));
+
+ /* Now we need to add_new_keypair */
+ next = r->r_next;
+ current = r->r_current;
+ previous = r->r_previous;
+
+ if (kp.kp_is_initiator)
+ {
+ if (next != NULL)
+ {
+ r->r_next = NULL;
+ r->r_previous = next;
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &current);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ r->r_previous = current;
+ }
+
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &previous);
+
+ r->r_current = noise_remote_keypair_allocate (r);
+ *r->r_current = kp;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &next);
+ r->r_previous = NULL;
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &previous);
+
+ r->r_next = noise_remote_keypair_allocate (r);
+ *r->r_next = kp;
+ }
+ secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
+ secure_zero_memory (&kp, sizeof (kp));
+ return true;
+}
+
+void
+noise_remote_clear (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
+ secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
+
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_next);
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_current);
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_previous);
+ r->r_next = NULL;
+ r->r_current = NULL;
+ r->r_previous = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+noise_remote_expire_current (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ if (r->r_next != NULL)
+ r->r_next->kp_valid = 0;
+ if (r->r_current != NULL)
+ r->r_current->kp_valid = 0;
+}
+
+bool
+noise_remote_ready (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_keypair_t *kp;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((kp = r->r_current) == NULL ||
+ !kp->kp_valid ||
+ wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
+ kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
+ kp->kp_ctr.c_send >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)
+ ret = false;
+ else
+ ret = true;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+chacha20poly1305_calc (vlib_main_t * vm,
+ u8 * src,
+ u32 src_len,
+ u8 * dst,
+ u8 * aad,
+ u32 aad_len,
+ u64 nonce,
+ vnet_crypto_op_id_t op_id,
+ vnet_crypto_key_index_t key_index)
+{
+ u8 iv[12];
+ clib_memset (iv, 0, 12);
+ clib_memcpy (iv + 4, &nonce, sizeof (nonce));
+
+ vnet_crypto_op_t _op, *op = &_op;
+
+ u8 _tag[16] = { };
+ if (op_id == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC)
+ {
+ clib_memcpy (_tag, src + src_len - NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN,
+ NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN);
+ src_len -= NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN;
+ }
+ vnet_crypto_op_init (op, op_id);
+ op->key_index = key_index;
+ op->src = src;
+ op->dst = dst;
+ op->len = src_len;
+ op->aad = aad;
+ op->aad_len = aad_len;
+ op->iv = iv;
+ op->tag_len = NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN;
+ op->tag = _tag;
+ vnet_crypto_process_ops (vm, op, 1);
+ if (op_id == VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC)
+ {
+ clib_memcpy (dst + src_len, op->tag, NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN);
+ }
+}
+
+enum noise_state_crypt
+noise_remote_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t * r_idx,
+ uint64_t * nonce, uint8_t * src, size_t srclen,
+ uint8_t * dst)
+{
+ noise_keypair_t *kp;
+ enum noise_state_crypt ret = SC_FAILED;
+
+ if ((kp = r->r_current) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* We confirm that our values are within our tolerances. We want:
+ * - a valid keypair
+ * - our keypair to be less than REJECT_AFTER_TIME seconds old
+ * - our receive counter to be less than REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES
+ * - our send counter to be less than REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES
+ */
+ if (!kp->kp_valid ||
+ wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
+ kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
+ ((*nonce = noise_counter_send (&kp->kp_ctr)) > REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* We encrypt into the same buffer, so the caller must ensure that buf
+ * has NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN bytes to store the MAC. The nonce and index
+ * are passed back out to the caller through the provided data pointer. */
+ *r_idx = kp->kp_remote_index;
+
+ chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, srclen, dst, NULL, 0, *nonce,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC,
+ kp->kp_send_index);
+
+ /* If our values are still within tolerances, but we are approaching
+ * the tolerances, we notify the caller with ESTALE that they should
+ * establish a new keypair. The current keypair can continue to be used
+ * until the tolerances are hit. We notify if:
+ * - our send counter is valid and not less than REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES
+ * - we're the initiator and our keypair is older than
+ * REKEY_AFTER_TIME seconds */
+ ret = SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH;
+ if ((kp->kp_valid && *nonce >= REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) ||
+ (kp->kp_is_initiator &&
+ wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME)))
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = SC_OK;
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum noise_state_crypt
+noise_remote_decrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t r_idx,
+ uint64_t nonce, uint8_t * src, size_t srclen,
+ uint8_t * dst)
+{
+ noise_keypair_t *kp;
+ enum noise_state_crypt ret = SC_FAILED;
+
+ if (r->r_current != NULL && r->r_current->kp_local_index == r_idx)
+ {
+ kp = r->r_current;
+ }
+ else if (r->r_previous != NULL && r->r_previous->kp_local_index == r_idx)
+ {
+ kp = r->r_previous;
+ }
+ else if (r->r_next != NULL && r->r_next->kp_local_index == r_idx)
+ {
+ kp = r->r_next;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* We confirm that our values are within our tolerances. These values
+ * are the same as the encrypt routine.
+ *
+ * kp_ctr isn't locked here, we're happy to accept a racy read. */
+ if (wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
+ kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Decrypt, then validate the counter. We don't want to validate the
+ * counter before decrypting as we do not know the message is authentic
+ * prior to decryption. */
+ chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, srclen, dst, NULL, 0, nonce,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC,
+ kp->kp_recv_index);
+
+ if (!noise_counter_recv (&kp->kp_ctr, nonce))
+ goto error;
+
+ /* If we've received the handshake confirming data packet then move the
+ * next keypair into current. If we do slide the next keypair in, then
+ * we skip the REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV check. This is safe to do as a
+ * data packet can't confirm a session that we are an INITIATOR of. */
+ if (kp == r->r_next && kp->kp_local_index == r_idx)
+ {
+ noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_previous);
+ r->r_previous = r->r_current;
+ r->r_current = r->r_next;
+ r->r_next = NULL;
+
+ ret = SC_CONN_RESET;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+
+ /* Similar to when we encrypt, we want to notify the caller when we
+ * are approaching our tolerances. We notify if:
+ * - we're the initiator and the current keypair is older than
+ * REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV seconds. */
+ ret = SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH;
+ kp = r->r_current;
+ if (kp != NULL &&
+ kp->kp_valid &&
+ kp->kp_is_initiator &&
+ wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RECV))
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = SC_OK;
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Private functions - these should not be called outside this file under any
+ * circumstances. */
+static noise_keypair_t *
+noise_remote_keypair_allocate (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_keypair_t *kp;
+ kp = clib_mem_alloc (sizeof (*kp));
+ return kp;
+}
+
+static void
+noise_remote_keypair_free (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r,
+ noise_keypair_t ** kp)
+{
+ struct noise_upcall *u = &r->r_local->l_upcall;
+ if (*kp)
+ {
+ u->u_index_drop ((*kp)->kp_local_index);
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_send_index);
+ vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, (*kp)->kp_recv_index);
+ clib_mem_free (*kp);
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+noise_remote_handshake_index_get (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ struct noise_upcall *u = &r->r_local->l_upcall;
+ return u->u_index_set (r);
+}
+
+static void
+noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (noise_remote_t * r)
+{
+ noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
+ struct noise_upcall *u = &r->r_local->l_upcall;
+ if (hs->hs_state != HS_ZEROED)
+ u->u_index_drop (hs->hs_local_index);
+}
+
+static uint64_t
+noise_counter_send (noise_counter_t * ctr)
+{
+ uint64_t ret = ctr->c_send++;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static bool
+noise_counter_recv (noise_counter_t * ctr, uint64_t recv)
+{
+ uint64_t i, top, index_recv, index_ctr;
+ unsigned long bit;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+
+ /* Check that the recv counter is valid */
+ if (ctr->c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES || recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* If the packet is out of the window, invalid */
+ if (recv + COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE < ctr->c_recv)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* If the new counter is ahead of the current counter, we'll need to
+ * zero out the bitmap that has previously been used */
+ index_recv = recv / COUNTER_BITS;
+ index_ctr = ctr->c_recv / COUNTER_BITS;
+
+ if (recv > ctr->c_recv)
+ {
+ top = clib_min (index_recv - index_ctr, COUNTER_NUM);
+ for (i = 1; i <= top; i++)
+ ctr->c_backtrack[(i + index_ctr) & (COUNTER_NUM - 1)] = 0;
+ ctr->c_recv = recv;
+ }
+
+ index_recv %= COUNTER_NUM;
+ bit = 1ul << (recv % COUNTER_BITS);
+
+ if (ctr->c_backtrack[index_recv] & bit)
+ goto error;
+
+ ctr->c_backtrack[index_recv] |= bit;
+
+ ret = true;
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+noise_kdf (uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, uint8_t * c, const uint8_t * x,
+ size_t a_len, size_t b_len, size_t c_len, size_t x_len,
+ const uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+{
+ uint8_t out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1];
+ uint8_t sec[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+
+ /* Extract entropy from "x" into sec */
+ u32 l = 0;
+ HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN, x, x_len, sec, &l);
+ ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ if (a == NULL || a_len == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Expand first key: key = sec, data = 0x1 */
+ out[0] = 1;
+ HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, 1, out, &l);
+ ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ clib_memcpy (a, out, a_len);
+
+ if (b == NULL || b_len == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Expand second key: key = sec, data = "a" || 0x2 */
+ out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
+ HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+ out, &l);
+ ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ clib_memcpy (b, out, b_len);
+
+ if (c == NULL || c_len == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Expand third key: key = sec, data = "b" || 0x3 */
+ out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
+ HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+ out, &l);
+ ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ clib_memcpy (c, out, c_len);
+
+out:
+ /* Clear sensitive data from stack */
+ secure_zero_memory (sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ secure_zero_memory (out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1);
+}
+
+static bool
+noise_mix_dh (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ uint8_t dh[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ if (!curve25519_gen_shared (dh, private, public))
+ return false;
+ noise_kdf (ck, key, NULL, dh,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
+ ck);
+ secure_zero_memory (dh, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool
+noise_mix_ss (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t ss[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ static uint8_t null_point[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ if (clib_memcmp (ss, null_point, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) == 0)
+ return false;
+ noise_kdf (ck, key, NULL, ss,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
+ ck);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void
+noise_mix_hash (uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t * src,
+ size_t src_len)
+{
+ blake2s_state_t blake;
+
+ blake2s_init (&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_update (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_update (&blake, src, src_len);
+ blake2s_final (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+}
+
+static void
+noise_mix_psk (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const uint8_t psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
+
+ noise_kdf (ck, tmp, key, psk,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, ck);
+ noise_mix_hash (hash, tmp, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ secure_zero_memory (tmp, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+}
+
+static void
+noise_param_init (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ const uint8_t s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ blake2s_state_t blake;
+
+ blake2s (ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN, (uint8_t *) NOISE_HANDSHAKE_NAME,
+ strlen (NOISE_HANDSHAKE_NAME), NULL, 0);
+
+ blake2s_init (&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_update (&blake, ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_update (&blake, (uint8_t *) NOISE_IDENTIFIER_NAME,
+ strlen (NOISE_IDENTIFIER_NAME));
+ blake2s_final (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+
+ noise_mix_hash (hash, s, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+}
+
+static void
+noise_msg_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t * dst, uint8_t * src,
+ size_t src_len, uint32_t key_idx,
+ uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+{
+ /* Nonce always zero for Noise_IK */
+ chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, src_len, dst, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC, key_idx);
+ noise_mix_hash (hash, dst, src_len + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN);
+}
+
+static bool
+noise_msg_decrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t * dst, uint8_t * src,
+ size_t src_len, uint32_t key_idx,
+ uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+{
+ /* Nonce always zero for Noise_IK */
+ chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, src_len, dst, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0,
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC, key_idx);
+ noise_mix_hash (hash, src, src_len);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void
+noise_msg_ephemeral (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ const uint8_t src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ noise_mix_hash (hash, src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ noise_kdf (ck, NULL, NULL, src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ck);
+}
+
+static void
+noise_tai64n_now (uint8_t output[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN])
+{
+ uint32_t unix_sec;
+ uint32_t unix_nanosec;
+
+ uint64_t sec;
+ uint32_t nsec;
+
+ unix_time_now_nsec_fraction (&unix_sec, &unix_nanosec);
+
+ /* Round down the nsec counter to limit precise timing leak. */
+ unix_nanosec &= REJECT_INTERVAL_MASK;
+
+ /* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */
+ sec = htobe64 (0x400000000000000aULL + unix_sec);
+ nsec = htobe32 (unix_nanosec);
+
+ /* memcpy to output buffer, assuming output could be unaligned. */
+ clib_memcpy (output, &sec, sizeof (sec));
+ clib_memcpy (output + sizeof (sec), &nsec, sizeof (nsec));
+}
+
+static void
+secure_zero_memory (void *v, size_t n)
+{
+ static void *(*const volatile memset_v) (void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
+ memset_v (v, 0, n);
+}
+
+/*
+ * fd.io coding-style-patch-verification: ON
+ *
+ * Local Variables:
+ * eval: (c-set-style "gnu")
+ * End:
+ */